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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Anna Miromanova
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2020
Title: Essays in International Trade and Russian Trade Policy
In this dissertation I investigate the evolution of the current Russian foreign
trade policy from trade liberalization following the accession to the World Trade
Organization in 2012 to protectionism in the form of the retaliatory embargo
in 2014. I focus on estimating the effects of each individual policy on Russian
international trade, as well as the interconnection of these two opposing policies
as parts of a broader strategy. First, I undertake an empirical analysis to estimate
the impact of the embargo on Russian aggregate foreign trade. I find that the
embargo was not fully effective in shutting down the imports of embargoed goods
from the sanctioning countries. Next, I use a triple difference estimation strategy
to identify the effect of the retaliatory embargo on the extensive and intensive
margins of firm-level trade. I find an increase in the exit rate of Russian firms
iv
importing goods targeted by the embargo from the sanctioning countries, with the
larger firms switching to trading with non-sanctioning countries (extensive margin
effects). Intriguingly, not all firms cut their trade relations with the sanctioning
countries, which suggests that the embargo was not fully enforced. I find no
evidence of unintended consequences of the embargo on the imports of other
product categories. Taken together, Russia has been able to mitigate some but not
all the costs to trade resulting from the self-imposed embargo. Finally, I analyze
the impact of Russia’s accession to the WTO on firm-level foreign trade dynamics.
Russia’s accession to the WTO had positive effects on Russian exporters and
importers along several margins, including an increase in the number of partner
countries for exporters and importers, and a significant increase in the number of
imported products. The evidence of the effects of the WTO membership on the
average export and import flows of firms is mixed. Additionally, I find evidence
in support of the claim that the retaliatory embargo could have been conceived as
a protectionist impulse to shield Russian producers in vulnerable industries (e.g.,
agriculture) from the increased competition following the accession to the WTO,
rather than a purely retaliation instrument to the sanctions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The current Russian trade policy is quite conflicting - after Russia
underwent a significant trade liberalization episode by joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2012, it rolled back straight to protectionism by imposing
an agricultural embargo in response to the economic sanctions imposed on Russia
in 2014. In this dissertation I analyze the impacts of each individual trade policy
on Russia’s foreign trade, and investigate how these two seemingly opposing
policies fit together as parts of a broader strategy.
Large economies bound together over the past few decades by globalization
are turning on each other. Trade wars and protectionist policies are gaining
support among increasing portions of population in developed countries. Recent
cases of tariff wars between the US and China, the UK’s desire to leave the
customs union with the other European countries, and the never-ending stream of
sanctions and counter-sanctions between Russia and the OECD countries illustrate
how trade policies are used to further the political agendas of large economies.
What will happen if this trend continues? What happens if large countries, whose
economies heavily rely on each other, initiate embargoes or trade wars? In my
dissertation I analyze how embargoes and sanctions impact a large economy,
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Russia, and provide several general predictions about the effectiveness of this type
of non-tariff trade barriers.
A major world political event occurred in 2014 when the Russian government
was accused of violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and of contributing to the ongoing
civil unrest in the country by invading the Crimean peninsula. Over the last
four years intense political conflict broke out between Russia and the majority
of the OECD countries, who opposed the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The
international community typically responds to governments’ behaviors that they
deem problematic by employing an array of economic, political and financial
sanctions, including arms ban, visa restrictions, exports ban and other measures.
Currently Russia is sanctioned by 37 countries, including the 28 EU countries
(counting the United Kingdom), the U.S., Canada, Australia, Norway, Iceland,
Lichtenstein, Albania, Montenegro and Ukraine. Being a large country with a
substantial degree of economic power, Russia retaliated against these economic
sanctions by imposing a partial embargo1 on imports from the sanctioning
countries. Because it is rare that sanctions are imposed on a large economy that
has market power to retaliate (like Russia), this incident presents an excellent
opportunity to study the direct and indirect impacts of sanctions and embargoes
on the economies of the participating countries, focusing both on import and
1The embargo mostly covers consumer agricultural goods, such as dairy products, fresh and
frozen fruits and vegetables, fish and meat.
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export flows. In Chapters II and III of my dissertation I analyze the impacts of
this conflict on Russian aggregate trade and Russian firms, respectively.
Presumably, Russia’s goal in retaliating was (1) to punish the sanctioning
countries while (2) limiting the costs to itself. Regarding (1), the embargoed goods
are agricultural products on which the smaller countries of the EU rely heavily.
Regarding (2), one would expect that in order to limit costs, the embargo would
target products that are relatively easy to substitute by redirecting the import
flows towards non-sanctioning countries. My estimation strategy in chapters 1 and
2 examines evidence for these two hypotheses. The embargo’s impact will vary
conditional on the type of goods being traded (embargoed versus non-embargoed
good) and the origin of the trade flow (sanctioning versus non-sanctioning
country). To capture this heterogeneity, I analyze three effects of interest. Trade
flows of embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries are likely to be the most
impacted by the embargo, and I denote these responses as the main effect. The
substitution effect will be experienced by firms that trade in embargoed goods
and attempt to switch the source of their import goods to countries that are not
targeted by the embargo. The last effect of interest is denoted the spillover effect
and refers to the effect of the embargo on firms which trade with the sanctioning
countries in non-embargoed goods. This approach of separating the embargo
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impact into main, substitution and spillover effects is a novel, and it reduces the
incidence of omitted variable bias2.
In chapter II, I estimate a structural logged gravity equation that uses
monthly data on bilateral product-specific trade flows to calculate the impact
of the embargo in the three categories of interest. My findings suggest a total
decrease in Russian imports of the embargoed products from the sanctioning
countries of more than 80%. On the aggregate scale, the estimated substitution
effect points to an increase in imports of embargoed goods from non-sanctioning
countries by about 40%; the magnitude of the substitution effect towards non-
sanctioning countries is not large enough to compensate for the embargoed
imports. I also find that the Russian embargo had the largest impact on the
smaller sanctioning countries. My findings point to the fact that Russia indeed
was able to inflict significant damage on the economies of the smaller European
countries, but was not able to mitigate the trade losses from these decisions by
switching the sources of embargoed goods towards the sanctioning countries.
These results are robust to a number of different tests - country and product
heterogeneity, dynamics and falsification exercise.
The self-imposed Russian food embargo, which has been in place since
August 2014, had significant negative impacts on aggregate Russian trade flows.
However, little is known about this policy’s effect at the micro level, on Russian
2When estimating the embargo’s effect on trade flows, omitting the substitution effect leads to
downward bias in the main coefficient of interest - main treatment effect.
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firms. In Chapter III, I use a novel customs level dataset sourced from the Russian
customs agency, that contains information on Russian firms’ imports and exports
to fill this gap in the economic literature. Utilizing a difference-in-difference
estimation technique embedded into a gravity equation framework, I examine the
variety of responses across firms in the intensive and extensive margins, focusing
on differences by firm size, export status and number of products traded. The
extensive margin of firms in the context of my study refers to the number of firms
that import or export a particular HS-8 level product code. The intensive margin
refers to the size of a firm’s average trade flow.
Methodologically, the effect of the embargo on firms’ extensive margin is
modeled as the change in the number of importers or exporters per HS-8 code,
using a Poisson count model. The estimation of the firms’ intensive margin utilizes
a difference-in-differences estimation of the gravity model in its multiplicative
Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) form (standard procedure in trade
literature). Per my findings, on average, the number of firms importing an HS-8
level product decreases by about 14 firms for embargoed goods. Quite intuitively,
the number of firms importing embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries
experiences a large and statistically significant decline, which is not fully offset
by an increase in the number of importers importing the embargoed products
from the non-sanctioning countries. These results are the strongest for the small
importers, while larger importers are able to leave the affected markets and
5
substitute towards non-sanctioning countries more efficiently. I also find evidence
of an increased market exit and decreased entry for the importers, who trade
in embargoed goods. The importers that choose to stay in the market for the
embargoed products after the embargo are more likely to switch source partners
to the non-sanctioning countries. At the intensive margin, surprisingly, I find
that firms experience a 13% decline in their imports of embargoed goods from
the sanctioning countries, which is significantly smaller than my estimates at the
aggregate level. This loss is mitigated by an increase in imports of the embargoed
goods from the non-sanctioning countries (an average firm is able to mitigate
the negative effect of the embargo by finding new partner countries). There is
significant degree of heterogeneity among the responses of different firm types
to the imposition of the embargo, at both the extensive and intensive margins.
Overall, I find that although Russian imports experience a significant decline after
the embargo, these effects are driven by the extensive margin of firms. Importers
abandon the markets for the embargoed goods, preferring to switch to the non-
sanctioning countries. I find no significant evidence of spillover effect (firms
keeping ties with the suppliers in the sanctioning countries, but switching to a
different subset of products).
In Chapter IV, written in co-authorship with Dr. Anca Cristea, we examine
the impact of Russia’s WTO accession on trade patterns at the firm level. A
large literature of cross-country studies examines the long run trade effects of
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GATT/WTO membership and generates surprisingly conflicting results. Our study
contributes to this literature by bringing micro-level evidence from the experience
of a large trading country. Using customs level data on the import and export
transactions of Russian firms over the period 2011-2015, we investigate the firms’
short-run trade responses along the intensive and extensive margins following
Russia’s WTO accession in 2012. Our results indicate an increase in the number
of exporters following the accession, an increase in the number of foreign countries
that Russian firms import from or export to, and a significant increase in the
number of imported products. The evidence of the effects of WTO accession on
the intensive margin of firm level trade is mixed. Although it is hard to extend our
findings to other countries or longer time periods, they nevertheless bring support
in favor of countries’ efforts to seek WTO membership.
Finally, we also uncover a disproportionate positive impact of the WTO
on agricultural imports, which could serve as evidence that the embargo was
intended as a protectionist policy and targeted a very specific sector whose imports
benefitted significantly from the WTO accession (agriculture) in order to help the
vulnerable domestic industry. Because the protectionist policies are against the
WTO provisions, the embargo could have been a convenient way to kill two birds
with one stone - retaliate against the embargo and protect domestic agricultural
production.
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CHAPTER II
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMBARGOES: EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA
Introduction
Trade policies such as sanctions and embargoes have always been popular
instruments of foreign policy (United Nations Security Council (2017)). These
tools are used to induce behavioral changes in non-complying agents (countries)
without military actions, which tend to be extremely costly and involve human
casualties. Understanding their impacts on trade, welfare, growth and other
economic outcomes for both sending and target countries is crucial.
One of the most recent examples of these foreign policies being enacted is the
economic sanctions that were imposed on Russia in the aftermath of the Crimean
conflict in 2014. The political conflict escalated quickly due to several unpopular
decisions made by the Russian government and resulted in the imposition of
sanctions by the majority of the OECD and several other European countries on
Russian individuals and businesses. The sanctioning measures included diplomatic,
financial, and economic restrictions such as freezing assets in foreign banks, visa
bans, and interruption of any cooperation with the businesses who supported the
annexation of Crimea, both in Russia and Ukraine. These measures have been in
place since March of 2014 and no change is expected in the foreseeable future. In
fact, several new rounds of sanctions have been applied to Russia since then, but
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most of them are in response to the alleged interference of the Russian hackers in
the U.S. 2016 elections.
On August 6, 2014, Russia imposed an embargo on a number of agricultural
products from the sanctioning countries, including dairy products, meat, fish,
fruits, and vegetables. This was done in response to the further intensification of
the sanctions, which followed the shooting down of flight MH17 on July 17th of
2014 over the territories controlled by a pro-Russian separatist military group.1
This is the first incident in modern history in which sanctions have targeted a
large country like Russia that has market power to retaliate against the sanctions,
unlike when sanctions were imposed on smaller countries like Iran, North Korea, or
South Africa. This power dynamic makes this setting unique.
Russia’s retaliation has the potential to create a significant impact (at
least in the short run) on its own bilateral trade flows as well as on total world
trade, 2 which is an important setting to evaluate. In this study I conduct a
comprehensive analysis of the effect of the embargo on Russian trade with a focus
on the effectiveness of the embargo and Russia’s ability to mitigate the import
losses from the embargo by finding new source countries for the affected goods.
1The new sanctioning measures included restrictions on lending to Russian state banks, an
arms embargo, an export ban on oil technology and services that could be used for Arctic or
deep-sea drilling or shale oil projects, and an export ban on dual-use goods equipment, such as
specialist computers or heavy engineering vehicles that could be used for military purposes.
2According to the World Trade Organization (2017), Russia is one of the largest countries in
the world, accounting for 1.99% of the world’s merchandise exports and for 1.32% of the world’s
merchandise imports in 2017.
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Presumably, Russia’s goal in retaliating was to punish the sanctioning
countries while limiting the costs to itself, i.e., the set of embargoed goods was
chosen optimally.3 The embargoed goods are agricultural products on which the
EU countries with lower GDP per capita rely heavily. For example, more than
90% of Lithuania’s total exports of tomatoes (HS-4 code 0702), cabbages (HS-4
code 0704), and lettuce (HS-4 code 0705) in 2013 was traded with Russia. Among
other smaller countries that rely on exports to Russia heavily are Albania, Estonia,
Latvia, and Poland. Thus, the Russian retaliatory embargo had the potential to
put enough pressure on the European economy to stimulate the removal of the
anti-Russian sanctions. Strategically, one would expect that in order to limit costs
to itself, the Russian embargo would target products that are relatively easy to
substitute by redirecting the import flows towards non-sanctioning countries.4
Several Russian food markets significantly depend on imports. For example, about
50% of all dairy products or fruits and vegeTablesare imported, and almost 74% of
pork is imported.5 The embargo has been extended multiple times and is currently
in place until the end of 2019.
3“Putin: Russian counter-sanctions hurt the sending countries’ trade. Fact check from
Meduza.io”.
https://meduza.io/feature/2016/10/17/putin%2Drossiyskie%2Dkontrsanktsii%2Dsilno%
2Dnavredili%2Dzapadnym%2Dstranam%2Da%2Dna%2Dsamom%2Ddele%2Dfaktchek%2Dmeduzy
4Some of the embargoed products (HS-codes 0202: meat of bovine animals frozen, 0406:
cheese and curd) were among the top 20 Russian import shares in 2013, so the sheer amount of
substitution needed might be too large for Russian firms to be able to mitigate the shock from
embargo completely, which is why I separate the main and substitution effects of the retaliatory
embargo in my analysis.
5According to statistics provided by Central European Financial Observer https://
financialobserver.eu/cse-and-cis/russia/the%2Dembargo%2Dhas%2Dtransformed%2Dthe%
2Drussian%2Dfood%2Dmarket/
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I build an empirical model of Russian bilateral trade flows in embargoed
and non-embargoed goods with sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries.6 This
allows me to (1) measure the ability of the embargo to negatively impact the
sanctioning countries, i.e., quantify the drop in imports of the affected goods from
the sanctioning countries, which is labelled the main effect of the embargo, and (2)
analyze the optimality of the chosen set of embargoed products by measuring the
increase in imports of the embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning countries,
which I call the substitution effect. Separation of the embargo impact into
main and substitution effects is a novel approach that reduces the incidence
of omitted variable bias. The main and substitution effects are estimated with
a standard multiplicative form of the gravity equation and Pseudo Poisson
Maximum Likelihood (PPML). The triple difference estimation strategy allows
me to compare the impacts of the embargo along the interaction of three margins:
embargoed versus non-embargoed goods, sanctioning versus non-sanctioning
countries, and the pre-embargo and post-embargo time periods. Additionally, I
examine the impact on the extensive margin of trade, which I define as a number
of partner countries per product, and the intensive margin, defined as an average
6Even though the terms “sanctions” and “embargoes” are used interchangeably in the
literature, it is important to distinguish between them for the purposes of this paper. The
term “sanctions” refers to the restrictive financial and economic measures imposed on Russia
by several European countries, the U.S., Canada, and Australia in March 2014. The goal of
sanctions is to coerce Russia into giving up control over the Crimean peninsula. The term
“embargo” refers to the Russian embargo imposed in August 2014 on the sanctioning countries as
a retaliation. Russia’s objective is to persuade the sanctioning countries to lift the sanctions.
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import or export flow of a product of a certain type from a sanctioning or non-
sanctioning country.
I find that the embargo was not fully effective in shutting down the imports
of embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries. My estimates suggest that the
average import flow of embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries decreased
by 51%, while the number of source sanctioning countries per embargoed good
fell from 11 in the pre-embargo period to 5 after the imposition of the embargo (a
fall of 55%). I find that the main effect is driven by the extensive margin, which
translates to about 7.07 billion USD lost in imports one year after the embargo,
which is roughly 30% of the total imports of embargoed goods in 2013 (or 3%
of total Russian imports in 2013). At the intensive margin the losses are about
6 billion USD or about 2% of total Russian imports in 2013. There are several
reasons for the ineffectiveness of the embargo. First, the observations in the
COMTRADE data are recorded as HS-4 level codes and even though the embargo
is imposed at the HS-4 digit level, some exceptions to the list of embargoed
goods are present in Russian law at the HS-8 and HS-10 digit levels. Thus, the
embargoed goods can still be admitted through customs even though they are
technically under the embargoed HS-4 code. Second, there are specific exemptions
made for the goods that are imported for production of some strategic goods, such
as baby food or food for athletes - these goods are allowed to be imported. Third,
customs officials are allowed to determine the set of embargoed goods not only
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using the HS-4 digit code but the name of the good as well. Thus, there are several
ways available to circumvent the embargo, which reduces its efficiency.
Regarding the optimality of the chosen set of goods, I find that the
main effect losses are not completely offset by substitution to other import
sources. I estimate that only about 56% of the lost imports of embargoed
goods from sanctioning countries are recovered by switching sources towards
non-sanctioning countries. Given the data, I am unable to account for two
caveats in my estimations of the substitution effect: import substitution through
domestic production and possible smuggling of the embargoed goods through
non-sanctioning countries, for which some anecdotal evidence exists. For example,
according to several Russian news sources (by24.org and Novaya Gazeta),7 shrimps
and pineapples allegedly produced in Belarus were found in several Russian
stores in 2014. Belarus does not have access to the sea or climate warm enough
to grow pineapples, which raised suspicion towards the possibility of smuggling
of embargoed goods through Belarus. Thus, although some substitution was
available, Russia was not able to fully mitigate the losses resulted from the
imposition of the embargo. This points to the fact that the set of embargoed goods
was not chosen optimally and rather than minimizing its own losses, the Russian
government prioritized negatively impacting the sanctioning countries in hopes of
7Shrimp from Belarus to Russia: http://by24.org/2014/08/19/belarusian_shrimps_goes_
to_hungry_russia/
Mussels from Mogilyov: https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2014/08/11/
60696-nou-hau-mogilevskie-ustritsy-fin-de-kler
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alleviating the sanctions. These results are robust to a number of different tests:
country and product heterogeneity, dynamics, and a falsification exercise.
Major trade shocks like the embargo can also have unanticipated impacts
on the dimensions of trade not directly impacted by it. Thus, I also explore the
possible impact of the embargo on the trade flows that are not directly impacted
by the embargo: imports of non-embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries
and Russian exports. I find evidence for an unexpected spillover effect of the
embargo on Russian exports: after the imposition of the embargo, the average
Russian export flow of non-embargoed goods to the sanctioning countries8 declined
by about 75 billion USD (cumulative loss of the extensive and intensive margins).
I cannot attribute this chilling effect to dropping oil prices as the effect is driven
by goods other than oil and gas. I also find some evidence that Russian exports
of intermediate embargoed goods fall, either due to redirection of these goods
to domestic production or the political or logistical motivations of the partners
in the sanctioning countries. These spillovers offer a very important takeaway
for policy makers: the embargoes will significantly decrease trade in affected
goods, but also have spillover effects onto goods that are not directly targeted
by sanctions by increasing the uncertainty of trade policy and the political and
logistical misalignment of the partners in the sending and target countries.
8Both non-embargoed goods and sanctioning countries are incredibly important in the
structure of Russian exports
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The unanticipated economic sanctions and the Russian food embargo had
a significant negative effect on the Russian economy, which had already been
weakened by declining oil prices at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014,9
causing a deficit of production inputs, which in turn led to rapid inflation.
Although I mostly find significant negative impacts of the embargo on
Russia’s foreign trade in that the substitution effect does not offset the trade
losses from the imposition of the embargo, my analysis does not capture any
shifts in internal domestic production. In that sense, the embargo had several
unexpected positive effects. For example, it allowed Russian agricultural producers
to increase production of grain (mostly wheat) and other important staples (Banse
et al. (2019)). However, domestic substitution did not go as well for all products.
Russian producers had to increase domestic production while cutting costs by
substituting towards cheaper production inputs (for example, substitution of
cow milk with powdered milk). Domestically produced goods are often of lower
quality relative to imported goods. According to the opinion poll conducted by
the Russian Research Holding Romir, almost 33% of respondents remarked on the
lower quality of dairy products in December of 2015.10. Another positive side of
the embargo was that Russia was able to strengthen its diplomatic connections and
940% of Russian total exports and more than 50% of its budget revenues depend on oil and
gas, which makes the Russian economy especially vulnerable to volatile oil prices, causing the
exchange rate between the Russian ruble and foreign currencies to increase significantly after the
oil price shock. The oil price shock combined with the sanctions and drop in trade lead to a deep
recession in 2015, characterized by a negative GDP growth rate (-2.8%), and inflation of almost
15%, according to the World Bank Indicators.
10See http://romir.ru/studies/711_1443646800/
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increase its sphere of political influence among countries that have similar “anti-
American” and “anti-EU” world views as Russia in the post-sanctions period, e.g.,
Egypt, Turkey, countries on the African continent (Foy (2020)).
My research pertains to other studies on the effectiveness of trade policies
such as economic sanctions, embargoes, and boycotts. Eaton and Engers (1992),
Eaton and Engers (1999) and Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) establish a
theoretical framework to study sanctions and their effectiveness. Bapat et al.
(2013), Hufbauer and Schott (1985) and van Bergeijk and van Marrewijk (1995)
conduct empirical analyses of sanctions’ effectiveness. In general, sanctions are
rarely effective and the effectiveness of the sanctions depends on the market power
of the participants. Coulibaly (2009), Kuehnapfel (2015), Teegen et al. (2008)
and Irwin (2005) study the effects of the South African embargo, Cuban embargo
and Jeffersonian embargo, respectively. The boycott11 of French goods after the
beginning of the war in Iraq (2003) has been studied intensively. For example,
Heilmann (2016), Chavis and Leslie (2009), Pandya and Venkatesan (2016),
Ashenfelter et al. (2007). The intuitive conclusion that embargoes, sanctions, or
boycotts hurt trade relations between countries, decreasing exports and imports, is
confirmed by some authors (Heilmann (2016), Michaels and Zhi (2016), Chavis and
Leslie (2009), Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015)), while other papers find effects
11Typically, boycotts are carried out by consumers against a certain brand or brands
originating in the boycotted country and are not officially enforced by governments. Embargoes
and sanctions, on the other hand, are enforced by the imposing countries: they decide on what
actions are included in the sanctions packet and for how long they will be carried out.
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of trade bans to be insignificant (Hufbauer and Schott (1985), Hufbauer et al.
(1997)).
The existing research on the Russian sanctions and retaliatory embargo
can be divided in two groups: the first group of studies concentrates on the
macroeconomic effects of these policies, such as effects on prices of Russian
goods and GDPs of the sanctioning countries and Russia, while the second group
concentrates on the effects of the sanctions and embargo on bilateral trade flows
between Russia and the sending countries. The studies of the macroeconomic
effects of the sanctions and the embargo include Dreger et al. (2016) and
Kholodilin and Netsunajev (2016). The former analyze the impact of the sanctions
on the exchange rate of Russian ruble to the US dollar and the latter examines
the changes in consumer good prices after the sanctions. From the second group,
the study most relevant to my work is the working paper by Crozet and Hinz
(2019). I would like to emphasize that my study and the study by Crozet and
Hinz (2019) were developed in parallel, and although there are some similarities
between the two papers, my study focuses on quantification of the effects of the
embargo for Russia, while Crozet and Hinz (2019) analyze the impact for the
sending countries, using the analysis of French firm-level export data to study how
the sending countries were affected by the sanctions. Interestingly, both studies
find unintended consequences of the embargo. I find that even though the embargo
targets a specific set of imported goods, there is a significant spillover onto Russian
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exports in the form of a decrease in flows of non-embargoed goods, while Crozet
and Hinz find that the total loss from the embargo for the French firms is not
due to the embargo, but rather what they call the “friendly fire” effect. To my
knowledge, my study is the first to examine this topic from the perspective of
Russia, bridging the existing gap in the economic literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the testable
hypotheses and the empirical model needed to test them, while section 2.3
describes data sources used in the empirical analysis. Section 2.4 provides the base
results for the main and substitution effects. Section 2.5 presents heterogeneity
and dynamics analysis, while results of the falsification check are recorded in
section 2.6. Section 2.7 describes the spillover effects of the embargo on Russian
exports. Section 2.8 concludes.
Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Model
Testable Hypotheses
In this section I outline the hypotheses about the impact of the embargo on
several dimensions of trade. To summarize the mechanisms driving these effects,
I introduce the concepts of extensive and intensive margins of trade. Extensive
margin in this context refers to the number of countries exporting a particular HS-
4 digit product code to Russia, and intensive margin refers to a product average
import flow from a partner country.
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One of the most interesting questions in the recent case of the retaliatory
embargo regards its efficiency, i.e., if the embargo eliminates all imports of
embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries. Ahn and Ludema (2019) find
that the impacts of sanctions for the firms that are strategically important
for the Russian government is smaller than on other firms, i.e., the Russian
government does have the tendency to shield certain firms and enterprises they
deem important for the economy. Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect that
exceptions can be made from the embargo, which would decrease its efficiency.
Several changes were made to the rules of the embargo within the first year of its
imposition. For example, although HS-4 code 0301 (live fish) is embargoed, the
fry used for aquaculture was exempt from the embargo in August of 2014, because
many producers claimed that it was impossible to continue production without
imports of fry. This points to the fact that although the Russian government is
willing to sacrifice the wellbeing of certain producers, the protectionist impulses
toward other industries are strong, which decreases the efficiency of the embargo. I
measure the effectiveness of the embargo by analyzing the change in the imports of
embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries, which I label the main effect.
The embargo’s aim was to reduce the embargoed goods’ imports in order to
coerce the sanctioning countries to lift the sanctions. Thus, sanctioning countries
will be dropping out of the embargoed goods’ markets (extensive margin) and/or
reducing the exports of the embargoed goods (intensive margin) if they stay in the
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markets (quite possibly through the pre-existing contracts for sourcing the inputs
for the domestic production channel). I test for the magnitude of these changes to
determine which margin contributes to the fall in imports, whether it’s the decline
in the average trade flow or the number of source countries.
I assume that the Russian government chose the optimal set of goods
with which to retaliate, for which substitution was readily available. A natural
market response to a sudden reduction of the set of source countries of the
embargoed goods would be an increase in trade in the targeted goods with the
non-sanctioning countries. The increase in the imports of the embargoed goods
from the non-sanctioning countries is labeled the substitution effect. There must
be a reason why the set of the embargoed goods was initially sourced from the
sanctioning countries: either they are of higher quality, less expensive, or more
readily available. Thus, I do not expect that the substitution effect will be large
enough to offset the losses from the embargo. It is also important to determine the
channels of the substitution, i.e., whether it operates through an increase in the
number of non-sanctioning countries that export embargoed goods to Russia, an
increase in the average import flow of that type, or both.
Major trade shocks like the embargo can also have unanticipated impacts
on the dimensions of trade not directly impacted by it. For example, there
exists anecdotal evidence that the Iranian customers experienced shortages of
medication and decreased access to medical services due to restrictions on money
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transactions, proper insurance, and other factors that emerged as a result of
the sanctions, although the humanitarian aid, medication and food staples are
never directly targeted by the embargoes and sanctions(Cheraghali (2013)).
Thus, I also explore the possible impact of the embargo on the trade flows that
are not directly impacted by the embargo: imports of non-embargoed goods
from the sanctioning countries and Russian exports. I call this possible impact
of the embargo on goods that are not directly targeted a spillover effect. Some
mechanisms that might factor into the spillover effect are political motivations and
logistics. Markets in the sanctioning countries might respond to an embargo with a
decision to boycott or drop out of Russian markets due to an increased uncertainty
of trade policy. Alternatively, there may be economies of scale in shipping, i.e., the
exporters of the embargoed goods in the sanctioning countries might also export
non-embargoed goods. If the relative size of the latter in total exports is small,
then the incentive to only trade in non-embargoed goods with Russia is small,
potentially interrupting trade altogether. As for the exports, it might be the case
that partners of Russian exporters chose to not conduct business with them after
the embargo either due to logistical reasons, uncertainty, or political motivations.
The macroeconomic conditions in Russia also deteriorated after the sanctions and
embargo were imposed. For example, Kholodilin and Netsunajev (2016) show that
the sanctions had a direct negative impact on Russian GDP growth, while Dreger
et al. (2016) conclude that although the bulk of the depreciation of the Russian
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ruble after 2014 is due to the falling oil price, the unanticipated sanctions matter
for the conditional volatility of the exchange rate. These changes could also have a
negative impact on exports.
To shed light on the mechanisms of the embargo on Russian trade, I build
an empirical model. My identification strategy relies on the assumption that
the imposition of the embargo was an exogenous shock to the bilateral trade
flows. This is a plausible assumption because the imposition of the embargo was
triggered by the shooting down of flight MH-17, which was a plausibly exogenous
event.
Empirical Model
I utilize a triple difference estimation and a PPML estimator to analyze the
changes in Russian trade flows (exports and imports) caused by the imposition of
the Russian embargo on food imports. The estimation equation is derived from the
standard gravity model, which has been widely used to estimate the responsiveness
of trade flows to various economic factors. I follow Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2003) and Feyrer (2009) in setting up the basic gravity relationship:
Tradeijt =
yityjt
yωt
(
τijt
PitPjt
)1−σ
(2.1)
where Tradeijt is bilateral trade between countries i and j at time t (I separate
export and import flows); yit, yjt and yωt denote the incomes of the exporter
22
country, the importer country, respectively the world at time t. τijt stands for
bilateral resistance term; Pit and Pjt denote the country-specific multilateral
resistance terms at time t. Taking logs of both sides of the equation (2.1), this
can be re-written as:
ln(Tradeijt) = ln(yit) + ln(yjt)− ln(yωt) + (1− σ) [ln(τijt)− ln(Pit)− ln(Pjt)]
(2.2)
We can think of the Tradeijt as the product of the two trade margins: the
extensive margin, denoted by N (i.e. number of partners country ı trades with),
and the intensive margin, denoted by T (i.e. an average value of a bilateral trade
flow).
I make the following transformations to the equation (2.2) to arrive at
the estimation equation to be taken to the data. Since the model applies to
Russia’s trade only, and Russia is always a trading partner, I drop the i subscript
to simplify notation. The data allow me to add a product dimension, which is
denoted by the k subscript. I model Russia’s retaliatory embargo as a bilateral
trade friction (i.e., part of τijt), which reduces both, the number of partners who
are willing to trade in the affected goods (N) and the average trade flow T . In
order to account for multilateral resistance terms Pit, Pjt, and for world income
yωt, I include country - year fixed effects, where I denote years by y subscript
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(since the data are available monthly, I preserve the t index for the month-year
periods) to model yjt in equation (2.3).
To capture the embargo’s impact on Russian imports and exports, I
utilize the variables for the three effects as discussed in the prior section: main,
substitution, and spillover. The omitted (i.e. reference) group consists of non-
embargoed goods from non-sanctioning countries. As is standard now in the
literature (beginning with Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)), I utilize the PPML
estimator and the j, t, y, and k subscripts for partner country, month-year time
period, year, and product, respectively, to construct the multiplicative form of
the estimation gravity equation. In the end, I arrive at the following estimating
equation:
Tradejkt = exp
∧[α + γjk + γt + γjy + γky + β1 ×Main effectjkt+
β2 × Substitution effectjkt + β3 × Spillover effectjkt + Tradecostjt)] + εjkt
(2.3)
The country-product fixed effects (γjk) account for the time-invariant
determinants of bilateral trade such as bilateral distance, common borders, and
common language. They also account for time-invariant product characteristics.
The time period fixed effects (γt) account for any Russian macroeconomic factors
that might affect trade (e.g. inflation, currency movements, etc). It is important
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to account for these factors because of a dramatic devaluation of the Russian
ruble due to the oil shock that took place in the beginning of 2014. The country-
year fixed effects (γjy) allow me to control for the multilateral resistance terms,
while the product-year fixed effects allow me to control for product-specific trends.
ln(Tradecostjt) is a time-varying trade cost variable in logs, which is constructed
in the following fashion:
Trade costjt = distancej × oil pricet
where distancej is the distance between Russia and the partner country j and
oil pricet is the price of a barrel of oil at time t. This trade cost variable is a proxy
for bilateral shipping cost.
I will next describe the three variables of interest and cost variables in
further detail.
1. Main effectjkt captures the direct effect of the retaliatory embargo on trade
in embargoed products with the sanctioning countries. This variable reflects
whether the Russian food embargo targets a particular product k imported
from country j at time t. It is constructed as follows:
Main effectjkt = DS country ×DE product ×DPost
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where DS country is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the partner country
is sanctioning Russia, and 0 otherwise; DE product is a dummy that takes
the value 1 if the product is embargoed by Russia as a retaliation, and 0
otherwise; DPost is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in all the months
following August 2014, i.e. the period when the embargo was imposed. For
the imports sample I expect that the coefficient β1 on Main effect to be
negative. I do not expect to find a significant main effect for the exports.
2. Substitution effectjkt measures the substitution effect of the embargo. This
dummy variable reflects how the trade flows in embargoed good k with the
non-sanctioning country j at time t were affected by the embargo. It is
constructed as follows:
Substitution effectjkt = DNS country ×DE product ×DPost
where DNS country is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the partner country
is not sanctioning Russia and 0 otherwise; DE product and DPost are as
described above. The coefficient β2 for the substitution effect should have a
positive sign for the imports sample because I expect Russia to import more
embargoed products from the non-sanctioning countries. For the exports,
similarly to the main effect, I do not expect to find a significant impact.
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3. Spillover effectjkt is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a
sanctioning country j trades in a non-embargoed good k at time t and 0
otherwise. The justification to include this variable is the possibility that
sanctioning countries voluntarily reduce trade with Russia in other product
categories as well. This variable is constructed as:
Spillover effectjkt = DS country ×DNE product ×DPost
where DS country and DPost are as defined above and DNE product is equal
to 1 if a product is not embargoed, and 0 otherwise. My prior is that the
coefficient β3 on Spillover effect will be negative, but not necessarily
significant for both samples, exports and imports.
I use a similar approach to equation (2.3) to analyze the impact of the
embargo on the extensive margin. The dependent variable for the extensive margin
becomes the number of countries from which Russia imports a particular good. To
introduce the country type dimension, I count the number of sanctioning and non-
sanctioning countries per HS-4 digit product k in a given period t. The estimation
equation for the extensive margin also utilizes the PPML estimator, and is of a
following form:
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Number of countries per productjkt = exp
∧[α + γjk + γt + γjy + γky + β1 ×Main effectjkt+
β2 × Substitution effectjkt + β3 × Spillover effectjkt + Tradecostjt] + εjkt
(2.4)
Equation (2.4) is estimated separately for the sanctioning and non-
sanctioning countries; thus the subscripts are modified slightly from equation
(2.3) . j now refers to the country type: sanctioning or non-sanctioning. Thus,
γjk refers to the product - country type time invariant trends, γjy refers to the
country type - year fixed effects, to control for the multilateral resistance terms
common across the sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries. The expected signs
on the coefficients for the imports’ sample are in line with the expectations for
the intensive margin: β1 < 0, β2 > 0, and β3 < 0. If any effect is present in the
exports’ sample, I would expect it to be the negative spillover effect.
Data
To estimate the regression model described above, I use several data sources,
including the UN COMTRADE, CEPII Gravity and World Bank Global Economic
Monitor databases. The UN COMTRADE data are available at product (HS-
4 digit) and monthly level over the period January 2010 to December 2016. I
analyze the impact of the Russian embargo on both its exports and imports. The
dataset on Russia’s imports is assembled from foreign countries’ reported exports
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to Russia, while the Russian export dataset is assembled from countries’ reported
imports from Russia.12
The CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales)
Gravity database provides information on the geographic distance between Russia
and its trading partners. It also provides the information on common language
and common border, on trade agreements, and other controls typically used as
regressors in the gravity equation. Data on the partner countries’ GDP and GDP
per capita are taken from the World Bank Global Economic Monitor database,
and are recorded on a yearly basis. I use these measures to conduct country
heterogeneity analysis. Monthly time series data on the oil price are provided by
St. Louis FRED. I use the price of BRENT oil in US dollars for the calculation of
trade costs.
After combining all these data sources I obtain a panel dataset of Russia’s
import and export trade flows by country, by product and by month of
transaction. The import sample contains 1,587,216 observations, while exports’
sample has 965,894 observations. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the
pre-embargo sample for imports in panel A, and for exports in panel B. There are
120 countries in the imports sample, and 130 in the exports sample, of which 37
are countries sanctioning Russia. The total number of unique HS-4 digit product
12This approach is chosen because in the COMTRADE database Russia starts reporting trade
at monthly level starting in January 2012, while other countries’ reports are available earlier. In
order to increase the number of observations, I proceed using other countries’ reports. In UN
COMTRADE, imports are recorded cif (cost insurance and freight) while exports are fob (free on
board).
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codes is similar across the two samples - around 1240 HS-4 digit product codes, of
which 49 are embargoed.13
It is worth pointing out that most of the sanctioning countries are EU
members, and they trade with Russia extensively due to the geographical
proximity and historically established connections. This is among the main reasons
why the share of the sanctioning countries in both imports’ and exports’ sample is
on average 76% versus 24% for the non-sanctioning countries in the pre-embargoed
periods. The embargoed products consist of different food groups, including fruit
and vegetables, meat and dairy products. The share of the embargoed products
in Russia’s imports is 8% of the sample, which signifies that this category of
goods is significant for Russia. The share of these goods in the exports’ sample
if below 1%, which is intuitive once we take into account that Russia’s major
exports are natural resources, such as crude oil, gas, coal. On average the unit
value of the imported embargoed products is lower than that of the non-embargoed
products (embargoed good’s unit value is 77 USD versus 447 USD for the non-
embargoed good); similar pattern is observed for exports, although the exported
embargoed goods are cheaper than imported ones on average (comparative
advantage confirmed). The disparity of unit values between the imported and
exported embargoed intuitive considering that only non-durable food items were
13The lists of sanctioning countries and embargoed products are provided in the Appendix,
Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively. Both lists are compiled from the Russian laws and the Russian
President’s Executive Orders, which contain the detailed description of the countries and
products to be embargoed. The embargoed products are listed at the HS-4 digit level, which
dictates the use of HS-4 digit level COMTRADE data.
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embargoed, while the expensive, durable goods were not affected by the embargo.
On average, from a sanctioning country Russia imports 81 distinct HS-4 digit
product codes; from a non-sanctioning country Russia imports 42 distinct HS-4
codes.
Base Results
In this section I present the estimation results based on equations (2.3)
and (2.4). I then analyze the effects’ dynamics and conduct several robustness
exercises. I exploit the variation in Russian import and export trade flows created
by the exogenous shock of the Russian embargo imposed in August of 2014 to
identify its effect. As my analysis of the Russian and foreign news sources in the
weeks preceding the imposition of the retaliatory embargo shows, the imposition
of the embargo was unanticipated by both Russian and foreign firms, thus the
shock was truly exogenous. I make an important identifying assumption that no
other shock happened at the same time and targeting the same set of countries
and commodities as the embargo, and that my estimations are picking up solely
the effect of the embargo.
The Effectiveness of the Embargo: Main Effect
Interestingly, although the absolute value of imports fell significantly (by
about 50% in comparison to the pre-embargo trend) after the embargo (1), the
structure of imports remained fairly consistent: about 6-8% of total import value
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is attributed to the embargoed goods. The same can be said about the structure of
imports based on the country type. Even after the sanctions and the retaliatory
embargo Russia maintains the import and export shares of the sanctioning
countries at about 68-75%. Thus, the margins of trade are very interesting to
analyze.
FIGURE 1.
Embargo Effects on Aggregate Trade Flows
Notes: This figure depicts the changes in Russian aggregate import and export flows (measured
in billions USD) of embargoed and non-embargoed goods introduced by the Russian food
embargo, imposed in August of 2014. Data source is UN COMTRADE. Each good in the
original imports sample receives an indicator as an embargoed or non-embargoed good,
depending on whether it is included in the embargoed products list by the Russian government.
I the plot the aggregate log trade for each good category against month-year time periods.
32
TABLE 1.
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Imports
Sanctioning country Non-sanctioning Embargoed product Non-embargoed
country country product
Log monthly trade flow 10.873 10.813 11.819 10.817
per product per country (2.852) (2.941) (2.812) (2.869)
Log yearly trade flow 24.374 23.71 22.87 25.214
per product per country (1.461) (1.089) (0.292) (0.656)
Log GDP of the partner country 26.834 26.741
(1.624) (1.942)
Unit value 76.774 447.154
(6985.021) (83,859.57)
Trade shares 0.76 0.24 0.08 0.92
Number countries in sample = 120: 37 83
Number of products in sample = 1240: 49 1191
Average number of products countries trade in 81 42
Observations (total = 1,588,575 ) 1,207,011 381,564 59,654 1,528,921
Panel B: Exports
Sanctioning country Non-sanctioning Embargoed product Non-embargoed
country country product
Log monthly trade flow 9.952 9.812 10.651 9.875
per product per country (3.274) (3.297) (2.966)) (3.29)
Log yearly trade flow 23.556 23.425 21.178 25.803
per product per country (2.99) (1.931) (0.573)) (0.679)
Log GDP of the partner country 26.638 25.445
(1.738) (1.951)
Unit value 40.056 530.252
(974.15) (37,606.79 )
Trade shares 0.768 0.232 0.008 0.992
Number of countries in sample = 130: 37 93
Number of products in sample = 1237 : 49 1188
Average number of products countries trade in 81 45
Observations (total = 965,894) 550,193 415,701 24,380 941,514
Notes: The table presents the sample summary statistics for selected variables prior to the
imposition of the embargo or imports sample (Panel A) and exports sample (Panel B). Variable
means; standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2 provides the motivation for choosing the main estimating equation
(2.3) as my benchmark specification for the intensive margin. I provide both,
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PPML (columns 4-7) and OLS results for comparison (columns 1-3). Each
column for both estimators contains different sets of fixed effects together with
the three treatment dummy variables of interest; I compare the effects of the
embargo across these specifications. In all specifications, I account for country
- product fixed effects. The reference group for all of the specifications consists
of non-sanctioning countries trading in non-embargoed products. In all of the
specifications, the main coefficients of interest are: 1) the main effect, measured
by β1, which captures the impact of the embargo on the embargoed goods’ flows
sourced from the sanctioning countries? i.e., the effectiveness of the embargo; and
2) the substitution effect (β2), which measures Russia’s import substitution in
embargoed products from sanctioning to non-sanctioning countries. I also consider
the effect of the embargo on the sanctioning countries’ trade in non-embargoed
goods (Spillover effect), β3.
The first thing to note is that across all specifications, with both OLS and
PPML, the signs of the coefficients on the main and substitution effects are
consistent with my hypotheses. The embargo had a significant negative impact
on the embargoed products’ flows from the sanctioning countries, while Russia
attempted to substitute its import flows of embargoed goods towards non-
sanctioning countries. However, the magnitudes of both, main and substitution
effects coefficients, are very different across the specifications. The PPML
estimates of the main coefficient are about twice as small as the OLS (-0.71 vs -
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1.534), which is consistent with the results in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006):
OLS in gravity equation overestimates the coefficients. However, I still find the
expected sign and the high significance of the main effect, which assures me
that these results are robust. The coefficients on the substitution effect variable
are similar across the two estimators, but the relative sizes of the main and
substitution effects vary significantly. For OLS, the coefficient of the substitution
effect is about a third of the main effect, while for the PPML this relation is more
of a 50%. Another thing to note is that the significance of the spillover effect
disappears when using the PPML estimator, and switches the sign. This could
be due to the fact that the embargo had a relatively smaller impact on this group
of country-product interactions, and accounting for the zero trade flows, and an
extensive set of fixed effects, removes the variation needed to identify this effect.
In column 7 of Table 2 I separately estimate the impact of Turkish sanctions,
which Russia imposed in January 2016 as a result of the shooting down of the
Russian military aircraft by Turkish air forces. Several of the embargoed goods are
also embargoed from Turkey beginning in January 2016. I do not find that these
sanctions have a significant impact on any of the effects of interest, and I do not
report this coefficient in the future analysis. The main takeaway from the Table
2 analysis is that the main effect coefficient is negative and highly significant,
and its magnitude is larger than the substitution effect, which is, as expected,
positive. I proceed by interpreting the results of my benchmark specification; these
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results are presented in column 7, in which I account for country - product, period,
country-year and product-year fixed effects, and use the PPML estimator. This
specification is the most conservative, which allows me to estimate all of the effects
of interest and account for most of the unobserved variation.
The embargo imposed by the Russian government on a number of products
from the sanctioning countries had a significant negative impact on trade with
those countries. At the intensive margin, the average import flow decrease by 51%
(i.e., e−0.71 − 1 = −0.508), i.e., the embargo was not completely efficient. The
purpose of the embargo was to negatively impact the sanctioning countries by
prohibiting exports of embargoed goods to Russia. I find that the imports in this
category declined slightly more than by 50%, which means that embargo did not
utilize its full potential and its main goal of inflicting the largest damage to the
sanctioning countries was not reached.
Next I provide a “back of the envelope” calculation of losses due to the
intensive margin. I calculate a decline of an average import flow of embargoed
goods from the sanctioning countries and multiply this number by a monthly
average number of country-product pairs of this type. The average monthly import
flow of embargoed goods from sanctioning countries of 1,745,908 USD declines by
51%, which translates to 890,413.08 USD loss per average import flow of this type.
On average there are 539 sanctioning country - embargoed product pairs in a given
month (11 countries per product × 49 embargoed products), and thus the monthly
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loss at the intensive margin is 890413.08 × 539 = 479.93 million USD. Thus, an
estimated intensive margin average loss one year after the embargo is 5.76 billion
USD, which translates to about 2% of total Russian imports in 2013. Cumulative
loss in this category of imports is 7.07+5.76 billion USD = 12.83 billion USD, or
about 60% of total imports of embargoed goods in 2013, and 5% total imports in
2013.
The embargo can also manifest at the extensive margin of trade, i.e., the
number of importers per product. To calculate the impact of the embargo on the
extensive margin, I estimate the equation(2.4). The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 3, in panel A for the imports sample, and in panel B for the
exports sample. I provide the description of the exports sample in section 6, and
concentrate on imports’ sample in this section.
Results in column 2 of Table 3 point to the fact that the number of
sanctioning countries, from which Russia imports embargoed goods fell by
approximately 58% (e−0.868 − 1 = 0.580) (the main effect). This corresponds
to a decline of about 6 sanctioning countries per product. An average monthly
import flow of embargoed goods from sanctioning countries in 2013 is 1,745,908
USD. Thus, the amount lost per embargoed product per month at the extensive
margin is 6 ×1,745,908 = 12.03 million USD. There are 49 embargoed goods total,
so the monthly import loss for all embargoed goods at the extensive margin is
12.03 × 49 = 589.44 million USD. Thus, conditional on average import flows,
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Russian imports have declined by 7.07 billion USD one year after the embargo.
This corresponds to about 30% of the total imports of embargoed goods in 2013
(or about 3% of total Russian imports in 2013).
It is quite surprising that the embargo does not cause a 100% reduction in
either margins, intensive or extensive. Although a clear decline in the average
number of sanctioning source countries is evident from Table 3, some sanctioning
countries continue exporting embargoed goods to Russia. It is also evident from
Figure 2: although the import shares of the top 10 embargoed HS-4 digit products
sourced from the sanctioning countries drops to almost zero for several top
products, for certain goods these shares do not decline significantly (for example,
HS-4 codes 0808 (apples, pears and quinces, fresh), 1901 (malt extract, flour, dairy
preparations, low cocoa), and 2106 (food preparations, nested). Decrease in the
the average imports of the affected good is about 50%. Granted, these are average
effects, and there could be a lot of heterogeneity masked under these estimates. I
conduct extensive heterogeneity analysis to uncover the driving forces behind this
in subsection 4.2.
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TABLE 2.
Total Trade: Specification Choice
Dependent variable: Log of trade Level of trade
OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Main effect -1.682∗∗∗ -1.566∗∗∗ -1.534∗∗∗ −0.586∗∗ −0.532∗∗ −0.713∗∗∗ −0.710∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.292) (0.229) (0.242) (0.233) (0.241) (0.249)
Substitution effect 0.271∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.066) (0.095) (0.129) (0.091) (0.091) (0.093)
Spillover effect -0.161∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ −0.074 −0.005 0.014 0.019
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.057) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Turkey sanctions 0.009
(0.752)
Log of cost -0.023 -0.137*** -0.138*** −0.078 0.005 −0.069 −0.150∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.060) (0.068) (0.055) (0.057)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Product-year FE No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,583,856 1,583,844 1,583,768 1,565,568 1,565,557 1,565,483 1,565,483
R2 0.76 0.764 0.77 0.816 0.841 0.861 0.861
Adjusted R2 0.753 0.757 0.762 0.811 0.837 0.856 0.856
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level. This table provides the motivation for choosing the main
estimating equation (3) as the benchmark specification for the imports sample. Columns 1-3 present OLS results for comparison, while
columns 4-7 present PPML results. Each column contains a different set of fixed effects along with the three treatment dummy variables of
interest. The benchmark specification is in column 6. Main effect refers to the imports of embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries;
substitution effect is imports of embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning countries; spillover effect refers to the imports of non-embargoed
goods from the sanctioning countries.
FIGURE 2.
Yearly Import Shares of Top 10 Embargoed HS-4 digit Codes by Country Type
Notes: Figure 2 depicts trade shares in total Russian imports of top 10 embargoed HS-4 digit
codes by country type. First, I calculate the trade shares of embargoed goods in the total
imports of embargoed goods. Then I choose the top 10 HS-4 digit codes and plot their import
shares in total Russian imports by country type: sanctioning vs. non-sanctioning. It is clearly
shown that the top 10 HS-4 digit codes are fairly consistent across times. In 2015 (year after
the embargo) the share of imports of embargoed goods from sanctioning countries for the top 4
HS-4 digit codes decreases significantly, and increases for the non-sanctioning countries. Short
HS-4 digit codes descriptions are as follows: 0202 - Meat of bovine animals, frozen; 0203 - Meat
of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen; 0207 - Meat and edible offal, of the poultry, fresh, chilled or
frozen ; 0302 - Fish, fresh or chilled; 0303 - Fish, frozen; 0402 - Milk and cream, concentrated
with/without sugar; 0405 - Butter and other fats and oils derived from milk; 0406 - Cheese and
curd; 0702 - Tomatoes, fresh or chilled; 0805 - Citrus fruit, fresh or dried; 0808 - Apples, pears
and quinces, fresh; 2106 - Food preparations.
Another reason why we do not see the trade in the embargoed goods from
sanctioning countries disappearing completely could be that the dataset I use
records the observations at the HS-4 level product codes, and even though
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the embargo is imposed at the HS-4 digit level, some exceptions to the list of
embargoed goods are present in the Russian laws at the HS-8 and HS-10 digit
levels. Thus the embargoed goods can still be let through the customs even
though they are technically embargoed. There are also specific exemptions for
the goods that are imported for production of baby food or food for athletes -
these goods are allowed to be imported. There is specific paperwork for these
types of exceptions, unfortunately it is not available to the general public and it
is impossible to estimate the true amount of imports of this type.
Additional explanation for why we do not see the 100% drop in the imports
of embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries is the several language changes
that have been introduced to the law on the embargo between the first time it was
imposed in August of 2014 and its intensification in 2015. Namely, the customs
officials are to determine the embargoed good not only using the HS4-digit but
the name of the good as well. To me this suggests that the embargo is flexible
for certain types of goods that are either of strategic interest to the Russian
government, or other individuals with certain connections. Thus, the bulk of the
embargoed goods will not be able to enter the country, while certain goods, which
are exempt from the embargo through either the strategic interest or law loopholes
will still cross the border. Some anecdotal evidence exists to support this claim.
According to the BBC,14 there are multiple cases of the public procurement of
embargoed goods by certain state affiliated enterprises (Parmesan cheese for the
14https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-36986348
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Russian federal Tax Service, Brie cheese for the Hematological scientific center of
the Russian Ministry of Health, state University of civil aviation purchased Finnish
cheese “Oltermanni” and many other cases). Given that these goods are specified
in the public procurement, they classify as imports.
The Substitution Effect
Regarding the substitution, or the goal of the embargo to minimize the
losses to the Russian economy while causing the most damage to the sanctioning
countries, I find that there is indeed significant positive substitution effect
at both the intensive and extensive margins of trade. Regarding the former
from column 7 of Table 2, the substitution effect is an increase of 42% (i.e.,
e0.350 − 1 = 0.419) in an average import flow of embargoed goods from non-
sanctioning countries. Regarding the latter I find that Russia starts importing
embargoed products from more non-sanctioning countries (column 2 of Table 3).
The number of non-sanctioning countries per product increased by approximately
38% (e0.323−1 = 0.38). Recall, from Figure 2, the import share of embargoed goods
from sanctioning countries in many products decreases to almost zero, while the
share of embargoed goods imports from the non-sanctioning countries increased for
the same products.
Using similar methodology to calculating loss, I estimate the gains from
substitution. The average number of non-sanctioning countries per embargoed
product is 5, and the average import flow is 2,918,573. There are on average 245
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non-sanctioning country - embargoed product pairs. I estimate the gains at the
extensive margin to be approximately 3.67 billion USD, and 3.59 billion USD
at the intensive margin. Thus, the total lost imports of embargoed goods one
year after the embargo is estimated at 5.57 billion USD (i.e. 12.83 -7.3). This is,
of course, an estimate, based on averages, and the actual losses to foreign trade
might be larger. My findings point to the fact that the set of goods chosen for
substitution was not optimal, because the substitution for these products was not
readily available, and Russia bore losses as result of its own retaliatory embargo.
My findings also do not reflect the fact that the domestic production of certain
embargoed products increased.
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TABLE 3.
Extensive Margin: Specification Choice
Panel A: IMPORTS Panel B: EXPORTS
W/o country dimension With country dimension W/o country dimension With country dimension
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Embargoed good ×DPost −0.310∗∗∗ −0.015
(0.037) (0.020)
Embargoed good × S country ×DPost −0.868∗∗∗ −0.019
(Main effect) (0.094) (0.036)
Embargoed good × NS country ×DPost 0.323∗∗∗ −0.028
(Substitution effect) (0.035) (0.032)
Non-embargoed good × S country ×DPost −0.00004 −0.029∗∗∗
(Spillover effect) (0.006) (0.007)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country type-product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country type -year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 95,984 177,220 90,183 160,822
R2 0.977 0.968 0.970 0.937
Adjusted R2 0.974 0.966 0.966 0.933
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level. Dependent variable: Columns (1) and (3) - number of
countries from which Russia imports a particular good. Dependent variable: Columns (2) and (4) - number of countries by type (S or NS)
from which Russia imports a particular good. I use PPML estimator to trace the changes in the umber of source countries for embargoed
goods versus non-embargoed goods after the embargo.
Smuggling
Another point that relates to the substitution is smuggling. There is quite a
lot of anecdotal evidence that the embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries
were smuggled through the non-sanctioning countries. Among the two largest
suspects of smuggling are Belarus and Kazakhstan, both countries being in a
customs union with Russia. The most infamous examples of this are shrimps
and pineapples found in Russian stores, and allegedly produced in Belarus,
according to by24.org and Novaya Gazeta.15Belarus has previously been involved
in a smuggling scandal with Russia. For example, in 2006 it became known that
Belarus was exporting the Brazilian and Cuban cane sugar into Russia disguised
as the beet sugar produced in Belarus. The government of Belarus gets certain fees
and payments for these schemes, and given this precedent it is not unlikely that
the embargo allowed Belarus to discover a new income source through the exports
of embargoed goods, which originated in the sanctioning countries, to Russia.
Currently the Russian Customs Service is engaging in several measures, including
tightening of the control procedures of Belarus exports at the border and pushing
the law of the total prohibition of exports of embargoed goods from Belarus into
15Shrimp from Belarus to Russia: http://by24.org/2014/08/19/belarusian_shrimps_goes_
to_hungry_russia/
Mussels from Mogilyov: https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2014/08/11/
60696-nou-hau-mogilevskie-ustritsy-fin-de-kler
Belarus will import shrimps and ham to Russia: https://news.tut.by/economics/412058.
html
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Russia.16 According to the Russian media reports, the smuggling happens either
through simple repackaging and relabeling of goods, or through fake phytosanitary
certificates of product origin (for example, Belarus re-exported apples from Malawi
and Zimbabwe to Russia, even though these countries did not produce any apples).
This narrative might significantly impact my estimates of the substitution effect,
because part of the substitution effect might be attributed to the smuggling. To
account for this I test for the presence of smuggling evidence in the estimates. Due
to the illegal nature of smuggling and not having trustworthy production data for
the smuggling countries, it is incredibly difficult to find any evidence of smuggling
in the official data. I attempt to tease it out by comparing the suspect countries’
imports of the embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning countries and their own
exports of embargoed goods to Russia.
If smuggling happens, it is most likely to happen through countries, with
which Russia has established trade connections, and which themselves trade with
the countries sanctioning Russia. I choose four such countries: Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The choice of countries was based on several factors.
First, for each of these countries there is anecdotal evidence of smuggling (reports
or mentions in the media). Second, they are all members of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), so they share common past and connections with
Russia - they are all former USSR republics. Third, Belarus and Kazakhstan are
16According to gazeta.ru, Fruit wars at the border with Belarus. https://www.gazeta.ru/
business/2019/04/10/12294055.shtml?updated
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both members of a customs union with Russia. To investigate the possibility of
smuggling, I analyze the response of these countries’ imports of embargoed goods
from the sanctioning countries. If the imports increase, it could serve as evidence
of two things: (1) the sanctioning countries begin exporting the embargoed goods
destined for Russia through Belarus in hopes of being able to smuggle them
through the customs; (2) sanctioning countries search for new markets after they
lose access to the Russian market and increase their exports of embargoed goods to
all the other markets. To address the second concern, I account for the imports of
embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning countries. If the former concern is true,
we shouldn’t see a change in the import flows of embargoed goods from the non-
sanctioning countries. If the latter is true, there might be a decline in the trade
of these countries with the non-sanctioning countries due to new sources of the
embargoed goods, and the proximity to the sanctioning countries.
To complete the smuggling story, I analyze the exports of these four countries
of embargoed goods to Russia. If these export flow increase, it could signify
two things: (1) the suspect country increased domestic production and is a
true substituting source for Russia; (2) the suspect country re-exports the
embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries, provided that it also experienced
a significant increase in its imports of these goods. The estimating equations are
presented under (2.5) and (2.6). In (2.5) I estimate the impact of the interaction
between sanctions and embargo on the imports of embargoed goods from the
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sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries to the four countries of interest. In (2.6)
I estimate the change in the exports of embargoed goods from these countries to
Russia.
Importsijkt = β1DE good ×DS ctry ×Dpost + β2DE good ×DNS ctry ×Dpost + γt + γjk + γjy + γky + εijkt
(2.5)
Exportskt rus = β1DE good ×DRussia ×Dpost + γt + γjk + γjy + γky + εjkt (2.6)
I put the two hypotheses to the test, these results are presented in Table
A.3 in Appendix. Two countries, Belarus and Georgia, increase their average
exports of embargoed goods to Russia significantly, by 33% and 107%, respectively.
However, I do not find a significant increase in imports of embargoed goods from
the sanctioning countries for any of these countries. It also appears that for all
of these countries their imports of embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning
countries fell significantly. The smuggling story thus seems difficult to prove. Even
though there exists anecdotal evidence for increase of Belarus exports of certain
goods tenfold, conditional on the fact that Belarus consumption didn’t experience
any shocks in the past few years to warrant such an increase, on average it is
difficult to prove that the numbers I see are the results of smuggling. This is most
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likely due to the illegal nature of smuggling, and the goods destined for smuggling
not being labeled as originating from the sanctioning countries, and as a result,
not registered by the customs. To conclude, I am not able to separate the true
substitution effect and the smuggling of embargoed products through the non-
sanctioning countries.
To conclude, Russian embargo was not successful in eliminating all imports of
embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries, while inflicting losses to Russian
imports, which Russia was not able to fully mitigate by switching to sourcing the
embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning countries. Two important caveats of
these estimations is that I am not able to estimate the amount of substitution
towards the domestic production, or the smuggling of embargoed goods through
the non-sanctioning countries. Thus, I estimate the cost of retaliation at roughly
5.57 billion USD in lost imports of embargoed products (about 3% of total Russian
imports in 2013 or 30% of embargoed good imports).
Figure 3 illustrates the point of the inability to substitute towards the non-
sanctioning countries well. The estimates are constructed by including interactions
of 12 leads and 12 lags with the three coefficients of interest in equation (2.3). The
significant drop in Russian imports of the embargoed goods from the sanctioning
countries (main effect) happens in August 2014, precisely when the embargo was
imposed by Russia and persists all the way to the end of the sample, although
the significance of the coefficient declines by approximately 4 months after the
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embargo. The negative trend, however, persists. This decline is offset by a smaller
increase in the Russian imports of embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning
countries in August 2014 (substitution effect), the month when Russian embargo
was imposed.
FIGURE 3.
Main and Substitution Effects Over Time
Notes: Figure 3 depicts 12 leads and lags of the estimated impact of the embargo on Russian
aggregate trade flows, comprised by the main (pink markers) and substitution effects (blue
markers). The 95% CI are represented by the grey area around the coefficients. The average
trade flows decrease significantly when the embargo is introduced in August of 2014. Trade
flows do not experience significant deviations from trend in 12 months preceding the embargo.
Heterogeneity and Dynamics
In this section I explore the country, product, and time heterogeneity of the
embargo’s effects. Product heterogeneity analysis results are presented in Table 4
and include the analysis of the embargo on three product classes - consumption,
50
capital or intermediate. I also analyze how exclusion of oil and gas products
from the dataset affects my estimates - in other words, I check whether assuming
monopolistic competition biases the estimates. Tables 5 and 6 record the country
heterogeneity analysis results, in which I inspect which countries lose the most
from the embargo based on the country’s income and spatial location relative to
Russia. I conclude this section by disentangling the short and long term impacts
of the embargo on the intensive margin of the Russian imports. These results are
presented in Table 7.
Product Heterogeneity
To analyze the impact of the embargo on product heterogeneity, I use the
Broad Economic Categories classification (BEC), which separates all goods into
consumption, capital and intermediate goods. For the consumption goods, there
is also a division into durable and non-durable goods. The BEC categories are
applied to HS-6 digit code products, so there can be multiple BEC codes within a
single HS-4 code. To ensure that the benchmark results presented in column 1 of
Table 4 are comparable to the more disaggregated dataset, I estimate equation
(2.3) using the disaggregated data (HS-6 digit level product codes) and using
the HS-6 digit product code aggregated up to HS-4 digit code within the BEC
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classification.17 I find that the results are of similar significance and magnitudes
for the aggregated dataset, and thus I proceed with the analysis.
In column 2 of Table 4 I analyze the impact of the embargo at the intensive
margin for the consumption goods versus the capital and intermediate goods. To
do so I include interaction terms between the main effect and indicator variables
for capital and intermediate goods. The same procedure is done for the other
two treatment variables - substitution and spillover effects. The reference group
consists of consumption goods.
The embargo’s impact on consumption goods (elasticity) is equal to βi, (with
i = 1, 2, 3), or eβi − 1 if translated into a percentage change. The effect on
intermediate goods is the summation of the main coefficient and the coefficient
on the interaction term (i.e., βi + βi × Dintermediate); same procedure is applied to
the interaction with capital goods.
Because no capital goods were embargoed, I can estimate the main effect for
consumption and intermediate goods only. Consumption goods experience much
stronger main and substitution effects than intermediate or capital goods. The
main effect for the intermediate effects is significant at 10%,18 and its magnitude
relatively to the main effect is smaller (-0.545 vs -0.111). The smaller drop in
17I begin with the dataset with HS-6 digit product code level and merge it with the BEC
conversion dataset. Each BEC code belongs to one of the three categories - consumption,
intermediate or capital goods. As a result, I create an HS-6 digit code level product dataset,
where each observation belongs to one of the three BEC categories. I then proceed by
aggregating the dataset to the HS-4 digit product code by country and product. Each
observation in this dataset is a HS-4 digit product code with BEC classification attached.
18Established using an F-test; H0: βi + γi × interaction term = 0.
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intermediate goods’ imports may be attributed to a smaller share of those goods
in the sample. Another reason for the smaller effect could be due to the fact that
some embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries were allowed to cross the
Russian border if they were intended to be used for production of special diet
foods (eg. baby food, food for diabetic patients, food for athletes). Another
reason for a smaller effect on intermediate goods might be due to the fact that
the embargo could be less strongly enforced in vital intermediate goods that are
key inputs for domestic production. My data do not allow me to disentangle the
intermediate embargoed goods that are used for those specific types of production
from all the other products, which could lead to the estimates being biased
upward.
Interestingly, intermediate and capital goods do not experience a substitution
effect at all, it is the strongest for the consumption goods. The spillover effect is
not significant for any good type. This makes intuitive sense because the Russian
government emphasized the importance of using domestically-produced inputs
in the production process, so I would not expect the Russian firms to increase
intermediate goods’ imports significantly and instead try to use domestic inputs.
In column 3, I investigate whether the consumption goods heterogeneity
is driven by durable or non-durable goods’ margins. I limit the sample to
consumption goods only and generate interactions between the three effects of
interest and an indicator variable for non-durable goods. The omitted group
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consists of durable consumption goods. Main and substitution effects are much
stronger for the non-durable goods: a 74% decrease in an average import flow
of non-durable consumption goods in comparison to a 40% decline for durable
goods. Surprisingly, the substitution pattern for the non-durable goods is negative,
signifying that the non-durable goods might be more difficult to source from the
non-sanctioning countries. Among non-durable goods are live fish and crustaceans.
Finally, I investigate whether the results so far are sensitive to the inclusion of
oil and gas products. Russia is one of the largest oil and gas exporters in the world
(though not an importer). I rely on an assumption that the prices in all goods’
markets is set according to the same mechanism (monopolistic competition).
However, oil markets do not follow the monopolistic competition assumption
because there are few producers with large market power (oligopoly), so the prices
of these goods are set differently, which impacts their supply and demand. I test
whether including oil and gas products in the dataset might be affecting the
estimates. To test this assumption, I drop the HS product codes for oil and gas
products from the main sample; the results are presented in column 4. The results
from both estimations - with and without oil and gas products in the sample
- are very close in magnitude for all effects - β1, β2 and β3 are very similar in
magnitude and significance (columns 1 and 4). The results hold for performing
this procedure with the dataset containing BEC-classification. Thus, including oil
and gas products in the imports sample has no impact on the estimates.
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TABLE 4.
Product Heterogeneity
Benchmark Intermediate, Consumption Consumption: No oil/gas goods
and Capital goods Durable vs Non-durable goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main −0.713∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.702∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.198) (0.206) (0.239)
Main × Intermediate 0.434∗∗
(0.184)
Main × Capital -
Main × Non-durable goods −0.837∗∗∗
(0.189)
Substitution 0.352∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.096) (0.082) (0.093)
Substitution × Intermediate −0.262
(0.707)
Substitution× Capital −0.204
(0.633)
Substitution × Non-durable goods −1.471∗∗∗
(0.261)
Spillover 0.014 0.056 0.084 0.017
(0.031) (0.065) (0.060) (0.032)
Spillover × Capital −0.025
(0.087)
Spillover × Intermediate −0.090
(0.077)
Spillover × Non-durable goods −0.077
(0.099)
Log of cost −0.069 0.012 0.009 −0.118∗∗
(0.055) (0.052) (0.115) (0.056)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,565,483 3,751,003 1,158,565 1,560,320
R2 0.861 0.343 0.367 0.866
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.334 0.358 0.862
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level. In column 2
the effect of the embargo is disentangled by the good type (as per Broad Economic Categories
(BEC) classification): consumption, intermediate, and capital goods. The imports are regressed
on the interaction between dummy variables for intermediate and capital goods and the three
main variables of interest (main, substitution, and spillover effects). The omitted category
consists of consumption goods. The “-” means that there are no observations in this category (it
cannot be identified). In column 3 I explore the effect of the embargo within the consumption
goods, for durable and non-durable goods. The omitted category consists of durable goods.
In column 4 all oil and gas HS-4 codes are removed to test the monopolistic competition
assumption.
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Country Heterogeneity
The analysis of country heterogeneity is twofold: first I analyze the impacts
of the embargo on countries of varying income levels proxied by the GDP per
capita, then I concentrate on the embargo’s effects on countries by their geographic
proximity to Russia. These results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
To analyze income heterogeneity, I utilize the existing World Bank
classification of countries by income: low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high
income.19 To simplify the analysis, I combine the lower-middle and upper-middle
income countries into one income bin, the middle income countries. I use these
guidelines and the GDP per capita as a measure of income to construct indicator
variables for the three income bins. Next, I create interaction terms with the three
effects of interest: main, substitution and spillover effects. These interaction terms
are then included in my benchmark specification for the intensive margin (3).
These results are presented in Table 5. As usual, column 1 provides the benchmark
specification results for comparison. The reference group in column 2 is comprised
of the high-income countries.
There are no sanctioning countries that fall into the low income bracket, so
the main or spillover effects cannot be estimated for this group. This analysis
provides some unexpected findings: while the main impact has the expected sign
and high significance for the high income countries (a decline of 71% for an average
19See https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-income-level-2017-2018
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import flow of embargoed goods for high income sanctioning countries), the main
effect is actually positive for the middle income countries (Bulgaria, Turkey and
Ukraine). Thus, after the imposition of the embargo Russian imports of embargoed
goods increased from these countries before the intensification of the embargo. The
strongest substitution effect (significant at 5%) is also driven my middle income
countries, such as Belarus, Moldova, China, Brazil and others. Interestingly, there
is a significant decline of non-embargoed goods from middle income sanctioning
countries.
There is strong evidence that Russia uses the embargo to strategically target
smaller countries. The largest effect of the embargo (a drop of almost 100%) is
registered for the lower-middle income countries, while the substitution effect for
this group is statistically insignificant and a significant negative spillover effect is
present. I conclude that the embargo was placed to ensure the largest losses to
smallest sanctioning countries (who would not be able to mitigate losses easily by
themselves) in order to impact the sanction decision.
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TABLE 5.
Country Heterogeneity by Income
Benchmark specification By income bracket
(1) (2)
Main −0.713∗∗∗ −1.243∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.331)
Main × Low -
Main × Middle 1.585∗∗∗
(0.323)
Substitution 0.352∗∗∗ 0.130
(0.091) (0.174)
Substitution × Low −0.110
(0.235)
Substitution × Middle 0.292∗
(0.162)
Spillover 0.014 0.030
(0.031) (0.031)
Spillover × Low -
Spillover × Middle −0.117∗∗∗
(0.041)
Log of cost −0.069 −0.067
(0.055) (0.055)
Period FE Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,565,483 1,565,483
R2 0.861 0.861
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.857
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level.
The income brackets are defined based on an average GDP per capita over the years
prior to the embargo using the World Bank classification; to simplify the analysis, I
combine lower-middle and upper-middle income countries into one income bin, the
middle income countries. Interaction terms between the three effects of interest: main,
substitution and spillover effects and the dummy variables for the low and middle
income brackets are included in the benchmark specification (3). The reference group in
column 2 is comprised of the high-income countries.
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Finally, I conduct a spatial heterogeneity analysis to understand how the
embargo impacts countries based on their proximity to Russia. I classify countries
as neighboring if the recorded weighted distance between them and Russia is
less than 4,000 kilometers (most of these countries share a common border with
Russia). The midrange countries’ weighted distance is between 4,000 and 10,000
kilometers; countries that are more than 10,000 kilometers away from Russia are
classified as distant countries. Similarly to the procedure described for the country
income heterogeneity analysis, I generate indicator variables for each of the three
distance bins, and interact them with the three variables of interest and include
them in my benchmark specification. These results are recorded in Table 6, in
which the reference group consists of the far-range countries.
The far-range countries experience the strongest main effect of the Russian
retaliatory embargo (e−2.066 − 1), which can be interpreted as a 87% drop in
Russian imports of embargoed goods from far-range sanctioning countries. Both,
neighboring and mid-range countries still experience a negative main effect, but for
the mid-range countries it is statistically significant only at 10%. These findings
are quite intuitive - sanctioning countries are in Europe, North America and
Australia, and are classified as neighboring, midrange or far-range countries. It is
interesting that the main effect is driven by the far-range countries, which include
the US, Canada, Spain and Portugal. The majority of the European sanctioning
countries are classified as mid-range, which explains why we see the strongest
59
impact for those countries. Counterintuitively, the substitution effect is the largest
in magnitude and with expected sign for the far-range countries. I would expect
Russia to try to substitute towards the neighboring countries, but it could be the
case that neighboring countries cannot satisfy Russia’s demand for embargoed
goods. The neighboring countries and mid-range countries actually experience
a decline in their average exports of embargoed goods to Russia. It could be
explained by the fact that logistically substitution towards far-range countries
requires withdrawal from neighboring and mid-range countries in order to cut
costs.
To conclude there is quite a lot of heterogeneity at the intensive margin of
trade along both margins, product and countries. The three surprising findings
are: (1) substitution is stronger for the far-range countries; (2) middle income
countries experience a positive, although statistically not significant main effect;
(3) both main and substitution effects are driven by consumption goods.
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TABLE 6.
Country Heterogeneity by Distance
Benchmark specification By distance bracket
(1) (2)
Main −0.713∗∗∗ −2.066∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.598)
Main × Neighbor 1.337∗
(0.693)
Main × Mid-range 0.916
(0.713)
Substitution 0.352∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.169)
Substitution × Neighbor −0.244
(0.209)
Substitution × Mid-range −0.790∗∗∗
(0.204)
Spillover 0.014 −0.087
(0.031) (0.298)
Spillover × Neighbor 0.112
(0.297)
Spillover × Mid-range 0.110
(0.289)
Log of cost −0.069 0.027
(0.055) (0.056)
Period FE Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,565,483 1,565,483
R2 0.861 0.861
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.856
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level.
Neighboring countries: recorded weighted distance ≤ 4,000 km (most of these countries
share a common border with Russia); midrange countries: weighted distance between
4,000 and 10,000 km; distant countries: weighted distance > 10,000 km. I generate
indicator variables for each of the three distance bins, and interact them with the three
variables of interest and include them in the benchmark specification (3). The omitted
group consists of far-range countries.
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Dynamics
Table 7 presents the results of the dynamics exercise, in which I disentangle
the short and long term impacts of the embargo on the intensive margin of the
Russian imports. The short run spans the first five months of the embargo (August
2014 till December 2014), while the long run includes periods from January 2015
to December 2016. I construct an interaction term with the long-term indicator
variable for each of the three effects, and compare the long and short term effects
(the control group consists of the short term effects). The benchmark model is
provided in column 1 for comparison.
The main effect of the embargo has a larger magnitude and significance in
the short run - Russian imports of embargoed goods from sanctioning countries
decrease by 48%. The long run impact is smaller and individually insignificant.
This is feasible since the embargo was an exogenous shock which was imposed
unexpectedly for all economic agents. Thus, the largest portion of the decline in
the imports of the embargoed products from the sanctioning countries happened in
the first 5 months after the embargo was imposed. The overall long-run impact of
the embargo on Russian imports estimated in column 2 is −0.665− 0.120 = −0.544
or a 54% decline. This shows that in the long run, the imports decrease less than
in the short run, i.e. the effectiveness of the embargo decreases over time. This
may indicate either a relaxation of embargo or an increase in domestic production.
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The substitution pattern presents interesting dynamics: it has the expected
sign and is highly statistically significant in the short run, a 42% increase in
average imports of the embargoed goods from non-sanctioning countries, while
the long run coefficient is statistically insignificant and has a negative sign. This
could serve as evidence that in the long run domestic production makes searching
for the new foreign trade partners less needed, and thus decreases the magnitude
and significance of the long run interaction term.
Both, the main treatment and substitution effects are the strongest in the
short run, as evidenced by the individual coefficients, β1 and β2, which have the
expected signs and high statistical significance. No large changes in trade flows
happen for either effect (main treatment or substitution) in the long run, as
evidenced by the low statistical significance of the interaction coefficient. However,
the negative impacts of both effects persist in the long run, which is shown by the
high joint significance of the long-run effects. The same conclusion can be drawn
from analyzing Figure 3: the significance of the main and substitution effects
dissipate over time, while new trends persist for many periods after the embargo
is imposed.
To enhance the analysis of the dynamic effects of the Russian embargo, I
analyze whether the “smart” sanctions had any impact on Russian imports. The
“smart” sanctions refer to the restrictions imposed on certain Russian individuals
and firms who supported the Crimean annexation. The first round of the “smart”
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sanctions was imposed immediately after the annexation of Crimea in March of
2014. These sanctions include a ban on all commercial activities with firms in
Russia and Ukraine that supported Crimean annexation. I disentangle the impact
of the embargo from the impact of the “smart”sanctions and present the results in
Table 8.20
I find a significant drop in Russian imports of embargoed goods from the
sanctioning countries following the imposition of the “smart”sanctions, however
this effect is of a much smaller magnitude than the effect of the embargo (-0.158 vs
-0.759) and lower significance than the main effect of the embargo. This finding
suggests that the sanctions might have a negative impact on Russian imports
from the sanctioning countries. This finding is in line with the study by Crozet
and Hinz (2019). The sanctions target a small number of firms, so their impact,
relative to the size of the embargo, which targets multiple countries and products,
is not expected to be large. I do not find a significant impact of sanctions on either
the substitution or the spillover coefficients, while the embargo still has a clearly
pronounced substitution effect, as expected.
20I create a new time indicator for the “smart” sanctions; it takes the value of 1 for periods
from March 2014 until August 2014, when the embargo was imposed. I then generate treatment
variables by interacting the time dummy with the indicators for the sanctioning or non-
sanctioning countries and embargoed or non-embargoed product (same procedure as described in
section 4). I re-estimate the benchmark model (3) including the old and new variables of interest;
the results are presented in column 2 of Table 8.
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TABLE 7.
Dynamics
Benchmark specification Dynamics of the effects
(1) (2)
Main −0.713∗∗∗ −0.665∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.232)
Main × Long run −0.120
(0.884)
Substitution 0.352∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.090)
Substitution × Long run −0.162
(0.724)
Spillover 0.014 0.010
(0.031) (0.030)
Spillover× Long run 0.142
(0.445)
Log of cost −0.069 0.004
(0.055) (0.054)
Period FE Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,565,483 1,565,483
R2 0.861 0.861
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.856
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code
level. The short run spans the first five months of the embargo (August
2014 till December 2014), while the long run includes all the other periods
following the embargo (January 2015 till December 2016). Long run is an
indicator variable for the long run. The reference group is short run effects
Falsification exercise
The previous estimates from the heterogeneity and dynamics analysis of
the embargo’s effects are of a similar significance and magnitude. This provides
evidence of the stability and robustness of the results. I conduct an additional
robustness checks: a falsification exercise. The aim of the falsification exercise is to
provide evidence that the strong negative impact found in the previous estimations
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is indeed due to the imposition of embargo and not other unaccounted exogenous
shocks and processes happening in the economy before the imposition of the
embargo.
The methodology of the falsification exercise is as follows. First, I limit the
sample to the period until August 2014, i.e. when the embargo was imposed.
Then I conduct permutation tests on this truncated sample. The procedure is as
follows. I generate 1000 samples from the truncated data, each sample containing
10000 observations chosen randomly. Next, counterfactual main treatment,
substitution and spillover effects variables are generated. Finally, I estimate the
benchmark specification (2.3) for each of these samples. The densities of each of
the three coefficients of interest are presented in Figure 4. The values for all three
coefficients are concentrated around zero, which signifies that no other negative
pre-existing trends contribute to the significant drop in Russian aggregate imports
after the imposition of the food embargo in August of 2014. To conclude, the
falsification exercise confirms that the significant drop in bilateral trade between
Russia and the sanctioning partner countries that I estimate is indeed attributed
to the imposition of the embargo.
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TABLE 8.
Smart Sanctions vs. Embargo
Benchmark specification Smart sanctions vs Embargo
(1) (2)
Smart sanctions × Main −0.158∗∗
(0.077)
Main −0.713∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.246)
Smart sanctions × Substitution 0.086
(0.092)
Substitution 0.352∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.100)
Smart sanctions × Spillover 0.042
(0.036)
Spillover 0.014 0.038
(0.031) (0.045)
Log of cost −0.069 −0.138∗∗
(0.055) (0.055)
Period FE Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,565,483 1,565,483
R2 0.861 0.861
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.856
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level. The
smart sanctions refer to the restrictions imposed on certain Russian individuals and firms,
who supported the Crimean annexation; they were imposed in March of 2014. I generate a
separate indicator variable for smart sanctions, which receives the value of 1 for time periods
from March till July 2014 and keep the original time dummy variable, which receives value of 1
in time periods following August 2014. I then generate the three coefficients of interest (main,
substitution and spillover effects) as described in section 3, using the new time indicator for the
smart sanctions. I include these variables along with the original treatment variables in the main
specification (3), and re-estimate specification (2.3) .
Spillover Effect: Exports
Major trade shocks like the embargo can have unanticipated impacts on the
dimensions of trade not directly impacted by it. Thus, I also explore the possible
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impact of the embargo on the trade flows that are not directly impacted by the
embargo: imports of non-embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries and
Russian exports. I do not find significant spillover effects on the imports side of
trade; in this section I analyze the spillover impact of the embargo on Russian
exports. The estimation results for the exports sample intensive margin are
presented in Table 9, and extensive margin in panel B of Table 3.
Intensive and Extensive Margins
For the intensive margin of exports, i.e., the average export flow of embargoed
or non-embargoed goods to the sanctioning or non-sanctioning countries. I follow
the same protocol as for the imports and compare the results of the estimating
equation (4) across specifications with varying sets of fixed effects and two
estimators, PPML and OLS. The benchmark specification is presented in column
7. As expected, the main treatment and substitution effects are insignificant and
are of much smaller magnitude than the respective effects for the imports sample.
However, interestingly the signs of the coefficients are opposite than expected
(main effect is positive and substitution effect is negative). However, the lack of
significance is intuitive - only imported goods were embargoed, while none of the
Russian exports were embargoed by the Russian government, and the share of the
embargoed goods in the sample is only 1%.
Interestingly, I observe a significant negative spillover effect of the embargo on
Russian exports. This result is robust with consistent magnitudes and significance
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across all specifications, irrespective of the estimator used, OLS or PPML. This
result is somewhat surprising, because I would not expect the embargo to hurt
Russian exports as its aim was to hurt the exports of the sanctioning countries,
not Russian exports. This could be due to (1) the “chilling” effect of the embargo -
it acts as an overall suppressant of trade and is driven by the politically motivated
decision of the firms in the sanctioning countries to stop importing from Russia
to boycott its decision to impose the embargo; (2) the exports’ sample consists
of predominantly non-embargoed goods, and my results might be picking up the
effects of the “smart” sanctions, which are described in the dynamics section
of this paper;21 and (3) the US increased its oil exports, so reliance on Russian
imports from the US and other countries declined.
Regarding (3), I account for the oil price as a composite of the cost variable in
the regressions and separately perform product heterogeneity analysis. Regarding
(1) and (2), I provide analysis of the dynamics of the three effects of interest
in order to disentangle the impact of the embargo on Russian exports from the
impact of the “smart” sanctions.
The same significance pattern emerges for the extensive margin coefficients:
The spillover effect is negative and highly significant, although its magnitude is
several times larger than the spillover effect coefficient of the extensive margin
effects for the imports . I estimate that, on average, after the embargo the number
of sanctioning countries to which Russia exports non-embargoed goods decreases
21The “smart” sanctions are analyzed in detail by Ahn and Ludema (2019).
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by 1, which represents a decline of about 20% of the pre-embargo number of
sanctioning countries. The average export flow declines by 21%. I estimate the
total cumulative loss of the embargo on Russian exports of non-embargoed goods
to the sanctioning countries to be 78 billion USD.
This is quite a surprising finding. The chilling effect of the embargo and
the sanctions had a much larger impact on the absolute exports levels than for
the absolute imports. The embargo was not completely effective in shutting
down the import flows from the sanctioning countries, and the optimality of the
chosen set of goods is questionable, because substitution was not available for the
full set of the goods. Additionally, Russian retaliatory embargo had a chilling
effect on Russian exports, impacting export flows of non-embargoed goods to
the sanctioning countries. These three points may serve as an evidence of the
ineffectiveness of these types of protectionist policies, because not only did the
Russian retaliatory embargo fail to coerce the sanctioning countries to lift the
sanctions, but it also had an unintentional spillover effect on the Russian exports
that were not supposed to be affected by the embargo.
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FIGURE 4.
Falsification Exercise: Simulation Results
Notes: This figure provides the results of permutation tests on a truncated sample (January 2010
- July 2014) to ensure that the effects of the embargo do not contaminate the permutation tests.
The procedure for the test is as follows. First, 1000 random samples from the data are generated,
each sample containing 10000 observations chosen randomly. Next, counterfactual main
treatment, substitution and spillover effects are generated. Finally, I estimate the benchmark
specification for each of these samples.
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Dynamics and Heterogeneity Analysis
To shed light on the driving forces of the embargo’s impact on Russian
exports, I conduct heterogeneity analysis. First, I analyze the impact of the
smart sanctions on Russian exports. The chilling effect of the embargo could be
explained by the “smart sanctions” imposed in March of 2014. To analyze whether
this concern holds, I create a time indicator for the “smart sanctions”, which takes
the value of 1 for periods from March 2014 till August 2014, when the embargo
was imposed. I then generate variables of interest by interacting these “smart
sanctions” time dummy with the indicators for the sanctioning or non-sanctioning
countries and embargoed or non-embargoed product (same procedure as described
in section 3). I include these interaction terms in the benchmark model (3) and
record the results in Table 10. I do not find that the “smart sanctions” had
an impact on any types of export flows, and I still find a significant spillover
effect after the imposition of the embargo, which confirms that the embargo had
unintended consequences for the Russian exports.
Second, I perform a heterogeneity analysis for the exports sample. The
largest concern with the Russian exports is the fact that Russia is a large exporter
of gas and oil products. These products do not comply with the monopolistic
competition assumption due to market structure for these products (cartels),
and thus could be biasing the estimates. After removing all gas and oil products
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from the exports sample, I estimate the benchmark specification on the truncated
sample. These results are presented in column 2 of Table 11. Exclusion of gas
and oil products from the sample has an impact on all three coefficients of
interest. The main effect coefficient becomes negative and remains not statistically
significantly different from zero. This could speak to the fact that in comparison
to the oil and gas products, the exports of the embargoed goods to the sanctioning
countries increased, because the exports of oil and gas products decreased, but
when excluding these goods, the exports of embargoed goods actually decline to
both country types. The spillover effect remains unchanged - the average exports
of the non-embargoed goods, which are not oil or gas products, to the sanctioning
countries decline by about 21%. This points to the fact that the embargo had a
chilling effect not only for the oil and gas goods, but for all other export products
as well. This eliminates the concerns that the spillover effect I find is driven by
macroeconomic factors.
Lastly, I address the break down of the three effects of interest by the BEC
good type, as described previously in the imports analysis section. These results
are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 11. Several interesting findings emerge.
The main effect, i.e. average exports of embargoed goods to the sanctioning
countries, is negative and is driven by the intermediate goods (a decline of about
63%). This could serve as evidence of Russia’s attempt to substitute imported
inputs by domestically produced ones - the domestically produced intermediate
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goods, which would be exported prior to the embargo, are redirected towards the
domestic production. The spillover effect loses significance, but the magnitude is
seemingly driven by the non-durable consumption goods (decline of about 48%).
To conclude, I find unexpected spillover effect of the embargo, i.e. that after
the imposition of the embargo average Russian export flow of non-embargoed
goods to the sanctioning countries (both non-embargoed goods and sanctioning
countries are incredibly important in the structure of Russian exports) decline by
about 75 billion USD (cumulative loss of the extensive and intensive margins). I
cannot attribute this chilling effect to dropping oil prices, the effect is driven by
the goods other than oil and gas. I also find some evidence that Russian exports
of intermediate embargoed goods fall, either due to redirection of these goods
to domestic production or the political or logistical motivations of the partners
in the sanctioning countries. Major trade shocks, like sanctions and embargoes,
bring heavy blows to bilateral trade flows, and often bring about unintended
consequences. This is a very important takeaway for the policy makers - the
embargoes will significantly decline the trade in the affected goods, but also have
spillover effects onto goods that are affected by increasing the uncertainty of trade
policy, political and logistical misalignment of the partners in the sending and
receiving countries.
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TABLE 9.
Specification Choice for Exports Sample
Dependent variable: Log of trade Level of trade
OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Main effect -0.026 -0.061 -0.020 0.374∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.233 0.233
(0.101) (0.099) (0.066) (0.084) (0.175) (0.188) (0.188)
Substitution effect 0.078 0.069 0.093 0.083 0.107∗ −0.118 −0.118
(0.062) (0.072) (0.072) (0.102) (0.064) (0.076) (0.076)
Spillover effect -0.123∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗ −0.220∗∗ −0.220∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.050) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088)
Turkey sanctions 0.200
(0.249)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Product-year FE No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 930,837 930,832 930,710 931,617 931,612 931,488 931,488
R2 0.78 0.784 0.79 0.912 0.923 0.930 0.930
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.774 0.778 0.908 0.919 0.926 0.926
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level. As a part of spillover effects analysis, I estimate
the impacts of the embargo on Russian exports. Columns 1-3 present OLS results for comparison, while columns 4-7 present PPML
results. Each column contains a different set of fixed effects along with the three treatment dummy variables of interest. The benchmark
specification is in column 6. Main effect refers to the exports of embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries; substitution effect is
exports of embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning countries; spillover effect refers to the exports of non-embargoed goods from the
sanctioning countries.
Conclusion
In this study I provide an extensive analysis of different dimensions of the
Russian retaliatory embargo and its impacts on Russian trade. I utilize the triple
difference estimation of the gravity equation to distinguish between the embargo’s
impacts on the imports of the embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries
(the main effect), the imports of embargoed goods from the non-sanctioning
countries (the substitution effect), and the imports of non-embargoed goods from
the sanctioning countries (the spillover effect). Even though Russian embargo
indeed significantly reduced the import flows from the sanctioning countries, it
was not fully effective as it did not eliminate imports of embargoed goods from
the sanctioning countries completely. I estimate the lost imports of embargoed
goods in the 12 months following the imposition fo the embargo at about 13 billion
USD (30% of all imports of embargoed goods in 2013) and lost exports of about 75
billion USD (about 17% of Russian total exports in 2013). Additionally I find that
the set of embargoed goods was chosen sub optimally, as the substitution was not
available for the entire amount of lost imports: only about 55% of the lost imports
were redirected to the non-sanctioning source countries. Although the sanctioning
countries indeed took a toll after the Russian embargo was imposed, it did not
lead to the desired outcome for Russia - the sanctions are in place till present
day. My study emphasizes the importance of understanding the magnitude of the
disturbances caused by embargoes, as even the embargoes that target a relatively
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small set of products causes spillovers, significantly increasing the costs of political
games played by the involved governments.
TABLE 10.
Exports Sample: Smart Sanctions vs Embargo
Benchmark specification Smart sanctions vs Embargo
(1) (2)
Smart sanctions × Main effect 0.248
(0.208)
Main effect 0.233 0.301
(0.188) (0.251)
Smart sanctions × Substitution effect 0.014
(0.111)
Substitution effect −0.118 −0.047
(0.076) (0.123)
Smart sanctions × Spillover effect −0.061
(0.061)
Spillover effect −0.220∗∗ −0.262∗∗
(0.088) (0.124)
Log of cost 0.006 0.007
(0.107) (0.107)
Period FE Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 931,488 931,488
R2 0.930 0.930
Adjusted R2 0.926 0.926
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level. The worry
that the embargo had a chilling effect on Russian trade, which means that not only the targeted
trade was impacted, but there is a sizable spillover onto other trade flows. However, Russian
exports could also have been affected by the “smart” sanctions given that certain firms, who are
likely to be exporters were targeted. I disentangle the effects of the “smart” sanctions from the
effect of the embargo for the exports sample.
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TABLE 11.
Exports Sample: Product Heterogeneity
Benchmark No oil/gas goods Intermediate, Consumption Consumption goods:
and Capital goods Durable vs Non-durable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main 0.233 −0.044 0.327∗∗ −0.053
(0.188) (0.072) (0.155) (0.090)
Main × Intermediate −1.344∗∗∗
(0.238)
Main × Capital -
Main × Non-durable -
Substitution −0.118 −0.118∗ −0.100 −0.261∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.068) (0.078) (0.100)
Substitution× Intermediate −0.376
(0.272)
Substitution × Capital −0.067
(0.404)
Substitution× Non-durable −0.160
(0.255)
Spillover −0.220∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.202 −0.315∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.035) (0.168) (0.096)
Spillover× Intermediate 0.016
(0.152)
Spillover × Capital 0.071
(0.282)
Spillover× Non-durable −0.414∗
(0.220)
Log of cost 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.005
(0.107) (0.063) (0.126) (0.193)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 931,488 921,130 1,704,598 425,224
R2 0.930 0.902 0.816 0.312
Adjusted R2 0.926 0.897 0.811 0.289
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level. The largest
concern with the Russian exports is the fact that Russia is a large exporter of gas and oil
products. These products do not comply with the monopolistic competition assumption due
to market structure for these products (cartels), and thus could be biasing the estimates.
After removing all gas and oil products from the exports sample, I estimate the benchmark
specification on the truncated sample (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 are constructed in a similar
fashion to columns 2 and 3 in Table 4. Omitted group in column 3 consists of consumption
goods. In column 4 the sample is reduced to consumption goods only. The omitted category in
column 4 consists of durable goods.
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CHAPTER III
QUANTIFYING THE TRADE REDUCING EFFECT OF EMBARGOES: FIRM
LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA
Introduction
Sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy, used in response to events
and behaviors that are deemed problematic. Sanctions take many forms, including
economic and trade restrictions, restrictions on bank activities and financial
operations, travel bans, and arms embargoes. These measures are frequently
used in practice: for example, currently the UN maintains 14 sanctioning regimes
(United Nations Security Council (2017)). In spite of that, the empirical evidence
on their economic impact or ultimate success is mixed. This may be explained
in part by the fact that historically sanctions have been imposed on smaller
economies (for example, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria). It wasn’t
until recently that a large economy such as Russia was targeted by economic
sanctions. This large country case brings new dimensions to the problem of
economic sanctions, as the targeted economy has the ability and market power
to retaliate in order to inflict economic costs on the sanctioning countries.
The goal of this paper is to take advantage of this unique case study and
to investigate the consequences of Russia’s counter-sanctions. I am particularly
interested to see what effect the retaliatory embargo had on Russia’s trade
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patterns and how trading firms responded to this negative shock. Understanding
the economic impact of the self-imposed retaliatory import embargo is important
in the context of the observed protectionist policies and increasing threats to the
global trading system made by large countries around the world.
The tensions between Russia and the international community go back several
years. After the decision to enter the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, the Russian
government has been widely criticized for its actions. This ultimately led to the
majority of the OECD countries imposing sanctions on Russia. The goal of the
anti-Russian sanctions is to coerce Russia to leave the Crimea. Currently Russia
is sanctioned by 37 countries, including the 28 EU countries (counting the United
Kingdom), the U.S., Canada, Australia, Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Albania,
Montenegro, and Ukraine.1 The sanctions against Russia were further intensified
after the shooting down of the Malaysian flight MH-17 over the territories
controlled by the pro-Russian armies in Eastern Ukraine. Russia retaliated
against these economic sanctions by imposing a partial embargo on imports of
48 agricultural HS-4 codes from the sanctioning countries only.
Both foreign policies sanctions and the retaliatory embargo, are likely to have
significant impacts on Russian economy and trade, because sanctioning countries
are important trade partners for Russia: prior to the embargo more than half
(i.e., 57 %) of Russia’s import value came from the countries sanctioning Russia.
1Full list of the countries sanctioning Russia and their affiliations is presented in Table A.1 of
Appendix A.
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The products targeted by the embargo (targeted products) are also an important
component of the Russian imports: prior to the imposition of the embargo, the
share of embargoed goods in total imports was 7% (with half of this volume
originating in the sanctioning countries). Most of the embargoed products (i.e,
82%) were consumer goods2 and included such items as dairy products, fresh and
frozen fruits and vegetables, fish and meat.3. Thus, the imposition of the embargo
shut off an important channel of Russian agricultural imports, which was likely to
impact consumers and firms that were involved in the importing of these products.
This paper uses firm-level data to examine the behavior of firms in response
to the retaliatory embargo. To guide the econometric analysis, I follow Bas and
Strauss-Kahn (2014) and propose a partial equilibrium model of intermediate
inputs trade that outlines a set of firm-level responses triggered by the imposition
of the embargo. In this framework a firm chooses the amount of labor and
composite inputs to use in the production process, and where to source these
inputs from. Firm could opt for domestic or international sources, and if it goes
international, it can choose from countries targeted by the embargo and non-
targeted. Inputs sourcing decisions are made to minimize the cost of production,
while the price of final goods is set to maximize the firm’s profits. Solving the
firm’s problem, I derive productivity cutoffs for the three types of firms: firms
2As per the Broad Economic Categories classification (BEC), all products were classified as
consumption, intermediate, or capital goods.
3Full list of the HS-4 codes targeted by the retaliatory embargo is presented in Table ?? of
Appendix A
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sourcing inputs domestically, firms importing inputs from the non-targeted
countries, and firms importing inputs from the targeted countries. The imposition
of the retaliatory embargo induces a decrease in the number of imported inputs
from the targeted countries. This, in turn, affects the productivity cutoffs that
determine firms’ input sourcing patterns.4 Given this set-up, I derive three
theoretical predictions regarding the firm’s response to the imposition of the
embargo: (1) after the imposition of the embargo, the exit rates of firms importing
inputs from the targeted countries increase for both targeted and non-targeted
products (the extensive margin); (2) conditional on a firm staying in the market
of a targeted country, the volume of trade falls (the intensive margin); (3) firms
exiting the markets of targeted countries begin importing inputs from the non-
targeted countries.
I test the model predictions using a novel firm-level transaction dataset, from
the Federal Customs Service of Russia. The advantage of the data comes from the
level of detail it provides on firm level decisions. The data set contains detailed
information on all Russian exporting and importing firms’ monthly trade flows by
partner-country and HS-8 level product code. I use a triple difference estimation
strategy to identify the impact of the embargo on the extensive and intensive
margins of firm-level imports. The extensive margin of firms in the context of this
study refers to the number of firms importing an HS-8 level code product from
a given country. The firm’s intensive margin refers to the size of a firm’s average
4Either directly or through the price index channel
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product-country import flow. I use information on the products and countries that
Russian firms imported from prior to the imposition of the embargo to determine
treatment effects. I refer to the changes in the imports of products targeted by the
embargo (targeted products) from the countries targeted by the embargo (targeted
countries)5 as the direct effect of the embargo. The response of the imports of
the targeted products from the non-targeted countries is called the substitution
effect. Finally, the spillover effect refers to the import response of the non-targeted
products sourced from the targeted countries.6 The main empirical contribution
of this paper is the analysis of the behavior of Russian firms in response to the
unexpected exogenous trade shock represented by the Russian retaliatory embargo.
Such micro level dynamics and any potential heterogeneities cannot be uncovered
using the aggregate data.
The main results of the paper suggest that firms’ exit rates increase in the
markets for the targeted products after the embargo is imposed, and these exit
rates are driven mostly by small firms. Large firms are able to remain in the
markets for the targeted products by switching their sourcing pattern towards non-
targeted countries (extensive margin effects). Surprisingly, not all firms discontinue
their imports of targeted goods from the targeted countries. For the subset of firms
that stay in these markets, the value of imports in targeted goods falls, on average,
by 13 percent (intensive margin effects). Although unexpected, this finding is in
5Countries that sanction Russia are the countries that Russian retaliatory embargo targets.
6Appendix B provides an example for each of the effects.
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line with Miromanova (2018), which shows that the Russian retaliatory embargo
was not fully effective in shutting down the imports of targeted goods from the
targeted countries.7 Lastly, I find no evidence of unintended consequences of the
embargo on the imports of other product categories. Taken together, the findings
in this paper suggest that Russian firms have been able to mitigate some but not
all of the costs resulting from the Russian retaliatory embargo.
This paper contributes to the economic literature on (i) trade sanctions;
(ii) Russian sanctions; and (iii) non-tariff barriers to trade. Regarding (i),
international sanctions and embargoes generally provide an excellent opportunity
to estimate the response of various economic outcomes to large exogenous shocks.
These policies have been used to estimate the impacts of shocks on trade flows,
GDP level, and stock market. For example, Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015)
utilize a sample of 160 countries, 67 of which experienced economic sanctions
over the period 1976-2012 to estimate the effect of the sanctions on the target
states’ GDP growth. Chavis and Leslie (2009) and Pandya and Venkatesan (2016)
use the US consumers’ boycott of the French goods to estimate the effects of the
boycott on consumer behavior. They find that the sales of brands with French-
sounding names and French wine, respectively, declined after the boycott was
7This could be either because of the strategic interest of the Russian government in
certain targeted goods needed for domestic production or because of the ineffectiveness of
the enforcement mechanism. There exists some anecdotal evidence of the fact that the public
procurement included purchases of targeted products from the targeted countries even after the
embargo was imposed, for example Alexander Soshnikov. “Parmesan forever: officials purchase
embargoed products” (translated from Russian). BBC, Russian unit, August 5, 2016. Accessed
online at https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-36986348
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declared, but returned to normal levels after the decline in the mentions of the
boycott in the media. Afesorgbor and Mahadevan (2016) analyze the Yugoslavian
conflict to establish that sanctions and wars decrease not only trade between
the countries directly engaged in conflict but also trade with the third countries.
Finally, Heilmann (2016) uses a difference-in-differences approach and a synthetic
control group method to analyze three episodes of sanctions and boycotts. He finds
that boycotts can have strong negative effects on bilateral trade in both goods and
services.
Researchers also expressed interest in (ii) the Russian sanctions in particular,
including their impact on goods prices in Russia (Dreger et al. (2016)), GDP of
EU and Russia (Kholodilin and Netsunajev (2016)) and trade flows (Miromanova
(2018)). Finally, regarding (iii) non-tariff barriers to trade, there are surprisingly
few studies of the impact of non-tariff barriers on the behavior of firms. The
trade literature has mostly studied how changes in tariffs affect firm behavior.
For example, in one of the most influential studies on firms in international trade,
Pavcnik (2002) explores the impacts of trade liberalization, i.e., the reduction in
tariffs, on firms in Chile. However, to my knowledge, there are few studies that
estimate the effects of non-tariff policies, such as sanctions ad embargoes, on firms.
Using the case of the Russian retaliatory embargo I analyze the firms’ behavior in
response to the non-tariff barrier to trade of the embargo.
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Two studies are especially relevant to my paper. Crozet and Hinz (2019)
estimate the impacts of the Russian sanctions on the extensive and intensive
margins of French firms in an attempt to quantify the effect of the embargo
on the sending country. My paper complements the work of Crozet and Hinz
(2019) as I focus on the other side of the story: I concentrate on estimating the
impacts of the Russian embargo on Russian firms. Haidar (2017) utilizes the
Iranian customs data set to analyze whether the export sanctions imposed on Iran
cause export deflection (defined as the firms in the sanctioned countries seeking
new trade partners among non-sanctioning countries). He finds evidence that
two-thirds of Iranian exports were deflected to non-sanctioning countries after
sanctions were imposed in 2008. I complement this study by analyzing the effect of
sanctions on imports rather than exports and whether changes in import patterns
as a result of the embargo are similar to the documented changes in exports. I
also analyze the effectiveness of sanctions as a trade barrier in the context of a
larger country (Russia). The effects could be different to the extents that firms in
Russia have different outside options after the embargo was imposed. To gain full
understanding of how sanctions and embargoes impact trade, we must analyze the
Russian incident from every aspect. My study complements the existing literature
on Russian sanctions but expands our understanding of how Russian firms reacted
to them.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents theoretical framework
of the response of importing firms to the imposition of the retaliatory embargo in a
partial equilibrium model. Section 3.3 describes the data used for the empirical
analysis and presents some stylized facts about the Russian importing firms.
Empirical techniques and corresponding results for the extensive and intensive
margin responses are presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
In this section I present a theoretical framework that outlines firms’ responses
to the imposition of the retaliatory embargo. The embargo is a response to the
imposition of sanctions, just as in the Russian case. The countries that impose
sanctions are also the countries targeted by the embargo. I propose a model of
intermediate input trade that follows the framework in Bas and Strauss-Kahn
(2014). The retaliatory embargo is modeled as a negative demand shocks that
reduces a firm’s ability to source inputs from countries targeted by the embargo.
Set-up
There is a continuum of potential domestic firms who supply horizontally
differentiated final goods under monopolistic competition.To produce a variety
of a final good k, a firm combines labor (L) and a set of composite inputs (Mi)
produced by each industry i. These inputs can be purchased domestically (D) or
internationally. Following Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2014), I make the simplifying
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assumption that a firm chooses to source all inputs either domestically or
internationally. If a firm chooses international inputs, it can source them from
two types of countries j: targeted by embargo (T ) or non-targeted (NT ). A
firm can choose to import products only from targeted countries or from non-
targeted countries. This choice is endogenous for firms and depends on the firm’s
exogenously drawn productivity.
The production technology a firm faces is given by a Cobb-Douglas function
of the following form:8
q = φLα
I∏
i=1
M θiij (3.1)
where q represents the production output for firms that are producers and j ∈
{D,T,NT}.9 φ represents the exogenous productivity of the firm, drawn from g(φ)
distribution with cumulative distribution function G(φ). Additionally, α and θi are
cost shares that satisfy the condition α +
∑I
i=1 θi = 1
The composite inputs are represented by a CES aggregator over different
varieties v of inputs from industry i, coming from country j, Iij is a set of all
possible varieties vij, and σi > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties
within industry i:
8I do not include the firm subscript to simplify the notation.
9Alternatively, q can be interpreted as a quantity of sold items for firms that import goods
and re-sell them on the domestic market.
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Mij =
∑
v∈Iij
m
σi − 1
σi
iv

σi
σi − 1
(3.2)
Following Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2014), I assume that the input varieties are
symmetrically purchased at a level m (i.e. mij = m for all i and j). From (3.1), it
follows that the composite input depends on the number of varieties from industry
i purchased from a set j (Nij) and the average purchase per input variety (m):
Mij = mN
σi
σi − 1
ij (3.3)
I model the imposition of the retaliatory embargo as a decline in the number
of available varieties from the targeted countries and targeted industries, Nij.
The number of varieties drops due to several reasons: (i) unavailability, because
it becomes more difficult to import these goods after the sanctions and embargo
are imposed (for example, customs paperwork becomes more complicated), (ii)
boycotting element, because firms might heed consumers, who choose to boycott
goods from the targeted countries. This set-up allows me to account for the
effectiveness of the embargo, i.e., whether the embargo is strictly enforced or there
exist ways to circumvent the embargo. When the embargo is strictly enforced, the
number of available varieties in the embargoed industries from the sanctioning
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countries becomes an empty set. If the embargo is not strictly enforced, the
number of available varieties from the targeted industries from the targeted
countries declines, but does not go to zero.10
The way I model the retaliatory embargo is through a fall in Nij for j = {T}.
This fall in the number of imported varieties is substantial in embargoed goods
(i.e. ∆Nij = δ < 0 for i = {T}) but it may affect other product categories as well
through a chilling effect (i.e. ∆Nij = g ≤ 0 for i = {NT} with g > δ). Imports of
targeted products from the targeted countries will experience a decline due to the
direct effect of the retaliatory embargo. If firms choose to increase their imports
of targeted products from the non-targeted countries to compensate for the losses
induced by the retaliatory embargo, they will experience a substitution effect. The
chilling or the spillover effect refers to the impact of the embargo on imports of
non-targeted products from the targeted countries.
I assume that prior to the imposition of the sanctions and the embargo,
NiT > NiNT for all i, i.e., the number of available varieties for all industries
in the targeted countries prior to the embargo is higher than the number of
available varieties from the non-targeted countries. This assumption reflects
a number of stylized facts about the importance of the targeted countries for
10Additionally, this set-up allows for the exceptions to the list of targeted products made
at the more disaggregate levels, than the level of the imposition of the embargo. For example,
current retaliatory embargo is defined at HS-4 product level, and if any exceptions are made at
the HS-8 industry level, the imports of HS-4 product will not drop to zero due to the presence
of exceptions at the more disaggregated level. Defining the industry i at a different level of
aggregation has impact on the set of available varieties and the implications of the embargo
for this set.
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Russian international trade: (i) more than a half of Russian imports (i.e., 58%)
originate from the countries sanctioning Russia (targeted countries); (ii) Targeted
countries are developed countries, which means they are likely to have higher
levels of production, and thus trade in more products; (iii) most of the targeted
countries (i.e., 28 out of 31) are in the EU, and due to their geographical proximity
to Russia, involve lower transport costs, which allows for an expanded set of
available varieties. I assume that the imposition of the retaliatory embargo reduces
the number of available input varieties from the targeted countries (i.e., Nij for
j = {T}). The change in Nij for all i after the retaliatory embargo is large enough
to reverse the inequality such that NiNT > NiT .
Each firm must pay a constant sunk cost to enter production, Fsunk paid in
units of labor. This cost represents licensing and set-up costs, and it must be paid
before firms observe how productive they are.This allows for the familiar set-up of
a productivity cutoff, below which firms do not produce and exit, and above which
firms begin to produce and sell their products.
On top of the sunk cost to enter production, each period firms must pay a
fixed cost to source the inputs (also paid in units of labor): FD if a firm uses
domestic inputs, FT if a firm sources inputs from the targeted countries, FNT for
firms sourcing their inputs from the non-targeted countries. I assume that FT >
FNT > FD, which captures the stylized fact that importing has additional costs
associated with it, such as customs clearing and other bureaucratic procedures,
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language barriers and other factors that are typically considered barriers to
trade. The assumption that FT > FNT is necessary for the model. Otherwise,
in equilibrium, no firm would import goods from the non-targeted countries due
to the lower number of available inputs from these countries.11 Additionally, I
introduce a fixed cost of lobbying, Flobby j, which must be paid by the firms that
want to continue importing targeted products from the targeted countries after
the embargo. This allows me to further emphasize that large firms who have the
necessary resources, can lobby the government and may obtain permission to
circumvent the embargo and continue their trade in targeted products with the
targeted countries.
Firm’s Problem
Given the outlined set-up, there are two types of firms: firms that use
domestic inputs, and firms that use imported inputs. The latter firms are further
divided into two types based on the source country: firms that import inputs
exclusively from targeted countries or from non-targeted countries. Using 3.3, all
firms solve the following cost-minimization problem:
11I observe that about 30% of all firms in the sample import goods from the non-targeted
countries prior to the embargo. Thus, it means that the lower appeal parameter of the inputs
must be offset by a lower cost to import. Furthermore, the targeted countries are developed
countries with higher standards of living, which implies higher labor and regulatory costs and
could translate to a higher entrance cost for the firms.
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min
L, m
wL+
I∑
i=1
pijMij (3.4)
subject to
φLα
I∏
i=1
M θiij ≤ q (3.5)
Solving this problem leads to an expression for the marginal cost that the
firms face:
MCj =
wα
I∏
i=1
pθiij
φ
I∏
i=1
N
θi
σi − 1
ij
1
αα
I∏
i=1
θθii
(3.6)
in which j ∈ {D;T ;NT}.12
Assuming that consumers in all countries have CES preferences, which take
the form of
12The term
1
αα
I∏
i=1
θθii
in expression(6) is a constant, so without loss of generality, it can be
omitted from the expression.
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U(Ωk) =
∑
k∈Ω
x(k)
γ − 1
γ

γ
γ − 1
, where γ > 1 and Ωk is the set of available
varieties, the demand for product k that each firm faces is xk =
X
P
(
P
pk
)γ
, where
P is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index and X is total expenditure in the economy.
Combining the total cost function and the demand that firms face, it follows
that by maximizing profits, firms set their prices as a constant mark-up over the
marginal cost: pj =
γ
γ − 1
MCj, where j is the index for source country, which
can also serve to indicate the firm type (i.e., firm that uses domestic inputs, inputs
from the targeted countries, or inputs from the non-targeted countries). Next,
combining the expressions for the demand and prices for good k, we can derive the
expressions for the revenue of a firm of type j selling product k:
rk = qkpkj = X
[pkj
P
]1−γ
=
X
P 1−γ
[
γ
γ − 1
MCj
]1−γ
(3.7)
Letting B =
X
P 1−γ
(
γ
γ − 1
)1−γ
and normalizing wages to 1 (i.e., w = 1),
profits for firms of different types can be defined as follows:
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πj = B

φ
I∏
i=1
N
θi
σi − 1
ij
I∏
i=1
pθiij

γ−1
− Fsunk − Fj − Flobby j (3.8)
in which j ∈ {D;T ;NT}. Flobby j = 0 if j = {NT} and Flobby j > 0 if j = {T},
.i.e., the lobbying cost will apply only to the firms that trade with the targeted
countries prior to the embargo and want to continue doing so after the embargo
is imposed. It represents the fact that not all firms need to cut their imports of
the targeted goods from the targeted countries and some may find it optimal to
circumvent the embargo.
Given this set-up, firms will make their sourcing decision based on the
exogenously drawn productivity φ. Using (8), I solve for the productivity cutoffs
for each type of firm. There exists a marginal firm that is indifferent between
not producing after paying a sunk cost Fsunk (i.e., receiving zero profit) and
producing using the domestic inputs: πD(φD) = 0. Defining Γj ≡
I∏
i=1
N
θi
σi − 1
ij
and Kj ≡
I∏
i=1
pθiij , where j ∈ {D;T ;NT}, the productivity cutoff for firms that
choose to produce using domestic inputs is as follows:
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φD =
(
Fsunk + FD
B
) 1
γ − 1 · KD
ΓD
(3.9)
Similarly, the cutoffs for the firms that choose to use inputs from the non-
targeted and the targeted countries can be determined. There exists a marginal
firm that is indifferent between producing using the domestic inputs or inputs
sourced from the non-targeted countries: πD(φNT ) = πNT (φNT ). Solving this
equality for φNT produces the productivity cutoff above which firms choose to
import inputs from the non-sanctioning countries. Finally, there exists a marginal
firm that is indifferent between producing using inputs sourced from non-targeted
countries or inputs sourced from targeted countries: πNT (φT ) = πT (φT ). Solving
this equality for φT produces the productivity cutoff above which firms choose to
import inputs from the targeted countries. Definitions of productivity cutoffs φNT
and φT are provided in the Appendix C.
Because of the ranking of fixed costs (Fj) and the number of available
varieties (Nij), it can be shown that φD < φNT < φT . The most productive firms
with productivities φ > φT source inputs from the targeted countries. Firms with
productivities φNT ≤ φ < φT source inputs from the non-targeted countries and
firms with productivities φD ≤ φ < φNT source inputs domestically. Figure 5
presents the determination of cutoffs for different types of firms and the profit
schedule prior to the embargo.
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To summarize, in this model for each product a firm produces, it chooses the
average import per variety imported m, amount of labor to use in production,
L, and how to source the composite inputs: domestically or internationally.
Inputs are sourced in such a way as to minimize the cost, while the price is set
to maximize firm’s profits. As shown previously, firm’s decisions depend on
its exogenously drawn productivity, φ, compared to a productivity cutoff φj,
j ∈ {D;T ;NT}, which is a function of the number of varieties firms import
(Nij) and the fixed costs the firm faces. The higher the productivity, the higher
the fixed cost a firm can meet. Thus, the more productive firms choose to import
their inputs, while firms with lower productivity opt into sourcing the inputs
domestically. The advantage of foreign inputs over the domestic ones comes
from the larger number of available varieties from the targeted countries, Nij for
j = {T}.
Theoretical Predictions
Recall that when the embargo is imposed, the available number inputs from
the targeted countries falls, such that
NiT
NiNT
< 1. The same is true for the
embargoed industries,
NTj
NNTj
< 1, where (T; NT) denote industries targeted by
the embargo and non-targeted industries from country j. Thus, the change in the
number of available inputs will vary based on the type of source country (targeted
versus non-targeted) and industry (targeted versus non-targeted) of the input.
The imposition of the retaliatory embargo impacts firms that source inputs from
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abroad, and especially from the targeted countries and/or inputs from the targeted
industries. The responses of these firms are likely to vary along several margins,
conditional on the behavior of the firm prior to the conflict.
Theoretical prediction 1.
After the imposition of the embargo, exit rates of firms from the sanctioning
countries increases for both embargoed and non-embargoed products (the extensive
margin).
Proof:
When embargo is imposed, number of inputs from the targeted countries decreases,
which forces firms to exit the targeted countries markets:
∂φT
∂NiT
=
∂φT
∂ΓT
−
∂ΓT
∂NiT
+
< 0 (3.10)
Thus, when the available number of inputs from the targeted countries falls, the
productivity cutoff for the firms that use inputs from the targeted countries must
increase because the profits are negatively affected, and to offset this change,
productivity must be higher to be able to cover the fixed cost of importing
from the targeted countries. Recall that the number of available inputs NiT has
two dimensions conditional on the type of product: embargoed (NT,T ) vs non-
embargoed (NNT,T ). The exit of firms from the targeted countries markets due
to the decline in the available number of the targeted inputs is referred to as the
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direct effect of the embargo, while the exit of firms from the targeted countries
markets due to the decline in the number of the non-targeted inputs is referred to
as the spillover effect of the embargo.
Additionally, the productivity cutoff would be further increased by the fixed
cost of lobbying Flobby j that firms must pay if they want to continue importing
targeted products from the targeted countries. This suggests that the direct effect
of the productivity cutoff change is larger in magnitude than the spillover effect:
∂φT
∂Flobby T
< 0.
Theoretical prediction 2.
Conditional on a firm staying in the targeted countries market, the volume of trade
falls (the intensive margin).
Proof:
For the incumbent firms who imported inputs from the targeted countries prior
to the embargo and were able to stay in the market after the imposition of the
embargo (i.e., their productivity is above the new productivity cutoff, φ > φ
′
S,
which allows them to offset the increase in the marginal cost and the fixed cost of
lobbying), the total imports of composite inputs decline due to the decrease in Nij
for j = {T}: ∂Mij
∂Nij
> 0. This holds for both product types and manifests as the
direct effect of the embargo (i.e., decline in imports of targeted inputs from the
targeted countries) as well as the spillover effect (i.e., decline in imports of non-
targeted inputs from the targeted countries).
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Theoretical prediction 3.
Firms exiting the targeted countries markets will begin importing inputs from the
non-targeted countries. Moreover, some firms trading with non-targeted countries
are forced out of that market. The net effect on the distribution of firms importing
from the non-targeted countries is ambiguous.
Proof:
See Appendix C, C2, C4 - C6
Because the relative number of available inputs from non-targeted countries
becomes higher after the imposition of the embargo, i.e.
NiNT
NiT
> 1, firms that
are forced to exit the targeted countries markets, switch to importing inputs
from the non-targeted countries. This is because these firms with productivities
φ < φ
′
T better off importing inputs from the non-targeted countries. The entrance
of higher productivity firms into the non-targeted country markets leads to a
redistribution of profits among firms.
These firms with productivities φNT < φ < φ
′
T have lower marginal costs than
firms with productivities φ < φNT because
∂MCj
∂φ
< 0, and as a result will be
able to offer lower prices for the final products, forcing the less productive firms
with higher marginal costs, who cannot compete with lower prices, to exit the non-
targeted country markets. Thus, this influx of higher productivity firms into the
non-targeted country markets will lower the price index, which in turn will lead
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to a change in the productivity cutoffs for the firms that import inputs from the
non-targeted countries. This is shown below:
∂φNT
∂NiT
=
∂φNT
∂B
−
∂B
∂P
+
∂P
∂NiT
+
< 0 (3.11)
Due to both, firms with productivities φT < φ < φ
′
T switching their import sources
to the non-targeted countries and the productivity cutoff φNT increasing, the net
effect of whether the interval [φ
′
NT , φ
′
T ] is greater than the interval [φNT , φT ] is
ambiguous.
Similarly, it can be shown that the productivity cutoff for the firms that use
domestic inputs increases as well, due to the decrease in the price index P
following the drop in the number of available inputs NiT :
∂φD
∂NiT
=
∂φD
∂B
−
∂B
∂P
+
∂P
∂NiT
+
< 0 (3.12)
This forces firms with productivities φ < φ
′
D to exit production completely.
Figure 5 illustrates the three predictions. The decrease in NiT for all i is
represented as a decrease in the slope component of the πT line. Additionally,
it leads to the decrease in the price index, which enters through the slope of the
πD and πNT schedules. The fixed costs increases for firms who wish to import
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inputs from the targeted countries, because these firms have to pay the lobbying
cost, Flobby S. They are unchanged for the firms that continue to use inputs from
non-targeted countries and forms that use domestic inputs. Thus the entire profit
schedule shifts to the right due to the increase in the cutoffs for all firm types.
FIGURE 5.
Determination of the Equilibrium Cutoffs Pre- and Post-Embargo
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Data and Stylized Facts
I use a novel data set on Russian firms’ monthly trade flows. To my
knowledge, these data have not been previously used, and I have a unique chance
of bridging the gap in the literature on the impacts of the embargo on Russian
firms. The data set provides detailed information on all Russian exporter and
importer firms’ monthly trade flows by partner-country and HS-8 level product
code. Because Russian retaliatory embargo directly targets imports, my analysis
focuses on the response of the importing firms. The full sample of importing firms
contains 21 million observations.The data span the time period from January 2011
to December 2015. The source of the data is Russian Customs; the data set is
acquired through the Russian analytical agency VedStat.13
The data sample includes a total of 139,873 importer firms, the majority of
which (i.e., 84%) begin importing (appear in the sample) before the embargo.
Figure 6 demonstrates the seasonally adjusted number of active importers in
the sample over time. The imposition of the sanctions in March of 2014 and the
retaliatory embargo in August of 2014 are represented by the vertical red lines.
The decline in the number of firms after the imposition of the embargo is clear.14
13http://www.ved-stat.ru
14Based on Figure 6, one might be concerned that the number of firms seems to decline prior
to the imposition of the embargo. The economic and financial sanctions were imposed on Russia
in March of 2014, immediately after the Crimean Annexation, which could potentially affect some
importers. I do not find a statistically significant impact of the first wave of sanctions on the
number of importers in the market.
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A small portion of firms (i.e., 6%) engage in trade in embargoed products.
The share of firms that trade with at least one country targeted by the embargo is
50%, covering 81% of the observations in the sample. This once again highlights
the importance of trade with the targeted countries for Russian importers, which
can be explained by the fact that the targeted countries are large (mostly OECD
countries) and have large trade shares in world imports and exports.
32% of all importers (or 38% of importers present in the market before the
embargo) trade exclusively with targeted countries prior to embargo; the same
proportion of importers trade exclusively with non-targeted countries prior to the
embargo (33% of all importers or 40% of importers present in the market before
the embargo). A smaller share of importers trade with both country types before
the embargo (19% of all importers or 22% of importers present in the market
before the embargo).
To classify firms as small, medium or large, I create 3 equal sized bins based
on their market share in the first sample year. Each size category consists of
46,625 firms. There are 41,266 single-product firms (i.e., about 30%) in the sample.
16% of the firms are both importers and exporters.
Selected summary statistics characterizing the state of the imports market
before the embargo are presented in Table 12. Before the embargo, the smallest
average trade flow is for the firms that trade with targeted countries in non-
targeted goods and the largest is for the firms that import targeted goods from
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TABLE 12.
Summary Statistics For the Pre-embargo Sample
Country-product Number of Mean imports Share in total Unit value
group observations imports
T countries - T goods 265,381 119,177.3 0.03 5.97
(426649.6) (60.19)
NT countries - T goods 212,071 185,872.9 0.04 4.73
(618100.3) (24.35)
T countries - NT goods 9,520,950 57,484.0 0.55 2649.35
(998289.6) (1427356)
NT countries - NT goods 5,473,935 67,252.7 0.37 991.71
(1011360.9) (282213.9)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. T countries refers to the countries sanctioning Russia
and as a result targeted by the Russian retaliatory embargo; NT refers to non-targeted countries.
T goods denotes products targeted by the embargo, NT refers to the non-targeted goods.
the non-targeted countries. On average, the unit values of non-targeted goods are
much higher than for the targeted goods. Intuitively, it makes sense given that the
majority of the targeted goods are agricultural products, while the non-targeted
category includes durable goods as well.
Estimation Techniques and Results
In this section I describe the empirical estimation techniques and provide
the results for the analysis of firms’ responses to the embargo along the several
margins, in particular, I focus on firms’ decision to stay, exit, or enter the market
for the targeted goods after the implementation of the policy, as well as on firms’
decision to switch source countries for the targeted products. I also quantify the
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FIGURE 6.
Number of Importers Over Time
Notes: This figure depicts the evolution over time of the number of unique importing
firms in the sample, adjusted for seasonality. The first red vertical line represents the
imposition of the sanctions on Russia after the annexation of the Crimea in March of
2014. The second vertical line represents the imposition of the retaliatory embargo in
August of 2014.
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loss of trade from the embargo at the firm’s extensive and intensive margins. I
define the extensive margin as a number of firms importing a product from a
particular country, and the intensive as a size of a firm’s average import flow of
an HS-8 level product from a country.
The Russian retaliatory food embargo was imposed in response to the
economic sanctions, imposed on Russia by foreign countries following the
annexation of the Crimea. However, the exact timing of the embargo itself was
triggered by a different exogenous event - the shooting down of the Malaysian
flight MH-17 over the territories controlled by the pro-Russian armies in
Donbass.15 The sanctions were intensified after this incident, and Russia responded
to the intensification of the sanctions by imposing the embargo on 48 HS-4 codes
imported from the sanctioning countries. In my analysis, I treat the timing of the
embargo as exogenous. I also make the assumption that the set of embargoed
products was chosen exogenously by the Russian government. The aim of the
embargo was to completely shut down the imports of the targeted products from
the targeted countries and to inflict economic damage to these countries.
The exogenous shock of the embargo provides a convenient triple difference
set-up for analyzing of the firm behavior to unexpected trade shocks. As with
any trade shock, firms are likely to have a variety of responses to the embargo,
conditional on their characteristics. The estimation strategy is built on the
15The region of Eastern Ukraine that includes Donetzk and Luhansk oblasts. It is controlled by
the pro-Russian military groups.
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assumption that the impacts of the embargo will vary conditional on whether
the firm trades in targeted goods and with the targeted countries. To capture
this heterogeneity, I analyze three effects of interest, described in the theoretical
framework section, including the direct, substitution and spillover effects. I utilize
these three effects to disentangle the impact of the embargo on the extensive and
intensive margins of Russian firms.
Market Decisions and Switching Patterns
I begin the empirical analysis of the importers’ behavior by studying their
decision to exit a market for a particular product, and the importers’ decision to
switch source countries for the targeted goods. For these exercises, I concentrate
on the importers that are present in the sample before the imposition of the
embargo (the majority of the firms in the sample), as they are the firms that
face the exogenous shock of the embargo, and are forced to make a decision in
response to the policy. This also matches the theoretical framework as firms are in
the market prior to the embargo.
I first concentrate on the firm’s decision regarding its behavior in the markets
for the affected products. According to the theoretical framework, outlined
in section 3.2, the firms should be abandoning the markets for the targeted
products, as the number of available targeted products decreases after the embargo
is imposed. We should also see that the larger firms (i.e. firms with higher
productivity, as I use firm’s size as a proxi for its productivity) are more likely to
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continue importing the targeted products, as they have the resources to circumvent
the embargo.
To conduct this analysis, I construct a binary variable exit, which gets the
value of 1 if the firm is observed importing an HS-8 level product before the
embargo but leaves the market for that product after the embargo. To analyze how
an importer’s decision to exit a market is impacted by the embargo, I regress the
binary decision to exit variable on the dummy variable for a targeted good. This is
illustrated by the regression model below: γh, γf stand for HS-2 level fixed effects
and importing firm fixed effects, respectively; and exitfk is the firm f decision to
exit the market for HS-8 level product k.
exitfk = β0 + β1Dtargeted goodk + γh + γf + εfk (3.13)
The coefficient of interest is β1. It is identified by comparing the firms exiting
markets for HS-8 level products to firms that stay in the market after the
imposition of the embargo, as well as to firms that do not import a particular HS-
8 product prior to the embargo. Here and other specifications in the probability
analysis section, standard errors are clustered at the HS-2 product level to allow
for clustering within a product but not across.
To analyze whether these decisions differ based on the firm size, as theory
predicts, I also estimate a model specification where I interact the dummy variable
109
for the targeted good with the dummy variable for each firm size. The results of
the exit decision and its potential heterogeneity by size are presented in Tables 13
and 14, respectively. The exit is defined as a firm stopping importing altogether.
If a firm exits targeted country but trades with a non-targeted country, this is not
counted as exit.
The results from estimating equation 3.13 are presented in column 3, while
columns 1 and 2 provide additional specifications with varying sets of fixed effects.
Across all specifications, I observe an increase in probability that a firm exists
the markets for targeted products in comparison to non-targeted products. The
results however are not significant. When I separate effects by size, as seen in
Table 14, small firms are more likely to exit imports of targeted products: their
probability of exiting the markets for targeted good increases by 4.4 percentage
points after the imposition of the embargo. This effect is significant at 10%. Large
firms experience a lower probability of exiting, which is in line with theoretical
prediction 1 - large firms have more resources to circumvent the embargo and are
more likely to stay in the market.
Because the exit decision analysis does not include the country dimension
and whether the foreign country is sanctioning Russia or not (which impacts
the availability of the import flow for the firms), I further investigate whether
the survival of firms is driven by switching patterns. If firms decide to continue
importing the targeted products after the embargo, it must be either because
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firms can circumvent the embargo, or because they are able to find non-targeted
suppliers for these goods, as per theoretical prediction 3. Thus, I analyze the
change in probability of switching to suppliers in the non-targeted countries for the
firms that decide to stay in the market for the targeted products after the embargo
is enforced.
TABLE 13.
Probability of an Importer Exiting an HS-8 Product Market
(1) (2) (3)
Targeted good 0.024** 0.033 0.035
(0.009) (0.024) (0.022)
HS-2 product FE No Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
Observations 7,470,752 7,470,752 7,470,752
R-squared 0.000 0.007 0.470
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-2 code level. This Table
reports results from estimating equation (3.13) in the text. The dependent variable is a dummy
for firm’s decision to exit the imports of a particular HS-8 level product, which takes the value
of 1 if a firm is observed importing an HS-8 product before the embargo but drops this product
after the imposition of the embargo. Targeted good is a dummy variable for the HS-4 product
code that is embargoed. The estimation sample includes only firms that are present in the
market before the embargo. I utilize OLS to estimate the change in probabilities of the decision
to discontinue imports of the targeted goods in comparison to their non-targeted counterparts.
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TABLE 14.
Decision to Exit: Heterogeneity by Size
Benchmark By size
(1) (2)
Targeted good 0.035 0.044*
(0.022) (0.023)
Targeted good × Medium firm 0.006
(0.013)
Targeted good × Large firm -0.013
(0.015)
HS-2 product FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 7,470,752 7,470,752
R-squared 0.470 0.470
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-2 code level. In this
Tablethe firm’s decision to discontinue the HS-8 level product import by importer size is
analyzed. The decision to exit the imports is constructed in the same way as in Table 13. I
utilize OLS to estimate the change in probabilities of each decision for the targeted goods in
comparison to their non-targeted counterparts for each importer size bracket. The omitted group
consists of small importers.
In the theoretical framework section I show that the switching decisions are
likely to differ based on the type of country the importer trades with prior to the
imposition of the embargo. Per my theoretical results, we should see the decline
in the probability of continuing to import targeted products from the targeted
countries for most firms (the direct effect), and an increase in the probability of
switching towards the non-targeted countries some of the firms (the substitution
effect).
To empirically test these theoretical predictions, I separate the importers that
choose to stay in the market for a product k into firms that trade exclusively with
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the targeted countries before the embargo (38% of all firms) and firms that trade
exclusively with the non-targeted countries before the embargo (40% of all firms).
Next I construct variables that represent firms’ switching decision for each product
a firm imports prior to the embargo. Firms that import goods exclusively from
the targeted countries prior to the embargo can continue to import from these
countries, switch completely towards the non-targeted countries, or add a new
supplier in a non-targeted country while maintaining their trade with targeted
country. The empirical model is presented below:
switchingfk = β0 + β1Dtargeted goodk + γh + γf + εfk (3.14)
where the binary dependent variable switchingfk equals 1 for each of the following
cases {T to T ;T to NT ;NT to T ;NT to NT}, where T stands for the targeted
country and NT stands for the non-targeted country. It essentially represents the
probability that after the embargo a firm continues to import from the same type
of country as before the embargo or switches to a supplier in a different country
type. For example, T to T = 1 if a firm that imported good k from the targeted
country prior to the embargo continues to import it from the targeted country
after the embargo as well. T to NT = 1 if a firm that imported good k from the
targeted country before the embargo switches (or adds) a partner in a non-targeted
country after the embargo. The dependent variable accounts for the timing of the
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embargo implicitly. As in (13), γh, γf stand for HS-2 level product and importer
fixed effects, respectively.
To investigate the heterogeneity in switching, I also estimate the model in
equation (3.14) using interaction terms between the dummy variable for the
targeted product and the dummy variables for firm size. The results of the
switching decisions and the heterogeneity analysis are presented in Tables 15 and
16, respectively.
TABLE 15.
Switching Decisions
Only T pre-embargo Only NT pre-embargo
T to T T to NT NT to NT NT to T
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Targeted good -0.069*** 0.100*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.023) (0.028) (0.003) (0.008)
HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,728,372 1,728,372 965,232 965,232
R-squared 0.451 0.409 0.585 0.558
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-2 code level. This Table
presents the results from estimating equation (16) in the text. The dependent variable is the
binary outcome of whether a firm imports a particular HS-8 code from a targeted or non-
targeted country prior to the embargo and after the embargo, i.e., it accounts for the timing
of the retaliatory embargo implicitly. The results are separated by the type of country firms
import from prior to the embargo. The intuition behind these results is that the firms that
import exclusively from the targeted countries prior to the embargo have the largest incentive to
switch to importing the targeted goods from the non-targeted countries after the embargo. In the
table, T stands for the country targeted by the embargo, while NT stands for the non-targeted
country. T to T means the probability of continuing to import an HS-8 level product from the
targeted country after the embargo if prior to the embargo a firm imported it from the targeted
country. The estimator used is OLS and therefore the results are interpreted as a simple linear
probability model.
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TABLE 16.
Switching Decisions: Size Heterogeneity
T to T T to NT
Benchmark By size Benchmark By size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Targeted good -0.069*** -0.012 0.100*** -0.000
(0.023) (0.050) (0.028) (0.075)
Targeted good × Medium firm -0.036 -0.019
(0.077) (0.103)
Targeted good × Large firm -0.063 0.121
(0.051) (0.079)
HS-2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,728,372 1,728,372 1,728,372 1,728,372
R-squared 0.451 0.451 0.409 0.409
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-2 code level. This Table
presents the results of the switching analysis by size. The sample consists of firms who import
exclusively from the targeted countries prior to the embargo. The omitted group consists of
small importers. In order calculate the effect of the embargo on the medium firms, the coefficient
on small importers is added to the coefficient of the interaction term between the dummy for
the targeted good and the size dummy for the medium importers. The joint significance is
determined using the F-test. The results are separated by the stayers (firms that continue
to import only from the sanctioning countries after the imposition of the embargo) and the
switchers (firms that add a non-targeted partner or switch completely towards the non-targeted
source countries. T stands for the targeted country, while NT stands for the non-targeted
country. T to T means the probability of continuing to import an HS-8 level product from the
targeted country after the embargo if prior to the embargo a firm imported it from the targeted
country.
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Theoretical prediction 1 is confirmed: for the firms that import exclusively
from the targeted countries prior to the embargo, the probability of continuing to
import embargoed products from the targeted countries falls by 6.9 percentage
points after the embargo. This provides evidence for the direct negative impact of
the embargo on firms. I also find evidence of the substitution effect (theoretical
prediction 3): firms that import exclusively from the targeted countries prior to
the embargo either switch completely their source countries or add a supplier in a
non-targeted country for the targeted products, as evidenced by column 2 of Table
15.
Additionally, I test for whether larger firms are indeed more likely to switch
source countries. For that I limit the sample to only firms that import exclusively
from the targeted countries prior to the embargo, as they are the ones the most
affected by this shock. Surprisingly, I find that large firms are less likely to
continue importing embargoed product from the targeted countries after the
embargo: their probability to continue to import from the targeted countries
falls by 7 percentage points (highly significant effect), while for the small firms
the decline in probability is only 1.2 percentage points and not statistically
significant. However, the switching towards non-targeted countries is driven by
the large importing firms (column 4 of Table 16). The probability that they add a
supplier in a non-targeted country or switch their sources completely increases by
12 percentage points after the imposition of the embargo. The probability of small
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firms switching source countries is zero. This finding is intuitive: large firms have
more resources for switching, i.e., it might be less difficult for them to establish
new connections, solve logistical or marketing issues than for the smaller firms.
To conclude the analysis on the decision to exit or switch import source
countries, I find evidence of an increased exit in the markets for the targeted
products. Additionally I find that large importers that choose to stay in the
market for the targeted products after the embargo are more likely to switch
source partners to the non-targeted countries.
Number of Firms
Next I proceed to quantify the effects of the embargo on the number of
importers present in the market for a good k from country j. In the theoretical
framework, the change in the number of firms is described by a change in the
productivity cutoffs and profits in response to the decrease in the number of
imported inputs Nij for j = {T}.
To estimate the impact of the embargo on the number of firms, I collapse the
sample across firms to the product - country - period dimension. In doing so, I
count the number of unique importers that import a particular HS-8 level product
from a particular country in a particular month. If product k is not imported into
Russia from a country j in a given month, the number of importers is recorded as
zero. On average, there are 35 firms per HS-8 level product prior to the embargo;
after the embargo this number drops to 33.
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I estimate the following empirical model of the firm’s extensive margin, using
the PPML estimator:16
number of importerskjt = exp[β1 ×Directjkt + β2 × Substitutionjkt+ (3.15)
β3 × Spilloverjkt + γt+ γjk + γjy + γky] + εjkt
The subscripts k, j, and t denote product, partner country, and time period
respectively. Equation (3.15) presents the estimation strategy for identifying
each of the three embargo effects (direct, substitution, and spillover effects) on
the number of importers per product-country pair. The period fixed effects (γt)
account for the macroeconomic conditions and seasonal variation in the number of
importers. Country-year and product-year (γjy, γky) account for the multilateral
resistance terms and the yearly product trends. Finally, country-product fixed
effects (γjk) accounts for the time-invariant country-product trends.
Directjkt captures the direct effect of the embargo on the number of importers
that import targeted products from the targeted countries. This variable reflects
whether Russia embargoes a particular product k from a country j at time t. It is
constructed as follows:
Directjkt = DT country ×DT product ×Dtime
16Because it is better suited to deal with the zero observations.
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where DT country is 1 if country j is sanctioning Russia and as a result is targeted
by the retaliatory embargo; DT product is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the
product is targeted by the embargo, and 0 otherwise; Dtime is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 in all the months following August 2014 period when the embargo
was imposed.
Substitutionjkt is the substitution effect of the embargo. This dummy variable
measures how the number of importers that import targeted goods k from the non-
targeted countries j at time t was affected by the embargo. It is constructed as
follows:
Substitutionjkt = DNT country ×DT product ×Dtime
where DNT country is 1 if country j is not targeted by the Russian retaliatory
embargo; DT product and Dtime are as described above.
Finally, Spilloverjkt is a dummy variable that captures the change in the
number of importers that source non-targeted products k from the targeted
countries j. The justification to include this variable is the possibility that the
targeted countries voluntarily reduce trade with Russia in non-targeted product
categories. This variable is constructed as follows:
Spilloverjkt = DT country ×DNT product ×Dtime
where DT country and Dtime are defined above and DNT product = 1 if a product is
not targeted by the embargo, and 0 otherwise.
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The three coefficients of interest are β1, β2, and β3. They capture the direct,
substitution, and spillover effects of the embargo on the number of Russian
importers. As shown in the theoretical framework, it is expected that firms will
stop importing targeted products from the targeted countries after the embargo
is imposed (in the theoretical framework modeled as a fall in Nij due to the fall
in both country- and product-specific components of the number of available
inputs), because the availability of these products from the targeted countries
decline (the direct effect), and thus the number of importers in this group should
decline. Large firms, who have resources to pay the switching cost, will switch to
sourcing targeted products from the non-targeted countries (the substitution effect
due to the changes in the cutoffs in the theoretical framework). I also expect that
some firms will have to leave the markets for the non-targeted goods imported
from the targeted countries either due to the uncertainty of trade policy, logistical
complications, or economies of scale in shipping. The results from estimating
equation (3.15) are presented in Table 17.
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TABLE 17.
Number of Firms: Specification Choice
Dependent variable: Number of firms Log number of firms Number of firms
OLS OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3)
Direct effect −0.717∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ −0.504∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.043) (0.044)
Substitution effect 0.111 0.048 0.109∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.033) (0.020)
Spillover effect 0.009 0.015 0.003
(0.094) (0.014) (0.003)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,852,178 5,851,089 5,137,599
R2 0.425 0.483
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at firm level. Extensive margin
refers to the number of importers per product k (HS-8 code) from a country j. In columns 1 and
2 I utilize OLS with the dependent variable in levels and logs, and in column 3 I utilize PPML.
PPML is the benchmark specification because number of products is a count data, and therefore,
Poisson count model is more appropriate. The direct effect refers to the number of importers
importing targeted HS-8 product k from a country j targeted by the embargo. The substitution
effect refers to the number of importers importing a targeted product k from a non-targeted
country j. Finally, the spillover effect refers to the number of importers per non-targeted product
k from a targeted country j.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 17 utilize OLS estimator, with two different types
of dependent variables: number of importers per product-country in logs and in
levels. Given that the dependent variable is count data (number of firms within
a product, which can never be negative and might have a large number of zero
observations), the benchmark specification is PPML (column 3) with OLS results
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provided for comparison. The direct effect of the embargo can be interpreted as a
45 percent decline in the number of importers that import targeted products from
the targeted countries (e−0.679 − 1 = −0.40). The substitution effect of the embargo
translates to an increase of only 11.5 percent in the number of importers that
switch to importing the targeted products from the non-targeted countries. I find
no evidence of a spillover effect, i.e., the embargo has no impact on the number of
firms that import non-targeted products from the targeted countries.
Figure 7 demonstrates the evolution of the direct and spillover effects over
time. The Figure is produced by regressing the number of importers per product k
from country j on 12 leads and lags of each effect and the same set of fixed effects
from equation (15). The Figure clearly demonstrates that the magnitude of the
direct effect of the embargo is strong and is not offset by the substitution effect.
The direct effect persists over time, while the substitution effect dissipates by the
end of the twelfth month after the imposition of the embargo.
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FIGURE 7.
Evolution of the Number of Importers per HS-8 Level Product Over Time
Notes: The extensive margin refers to the number of importers per HS-8 code. The direct effect
refers to the number of importers importing targeted products from the targeted country, while
the substitution effect is the number of importers importing targeted products from the non-
targeted countries. The figure is produced by regressing the number of importers per product
k from country j on 12 leads and lags of each effect and a set of fixed effects. The Figure
demonstrates that the direct effect of the embargo is strong and is not offset by the substitution
effect.
The results of the size heterogeneity analysis are presented in Table 18.
The omitted group in column 2 consists of small importers. I find that the small
importers are the most affected by the embargo: the number of small firms
importing targeted and non-targeted goods from the targeted countries drops by
66 and 71 percent, respectively (the direct and spillover effects).17 In addition,
17To compute the direct effect of the embargo on large firms, the following expression is
calculated: e( − 0.037 − 1.084) − 1 = −0.662. According to Shang et al. (2018), interpretation
of the interaction terms in the PPML regression may not be that straightforward. They compute
the true effect of the interaction term as e(β2+β4) − eβ2 , where y = β2 × Direct + β3 × Large +
β4 × Direct × Large. Utilizing this method, the estimates in my specification would produce
unexpected results and given additional evidence of the robustness of my estimates, I resume
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small firms are also not able to substitute towards the non-targeted countries,
because the number of these firms importing targeted products from the non-
targeted countries falls by 59 percent.
Large firms have more resources and therefore are in a better position to
overcome the effects of the embargo. The direct effect of the embargo on the
number of large firms translates to a 13 percent decline, while the number of
large firms that import targeted products from the non-targeted countries (the
substitution effect) increases by 66 percent. These findings are in agreement
with the theoretical framework: large firms are more likely to switch to source
inputs from the non-targeted countries due to higher productivity and a greater
number of available resources. Quite surprisingly, and counter to the theoretical
predictions, the number of large firms importing non-targeted goods from the
targeted countries increases. One interpretation of this result is that one could
explain the spillover effect as a different way of substitution for firms in order to
compensate for the losses from the embargo: large firms who already import from
the targeted countries have already established partner connections with these
countries, and instead of choosing to find new markets from which to source the
targeted products (the substitution effect), they might choose to import more non-
targeted products from the targeted countries.
analysis utilizing the traditional approach of interpretation of the interaction terms in the PPML
regressions.
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TABLE 18.
Number of Firms: Heterogeneity Analysis
Benchmark By size
(1) (2)
Direct effect −0.504∗∗∗ −1.084∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.111)
Direct × Medium −0.037
(0.077)
Direct × Large 0.941∗∗∗
(0.135)
Substitution effect 0.109∗∗∗ −0.898∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.032)
Substitution × Medium 0.209∗∗∗
(0.036)
Substitution × Large 1.402∗∗∗
(0.046)
Spillover effect 0.003 −1.221∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.024)
Spillover × Medium 0.314∗∗∗
(0.018)
Spillover × Large 1.699∗∗∗
(0.035)
Period FE Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 5,137,599 5,137,599
R2 0.962 0.518
Adjusted R2 0.961 0.507
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-8 product level. In this
TableI present results of the heterogeneity analysis of the extensive margin by importer size. The
dependent variable is the number of importers of size s importing product k (HS-8 code) from a
country j. The direct, substitution, and spillover effects are defined as in Table(7). The omitted
group consists of small importers. The estimator used is PPML.
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To conclude, the number of firms importing targeted goods from the
targeted countries decreases by 66 percent. This decline is driven by small firms
discontinuing these imports, and by the number of large firms switching to the
countries not targeted by the embargo. Additionally, the number of importers that
import targeted products from the non-targeted countries increases by 12 percent.
These effects are driven by the large importers, confirming theoretical predictions.
Intensive Margin
As shown in the extensive margin analysis, the exogenous shock of the
retaliatory embargo forces smaller importers to discontinue imports of the
targeted products imported from the targeted countries. However, large firms have
resources to continue importing and the average import flow of these importers is
likely to be impacted by the embargo. Recall from theoretical prediction 2 that
∂Mij
∂Nij
> 0 for j = {T}, i.e., the import flow of products from the targeted countries
decline as the number of varieties falls after the embargo is imposed. Thus, I
expect to see the average import flow of both targeted and non-targeted goods
from the targeted countries to decline (the direct and spillover effect, respectively).
Additionally, the average import of non-targeted products from the sanctioning
countries is expected to increase (the substitution effect).
To capture the true intensive margin effect of the embargo, I restrict the
sample to incumbent importers only (firms that are present in the market prior
and after the embargo), and use the multiplicative form of the gravity equation to
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separate the impacts of the embargo into the direct, substitution, and spillover
effects, which were described in the extensive margin section. The estimating
equation becomes:
Tradefjkt = exp[β1 ×Directjkt + β2 × Substitutionjkt + β3 × Spilloverjkt+ (3.16)
γfjk + γt] + εfjkt
The subscripts f, k, j and t denotes firm, product (HS-8 level), partner
country, and time period, respectively. The reference group consists of the non-
sanctioning countries trading in non-embargoed goods. Equation 3.16 presents
the estimation strategy for identifying each of the three embargo effects (direct
treatment, substitution, and spillover effects) on the level of import flow of firm
f importing product k from country j in period t. The firm-country-product
fixed effects (γfjk) account for the time-invariant determinants of bilateral
trade in good k such as bilateral distance, common borders, common language,
product trends for a particular firm. The period fixed effects (γt) account for
macroeconomic factors that might affect trade (e.g. inflation, currency movements,
etc) and seasonality. The detailed description for the construction of the treatment
variables is presented in the previous subsection on the extensive margin analysis.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm-product-country level.
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Following the literature, I utilize the PPML estimation technique to account
for the presence of zeros in the data set. I expect the embargo to have a negative
impact on the firms’ import flows of the targeted goods from the targeted
countries (β1 < 0), modeled as a decline in imports due to the decline in the
number of the available parameters Nij. Theoretically, β2 is positive because
after the embargo is imposed, firms may decide to source their imports of targeted
goods from the non-targeted countries to mitigate the losses from embargo. In the
theoretical framework this is due to the increase in the productivity cutoffs for the
firms that import products from the sanctioning countries, forcing an influx of a
higher productivity firms to source inputs from the non-targeted countries. β3 is
likely to be negative, as I would expect firms to decrease their ties to the targeted
countries in order to minimize the losses and uncertainty. This is modeled as a
decline in the number of varieties from the targeted countries, NiT .
To motivate the choice of PPML estimation technique over OLS and the set
of fixed effects, I estimate equation (16) using OLS (using log-linearized version
of the equation) and PPML, and with two sets of fixed effects: 1) firm-product-
country, month and year fixed effects versus 2) firm-product-country and period
fixed effects. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 19. The
coefficients of interest are as hypothesized across all specifications, however there is
a significant amount of variation in the magnitudes and significance levels. Using
both sets of fixed effects, OLS overestimates the absolute values of coefficients
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for the main treatment effect. Reverse pattern holds for the coefficients of the
substitution effect. Inclusion of period fixed effects removes the significance of
the spillover effect, but the significance and signs of the main treatment and
substitution effects is preserved. The benchmark model is presented in column 4
of Table 19; I use PPML estimation technique and the second set of fixed effects to
account for oil price and exchange rate fluctuations during that time.
TABLE 19.
Intensive Margin: Specification Choice
Dependent variable: Log of trade Level of trade
OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct effect -0.328*** -0.274*** -0.219*** -0.143***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.046) (0.048)
Substitution effect 0.100*** 0.148*** 0.220*** 0.292***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.029)
Spillover effect -0.066*** -0.014*** -0.082*** -0.014
(0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.025)
Firm-product-country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 18,868,557 18,868,557 18,868,702 18,868,702
R-squared 0.819 0.819
Number of firm-product-country gr. 2,495,869 2,495,869
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at firm-product-country level.
In this TableI analyze the impact of the embargo on firm’s average trade flow by product
and country types. The main effect refers to the imports of targeted goods from the targeted
countries. The substitution effect refers to imports of targeted goods from the non-targeted
countries. The last effect of interest is denoted the spillover effect and refers to the effect of the
embargo on average import flow of non-targeted goods from the targeted countries.
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As expected, I find a highly significant negative direct treatment effect for an
average Russian firm of about 13 percent (e−0.143 − 1 = −13%). This impact is not
as large as expected, which suggests that there might be a large degree of variation
in the impact of the embargo conditional on the type of firm. In dollar terms, this
corresponds to roughly a loss of about 15,493 USD in imports of targeted goods
from targeted countries (for the average firm). A significant positive substitution
effect of 34 percent increase in trade flows of targeted goods with non-targeted
countries, which on average seems to offset the direct effect of the embargo.18
Consistent with Miromanova (2018), I do not find a significant average spillover
effect at the intensive margin.
It is reasonable to expect a large amount of variation in these estimates
conditional on the importer’s attributes. Thus, I proceed by conducting
heterogeneity analysis of the embargo’s impacts on the intensive margin of firms.
These results are presented in Table 20. The benchmark model estimates are
presented in column 1.
The heterogeneity in the effects of the embargo by firm size is quite large. The
reference group for this specification consists of small firms. As theory predicts, I
find that the small firms experience the largest direct treatment effect, meaning
that a small firm’s average trade flow of targeted goods from the targeted countries
experiences the largest decrease: 56 percent drop versus 9 percent decline for the
18The increase in average firm’s import flow of targeted goods from non-targeted countries if
roughly 63,197 USD.
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large firms, 19 significant at 5%. These findings are in agreement with the effects
of the embargo on the extensive margin of bilateral trade described previously -
small firms bear the largest impact of the embargo by having the highest exit rates
and largest decline in the average import flow. If a large firm is able to continue
importing targeted products from targeted countries, its average import flow does
not decline by much because it is able to circumvent the embargo. One of the most
likely ways to do so is by claiming the need for imported inputs from the targeted
countries for a strategic domestic production. Additionally, large firms have more
resources for substitution, as they are able to increase their imports of targeted
products from the non-targeted countries by 34 percent (significant at 1%), while
for the small firms this increase is only 21 percent.
Surprisingly, only medium firms experience a large positive spillover effect:
an increase of about 16% in the average trade flow. Medium firms also increase
their imports of the targeted goods from the non-targeted countries more than
large firms do, and experience a positive spillover effect. Thus, the non-targeted
product imports from the targeted countries for the medium sized importers
actually benefit from the embargo. It could be that these firms were able to benefit
from the smaller firms discontinuing imports of these products by increasing their
presence in these markets.
19Using the Shang et al. (2018) method, 43 versus 12 percent decline
131
TABLE 20.
Intensive Margin: Heterogeneity Analysis
Benchmark By firm size
(1) (2)
Direct effect -0.143*** -0.822***
(0.048) (0.202)
Direct × Medium 0.670***
(0.234)
Direct × Large 0.723***
(0.207)
Substitution effect 0.292*** 0.206***
(0.029) (0.059)
Substitution × Medium 0.230**
(0.107)
Substitution × Large 0.087
(0.061)
Spillover effect -0.014 -0.116
(0.025) (0.121)
Spillover × Medium 0.270**
(0.121)
Spillover × Large 0.094
(0.120)
Period FE Yes Yes
Firm-country-product FE Yes Yes
Observations 18,868,702 18,868,702
Number of firm-product-country groups 2,253,754 2,253,754
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at firm-product-country level.
This Table presents the results of heterogeneity analysis at the intensive margin by importer size.
Importer’s size is determined by importer’s share in total imports in the first year the importer is
present in the sample. I separate the importers into small, medium and large. The omitted group
consists of small firms.
I find that all three effects of the embargo are highly significant and have
expected signs. Among the incumbent importers the average import flow of the
targeted products from the targeted countries declines by 13% (the direct effect),
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the average imports of the targeted products from the non-targeted countries
increases by 34% (the substitution effect), and the imports of the non-targeted
products from the targeted countries declines insignificantly by 1% (the spillover
effect). There is a large degree of heterogeneity in the consequences of the embargo
among importing firms. Small firms have fewer resources available to mitigate
shocks and as a result experience larger direct treatment effects and are not able
to offset this negative impact by finding new partners among the non-targeted
countries. One surprising finding is that medium size firms seem to have the
ability to respond to the embargo by focusing on increasing their trade flows of
the non-targeted goods rather than switching to new partners in the non-targeted
countries. It could also be the case that medium firms are increasing their trade
flows by absorbing the import flows of smaller firms that exit due to the lack of
resources, or alternatively the shares of large firms that exit due to inability to
switch quickly because of economies of scale.
Robustness checks
To ensure that no other exogenous shocks are causing the observed changes
in bilateral trade, I conduct several robustness checks. First, I explicitly test for
the concern that the first wave of sanctions might impact the extensive or intensive
margin results. Second, for the intensive margin I conduct the placebo test by
assigning placebo treatment to random subsamples of the data and re-estimating
specification 3.16 to ensure that no other policies are driving my estimates.
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TABLE 21.
Number of Firms: Pre-trends Analysis
Benchmark Pre-trends
(1) (2)
Pre-Direct effect 0.013
(0.036)
First wave Direct 0.006
(0.070)
Direct effect −0.504∗∗∗ −0.568∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.112)
Pre-Substitution −0.066∗
(0.036)
First wave Substitution −0.107
(0.084)
Substitution effect 0.109∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.020) (0.070)
Pre-Spillover 0.079∗∗∗
(0.006)
First wave Spillover 0.148∗∗∗
(0.010)
Spillover effect 0.003 0.136∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.010)
Period FE Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 3,946,873 3,946,873
R2 0.962 0.963
Adjusted R2 0.961 0.961
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at firm level. In this TableI
conduct the robustness check by including the pre-trends (all periods up to March of 2014) for
each of the three effects and dummies for first wave of sanctions (March through August of 2014)
for each of the three effects of interest to ensure that the embargo is the only policy that had
impact on the number of firms.
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The results of the first robustness check are presented in Tables 21 and 22
for the extensive and intensive margins, respectively. To ensure that there are no
significant pre-existing trends and that the first wave of sanctions does not impact
the results, I include interaction terms between the dummy variable for the pre-
trends, i.e., 12 months before the imposition of the first wave of sanctions (1 if the
time period is between February 2013 and March 2014, and 0 otherwise) and all
three effects of interest, as well as interaction terms between the indicator variable
for the first wave of sanctions (which is equal to 1 from March to July of 2014 and
0 otherwise) and the three effects of interest. For both, intensive and extensive
margin benchmark, I do not find a significant impact of pre-trends or the first
wave of sanctions for the direct effect. Controlling for the pre-trends removes the
significance of the substitution effect for the extensive margin results. Additionally,
interesting dynamics are observed for the spillover effect at the extensive margin
(column 2 of Table 21): there exits a pre-existing positive trend for the number of
importers who import non-targeted products from the targeted countries. The pre-
existing trend persists when I include a tighter set of fixed effects, which suggests
that some uncontrolled variation is affecting the coefficients. However, even with
varying sets of fixed effects I still find that the magnitude and significance of the
main effect remain fairly constant.
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TABLE 22.
Intensive Margin: Pre-trends Analysis
Dependent variable: Level of trade Log of trade
PPML OLS
Benchmark Pre-trends Benchmark Pre-trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-Direct -0.136 -0.033
(0.106) (0.075)
First wave Direct 0.006 0.11
(0.104) (0.074)
Direct effect -0.143*** -0.248** -0.274*** -0.262***
[0.048] (0.113) [0.051] (0.076)
Pre-Substitution -0.217 -0.194**
(0.169) (0.092)
First wave Substitution -0.087 -0.098
(0.169) (0.093)
Substitution effect 0.292*** 0.106 0.148*** -0.011
[0.029] (0.166) [0.020] (0.092)
Pre-Spillover -0.135 0.045
(0.089) (0.031)
First wave Spillover -0.092 0.070**
(0.088) (0.031)
Spillover effect -0.014 -0.139 -0.014*** 0.038
[0.025] (0.091) [0.004] (0.031)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-country-product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,868,702 18,868,702 18,868,557 18,868,557
R-squared 0.819 0.819
Number of firm-product-country gr. 2,495,869 2,495,869 2,495,869 2,495,870
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at firm-product-country level. In
this TableI conduct the robustness check by including the pre-trends (all periods up to March
of 2014) for each of the three effects and dummies for first wave of sanctions (March through
August of 2014) for each of the three effects of interest to ensure that the embargo is the only
policy that had impact on the intensive margin, and I am identifying the true effect of the
embargo in my estimations.
The second robustness check confirms these results. I truncate the sample
in July 2014 and create 1000 random samples of 100,000 observations from
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this truncated sample. I then estimate specification (3.16) for each of these
1000 samples. Finally, I plot the densities for each of the three coefficients of
interest. These plots are presented in Figure 8. It is clear that all three effects
are centered around zero with the means of 0.001 for the direct effect, 0.005 for
the substitution effect, and 0.001 for the spillover effect, providing further evidence
of the fact that the decline in a firm’s average import flow of embargoed products
from the sanctioning countries is due to the embargo, and not a different policy,
implemented prior to the embargo.
Conclusion
In this study I estimate the impacts of the Russian retaliatory embargo, which
was imposed in the aftermath of the Crimean conflict in 2014, on the Russian
importers. The exogenous timing of the embargo presents an excellent opportunity
to study the direct and indirect impacts of these non-tariff policies on firms in the
targeted countries. I build a theoretical framework, which outlines firms’ responses
to the imposition of the retaliatory embargo. Using the framework I then derive
three theoretical predictions about possible responses of the importers to the
embargo, based on the type of products they import and the source countries of
their imports prior to the embargo. Next, I utilize a novel micro level data set,
sourced from the Russian customs, to test these predictions empirically.
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FIGURE 8.
Intensive Margin Analysis: Placebo Test
Notes: The figure is created using the following methodology. The sample is truncated at July
2014 (one month prior to the imposition of the embargo). I then generate 1000 random samples
of 100,000 observations from this truncated sample. Next, the intensive margin specification
(16) is re-estimated for each of these 1000 samples. Finally, the densities of each of the three
coefficients of interest are plotted. All three effects are centered around zero, providing evidence
of the fact that the decline in a firm’s average import flow of targeted products from the targeted
countries is due to the embargo, and not a different policy, implemented prior to the embargo.
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I find that the extensive margin, which is defined as a number of firms
importing product k from a country j, experiences a significant negative impact
after the embargo is imposed. The number of firms importing targeted goods
from the targeted country decreases by 66 percent. This translates to about 23
firms discontinuing their imports of targeted products from the targeted countries
after the embargo is imposed. This decline is driven by small firms discontinuing
these imports, while the number of large firms experiences a smaller decline.
Additionally, the number of importers that import targeted products from the non-
targeted countries increases by 12 percent, i.e., about 4 additional firms begin to
import targeted products from the non-targeted countries. These effects are driven
by the large importers, confirming theoretical predictions that large firms are more
productive and therefore, are less likely to discontinue the affected markets.
Conditional on a firm continuing to import targeted products from the
targeted countries, the average import flow of targeted goods from the targeted
countries decreases, while the average import flow of the targeted products from
the non-targeted countries increases. By my estimation, an average firm loses
15,493 USD in its imports of targeted product from the targeted countries in
a month. There is a large degree of heterogeneity in the consequences of the
embargo for the firms of different sizes. Smaller firms experience larger losses due
to the embargo and are not able to mitigate them by redirecting imports towards
non-targeted countries, most likely because of insufficient resources to do that. All
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of the theoretical predictions are confirmed by the empirical analysis, but some
puzzles regarding the behavior of the medium sized importers at the intensive
margin remain.
The main contribution of this study is the in-depth analysis of one type of
non-tariff barriers on firms, which to my knowledge, is rare in the literature. I
use the novel micro-level data set that allows me to uncover the firm level effects
of such policies. These impacts could not be estimated with aggregate data. My
results also lead to new avenues of research. Some of them include analysis of
non-tariff trade barriers on a unique intersection of firms that both import and
export, to determine how the embargo impacted the trade openness of these firms,
and their ability to remain part of global supply chains. Additionally, geographic
heterogeneity of the embargo’s impact on firms can be explored.
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CHAPTER IV
FIRM LEVEL TRADE EFFECTS OF WTO ACCESSION:
EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA
Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have been the pillars of our global
trading system, continuously promoting market integration through the gradual
removal of tariffs and other barriers to trade. Today, the WTO is undoubtedly the
largest international trade agreement with over 160 member countries worldwide.
Membership to the GATT/WTO guarantees not only market access benefits and
a more predictable trade policy environment (e.g., the most favored nation (MFN)
tariffs), but it also provides rules and procedures for settlements over disputes,
regulations in the sphere of trade in services, or a framework for intellectual
property rights protection. These benefits of trade liberalization have motivated
most countries around the world to seek accession to the WTO.
Because of this general belief that GATT/WTO provides important trade
gains to its member countries, Rose (2004)’s seminal paper that questions such a
belief has stirred a lot of attention and interest in the empirical trade literature.
The failure to identify empirically any positive benefits of WTO membership
on international trade flows has raised questions about the data sample and
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estimation strategy. Yet more than fifteen years later, after substantial empirical
research on this topic, there still isn’t a consensus in the literature about the role
of WTO membership in promoting international trade.
This paper aims to contribute to this on-going debate by bringing micro-
level evidence from the experience of Russian importers and exporters following
the country’s 2012 accession to the WTO. Using customs level data on all
international transactions over the period 2011-2015, we investigate the ways
in which trading firms in Russia responded to this significant trade policy
change. We examine several dimensions of firm-level trade that may be directly
impacted by the WTO, and are particularly interested in capturing any short-
run changes along the intensive and extensive margins. Following the work of
Handley and Limao (2017), we hypothesize that Russia’s accession to the WTO
has the potential to decrease the trade policy uncertainty surrounding Russia’s
trade partners. This decrease in uncertainty can manifest through an increase
in the number of importing and exporting firms, an increase in the frequency of
trade shipments, and possibly an increase in the average trade flow per firm and
product-country pair. Furthermore, accession to the WTO also provides Russian
trading firms easier access to new markets along both the product and partner
country dimensions as a result to reduced barriers to trade. This paper undertakes
all of these empirical exercises in order to provide micro-level evidence on the main
effects of WTO accession.
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To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to bring firm level
evidence on the trade effects of WTO membership. We attribute this gap in
the literature to the fact that micro-level datasets have become increasingly
available only in recent years while many countries around the world joined the
GATT/WTO several decades back. There are only a few countries with prominent
presence on global markets whose WTO accession happened in recent years. Along
with China, Russia is one such country.
Using Russia’s accession to the WTO as a case study has its benefits and
limitations. A key advantage is the fact that international trade is an important
component of Russia’s economy, accounting for 24 percent of its GDP in 2017.
Worldwide, Russia ranks 14th in exports of merchandise and 22nd in imports of
merchandise for year 2018. This is suggestive of the extent to which Russian
firms participate in cross-border transactions and are likely to be affected by the
country’s WTO accession. However, a limitation in working with data for a single
country is that the findings of the econometric analysis may be specific to that
event. After all, Russia’s accession to the WTO was an unusually long process.
While it applied to the GATT in 1993, it only joined the GATT/WTO in 2012
after 19 years of (intermittent) negotiations. It is interesting to ask why it took so
long for Russia to join the WTO. One explanation could be that, in line with the
findings in Rose (2004), countries are not expecting large benefits from the WTO
membership. On the other hand, the increase in foreign competition caused by
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trade liberalization may potentially inhibit politically-motivated governments from
pursuing the WTO membership more actively.1 Another complication in assessing
the trade effects of Russia’s WTO accession is that not too long after becoming
a WTO member, Russia became the target of economic sanctions to which it
retaliated by imposing a food trade embargo. While only a small share of Russia’s
trade is the subject of these trade disputes, the time proximity of the two trade
policy events requires additional attention in correctly specifying the econometric
model and in identifying the firm level trade effects of WTO membership.
Using a difference in differences estimation strategy applied to a firm-level
regression model of international trade, we find evidence of strong positive trade
effects along the partner-country margins for both exporting and importing firms
and along the product margin for the importers. For example, the importers
import 8.6% on average more HS 8-level products after the accession to the
WTO, while for the exporters the increase of 5% in the average number of partner
countries is significant. We also find some evidence of an increase in the number
of exporting firms in the market after the WTO accession, and an increase in
the frequency of import shipments for importers by about 6%. Finally we also
explore the connection between the two foreign trade policies, WTO accession
and embargo, which push trade in two different directions. We find some evidence
of disproportionate positive impacts of WTO on agricultural imports, such as a
1Åslund (2010) provides an excellent description of the history of Russia’s accession to the
WTO, its goals and hopes for the accession. He explains that one of the main reasons behind its
slow accession are the strong lobbying interests of certain exporting industries (aluminium).
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significant increase in the frequency of imports, increase in the average number
of products imported, and a significant increase in the average firm-product-
country import flow. These findings could serve as evidence that the embargo
was intended as a protectionist policy and targeted a very specific sector whose
imports benefitted significantly from the WTO accession (agriculture) in order to
help the vulnerable domestic industry. Because protectionist policies are against
WTO provisions, the embargo was a convenient way to kill two birds with one
stone - retaliate against the economic sanctions and protect domestic agricultural
production.
Our findings contribute to several literatures. First of all, they contribute
to the substantial work on the trade effects of WTO membership. Most of this
literature follows the seminal work of Rose (2004) and consists of cross-country
studies investigating the long-term effects of WTO participation. Some subsequent
studies confirm Rose (2004)’s findings of no effect of GATT/WTO membership
on bilateral trade flows even after refining the estimation strategy following the
latest developments in gravity equation estimations (e.g., Eicher and Henn (2011),
Esteve-Perez et al. (2019)). Others found positive effects of WTO membership
on total bilateral trade flows once the treatment group was redefined to include
de facto WTO members (Tomz et al., 2007), or once country heterogeneity based
on level of development was directly accounted for (Subramanian and Wei, 2007).
Other studies attempted to reconcile Rose (2004)’s results by decomposing the
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aggregate WTO trade effects along the extensive and intensive margins of trade
(Liu (2009), Dutt et al. (2013)). Our findings are in line with the aggregate results
in the literature in that, like Dutt et al. (2013), we find a strong effect of WTO
membership on the extensive margin but not much of an effect on the intensive
margin, and like Liu (2009), we find that these effects are robust to departing
from the traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method and instead
using the Pseudo-Poison Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method.
A second strand of literature that closely relates to our study investigates
the effect of WTO accession on various firm- or industry-level economic outcomes
other than international trade patterns. Most of these studies exploit China’s 2002
accession to the WTO as a major trade liberalization shock. Brandt et al. (2017)
examine the impact that China’s WTO accession had on firm-level productivity
and price mark-ups. Baccini et al. (2017) use the experience of Vietnam’s
accession to the WTO in 2007 to investigate whether state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) respond differentially to trade liberalization compared to privately owned
firms, focusing on market entry and exit rates, access to capital, as well as changes
in productivity and in profitability. Handley and Limao (2017) examine the
impact of trade policy uncertainty on industry-level trade by treating China’s
accession to the WTO not only as a tariff liberalization event but also a policy
that significantly reduced the U.S. threat of a trade war with China. Handley
and Limao (2017) show that this reduction in trade policy uncertainty explains a
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significant fraction of China’s export growth to the U.S. While not directly related
in scope, our paper relates to all these studies by analyzing the WTO accession of
a country that carries sufficient similarities to the experience of China.
Lastly, our work relates to existing research evaluating the effects of the WTO
on the Russian economy. While we are not the first to ever examine Russia’s
accession experience, most of the existing studies are either descriptive in nature
or employ a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework.2
The remainder of the paper proceed as follows. In the next section we
describe in more detail Russia’s process of accession to the WTO and provide some
preliminary descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 presents the estimation strategy and
discusses model identification. Section 4.4 describes the main data sources and
the construction of the estimation sample. The estimation results are discussed in
section 4.5 together with the robustness checks implemented to further validate our
findings. Finally, section 4.6 concludes.
2For example, Chowdhury (2004) concentrates on the analysis of the negotiations, and
emphasizes that some of the serious barriers to Russia’s membership in WTO is the presence
of heavy subsidization in several sectors of the economy, lack of liberalization and intellectual
property rights. Connolly and Hanson (2012) and Tochitskaya (2012) describe the commitments
Russia undertook when it decided to join WTO, including the tariff schedules, foreign
investment, and non-tariff barriers. Lissovolik and Lissovolik (2006) attempt to estimate whether
Russia’s ”WTO outsider” status had an impact on its exports. They show that Russia’s export
structure was skewed significantly away from WTO members in the pre-accession period 1995-
2002. Jensen et al. (2004) and Rutherford et al. (2005) utilize a CGE model to estimate the
impact of Russia’s accession to the WTO on a host of economic characteristics. The largest gains
are predicted to come from the liberalization of barriers against multinational service providers.
Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel (2004) investigate the impact of institutions on trade and
estimates the potential for an increase in trade between the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) and the European Union (EU). They then use these estimates to back out the
potential benefits of joining the WTO.
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Policy Background: Russia’s WTO Accession
Process and Timeline
Russian Federation applied to the GATT in 1993, however it only managed
to joined the GATT/WTO on August 22, 2012 after 19 years of negotiations. The
negotiations were not continuous throughout this period though, with the longest
break in the negotiation process taking place from 2006 to 2011 when President
Putin announced Russia’s accession to the WTO as one of the main goals of his
upcoming presidency. There are several reasons for significant delays in Russia’s
accession process. Among the most important reasons is the fact that when Russia
initially applied to the WTO, its economy had a different structure from the
decentralized market economies of the existing GATT/WTO members. After the
USSR fell apart, Russia went through a host of socio-economic, legislative, and
political reforms, which left the financial and fiscal systems in disarray for a long
time. The absence of rigorous structure and regulation of many aspects of the
economy led a number of WTO members to doubt Russia’s ability to fulfill its
obligations as a WTO member (Chowdhury, 2004).
Another major reason for the delays in Russia’s WTO negotiations process
has been the strong lobbying interests of certain exporting industries such as auto
and airplane production, agricultural production, and services. The auto and
airplane industries typically exploited the infant industry protection argument -
i.e., the increased need of protection for certain industries that are more prone
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to be displaced by competition in the short run but capable of upgrading in
the medium-to-long run. The agricultural industry in Russia, similar to the
situation of other countries, generally struggled with WTO’s restrictions because
of state subsidies to the sector and fear of competition. The service sector
lobbied against intellectual property rights and the issue of foreign ownership
in telecommunications, insurance, and banking industries (Åslund (2010)).
Unfortunately, even after joining the WTO, Russia remains reluctant to fully
embrace trade liberalization and relies heavily on non-tariff barriers to trade: in
2018 there were 225 non-tariff measures in force. The most notorious measure is
the retaliatory embargo which Russia imposed on a set of 48 agricultural products
(defined at HS-4 level) in response to the sanctions that 38 countries imposed on
Russia after its invasion in Crimea.
Among the commitments Russia undertook when joining the WTO is
the augmentation of the tariff schedule, liberalization of services, including
telecommunications, insurance companies and banks, elimination of quotas that
are unjustified under WTO provisions, elimination of industrial subsidy programs,
and enforcements of the intellectual property rights. Tariffs on more than one third
of national tariff lines had to be reduced immediately after Russia’s accession to
the WTO. The rest of the tariff cuts were scheduled to be implemented gradually
over a three year period (Tochitskaya (2012)). These changes, however, do not
apply to the sectors that Russia deemed “most vulnerable”, for which a transition
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period of 7 to 8 years was negotiated. These industries include agriculture,
automotive and civil aircraft industries (Tochitskaya (2012)).
Summary Statistics
International trade is a very important component of Russia’s GDP: in 2017,
trade accounted for 24 percent of Russian GDP. Russia accounts for about 2
percent of the world trade. Russia is ranked 16th in exports of merchandise and
20th in imports of merchandise; as for the trade in services, Russia takes 26th
place worldwide in exports of services and 16th in imports of services. Among
the top Russian imports are fruits, pharmaceuticals, broadcasting equipment,
planes and helicopters, and motor transport for personal transportation. As for
the exports, Russia was the third largest producer and exporter of oil and natural
gas in the world in 2019. Other top exports are wheat and coal. In terms of trade
value, Russia’s five top export destinations are China, Netherlands, Germany,
Belarus, and the United States. Five top import origins are Germany, Belarus,
the United States, Italy, and China.
One of the main steps of the WTO accession is the augmentation of the
country’s tariff schedule. According to the WTO provisions, all WTO member
countries apply the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff to each other. Prior to the
accession to the WTO, Russia’s average bound tariff for all products was 10%,
for agricultural products 13.2%, and for manufactured goods 9.5%. According to
the negotiated agreement, the average bound tariff for all products must decrease
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to 7.8% by 2017, and for the manufactured products to 7.3%. Agricultural tariffs
must be decreased to 10.8% by 2021. In 2018, the simple average final bound tariff
for Russia was 7.6%, 7.1% for the manufactured goods, and 11.2% for agricultural
products. Products that receive the highest import tariffs are animal products
(23.2 percent on average) and beverages and tobacco (23.3 percent). Products with
the lowest tariffs are petroleum (5.0 percent) and chemicals (5.2 percent).3
FIGURE 9.
Evolution of Russia’s Average MFN Tariffs over 2011-2015
Figure 9 uses information collected by the WTO on Russia’s ad-valorem
MFN tariffs. The grey bars correspond to the (unweighted) average MFN tariff
computed across all HS 4-digit products codes. The overlapping dark lines indicate
the inter-quartile range (IQR) of ad-valorem MFN tariffs over all HS 4-digit
product codes. The figure confirms our earlier claim about the modest change in
3Information from the WTO Russian Federation member profile. The averages do not include
zero tariff lines.
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average MFN tariffs in the first three years following Russia’s WTO accession. It
also illustrates that the tariff liberalization efforts were focused particularly on the
sectors with the highest import tariffs (as suggested by the fall in the IQR post-
accession).
Figure 10 provides a better illustration of the change in Russia’s average MNF
tariffs at the HS 4-digit product level over the period 2011-2015. The scatterplot
correlates the tariff changes to the initial tariff level in the year prior to Russia’s
WTO accession. The downward sloping fitted line indicates that the industries
(i.e., HS 4-digit products) with the highest tariffs prior to WTO accession are the
industries experiencing the largest drops in tariffs in the first three years post-
accession.
FIGURE 10.
Correlation Between Initial MFN Tariffs and the Change in MFN Tariffs During
2011-2015
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Because we are interested in the impact of the WTO membership on the
dynamics of Russian firms that engage in international trade, we next provide a
brief overview of the firms’ international trade performance. To conduct this study,
we use a novel data sourced from the Russian Customs Agency4. The data set
provides detailed information on all Russian exporter and importer firms’ monthly
trade flows by partner-country and HS-8 level product code. The full sample of
importing firms contains 21 million observations, while the exporting firms’ sample
consists of approximately 2.5 million observations.The data span the time period
from January 2011 to December 2015.
Prior to Russia’s accession to the WTO in 2012, there are 20,225 exporting
firms and 62,616 importing firms. One year after Russia joins WTO, in 2013, the
number of exporters increases to 21,005 and the number of importers increases to
69,314. Figure 11 demonstrates the seasonally adjusted dynamic in the number
of Russian firms engaged in foreign trade. The number of exporters exhibits a
clear upward trend after Russia joined the WTO (first vertical line on the plot).
The plot presents some evidence that more exporters were present in the market
after Russia joined WTO due to the opening of new markets for the domestic
firms and exporters. We observe a steady increase in the number of importers
prior to the WTO accession, which continues for some time after August 2012.
However, after that the number of importers stabilizes and, finally, it decreases
4The data set is acquired through the Russian analytical agency VedStat, http://www.
ved-stat.ru.
153
after the retaliatory embargo is imposed in August of 2014. The stabilization and
the decline in the number of importers prior to the embargo could be due to the
macroeconomic shocks that hit Russian economy after the significant drop in oil
prices in the end of 2013 - beginning of 2014.
To complement Figure 11, we also plot the firm entry into foreign trade. We
separate firms into purely exporters, purely importers, and firms that both import
and export. We then plot the number of firms in each category that begin their
operations before Russia joins WTO and after Russia’s accession. This information
is presented in Figure 12. The number of firms is weighted by firm size, and the
time period ends in February 2014, one month prior to the imposition of economic
sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Crimea. The entry rate for the importing
firms after Russia joins the WTO is higher than for the exporters. Typically,
importing involves lower costs, which could explain partly why there are initially
more importers than exporters. However, the number of exporters that begin to
export after Russia joins WTO is a little higher than the number of exporters
that begin to export prior to the accession. This could be explained by the fact
that accession to the WTO opens new markets abroad for domestic producers
stimulating export entry, while importers suffer from increased foreign competition,
which leads to a decline in the number of firms that import.
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FIGURE 11.
Number of firms engaged in foreign trade over time
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FIGURE 12.
Number of Firms to Begin Foreign Trade
Lastly, we provide some information on within-firm dynamics. We calculate
summary statistics on some characteristics of foreign trade and present them
in Table 23. We compare the value of each firm characteristic one year before
Russia’s accession to the WTO (i.e., year 2011) to the value one year after Russia
joins WTO (i.e., year 2013). Trade frequency, which we define as the number of
periods within 6 months intervals when a firm has at least one positive trade flow,
be it exports or imports, increases for both importing and exporting firms. On
average, firms import (export) about 2.6 (2.37) times every six months prior to
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the accession. After Russia joins WTO, these values increase to 2.77 for imports
and 2.54 for exports. Additionally, WTO positively affects the average number
of products traded for both importers and exporters and the average number of
partner countries to which an average firm exports. An average firm’s import
flow is significantly lower than an average export flow. This could be explained
by a significantly larger number of firms that participate in imports compared to
exporting firms. The average value of imports declines after Russia joins WTO,
due to a decrease in both the quantity of imports (i.e., the average weight of an
import shipment) and in unit values. The average exporting firm, on the other
hand, increases the value of its trade flow from 736,159 USD in 2011 to 882,148
USD in 2013. This increase can be attributed to a large, five-fold increase in a
firm’s average unit value.
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TABLE 23.
Summary Statistics
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Variable 2011 2013 2011 2013
Avg value of a trade flow∗ 68,174.78 62,096.48 736,158.7 882,147.5
(1218553) (870131.9) (1.67e+07) (1.94e+07)
Avg weight of a trade flow∗ 25,602.27 23,470.23 1,352,433 1,307,704
(792872.9) (784849.6) (3.41e+07) (2.67e+07)
Avg unit value of a trade flow∗ 1,642.98 1,485.48 69,643.55 377,400.3
(996491.5 ) (383572) (1.87e+07) (8.19e+07)
Trade frequency 2.60 2.77 2.37 2.54
(1.75) (1.86) (1.67) (1.81)
Avg number of products traded∗∗ 7.76 7.97 3.10 3.13
(22.60) (22.60) (8.28) (7.29)
Avg number of partner countries 1.09 1.09 1.29 1.31
(0.39) (0.41) (0.99) (1.10)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
∗ Calculated at HS-8 level product-country.
∗∗ HS-8 level products traded with one country.
Estimation Strategy
This section describes the estimating equations for the firm-level extensive
and intensive margins, as well as for the frequency of trade shipments. Our micro-
level dataset includes information on monthly import and export transactions
by firm, (HS 8-digit) product and foreign country. This allows us to define the
extensive margin in multiple ways, such as, the number of products traded by a
firm, or the number of products traded by a firm in a given foreign market, or the
number of countries that a firm trades with, or the number of countries that a firm
trades a particular product. The intensive margin is defined as the value of a trade
transaction for a given product carried out by a firm in a given foreign market.
Similarly, the frequency of trade shipments is defined at the firm-product-country
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level as the number of months within a six-month period that a firm registers
positive trade flows.
Our methodological approach to evaluate the response of Russian firms along
all these different margins following the country’s WTO accession boils down
to a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. In presenting the estimating
equations, we will also discuss the preferred estimation method and any model
identification issues.
Firm-Level Extensive Margins
Russia joined WTO in August 2012, so any trade transaction after this
date takes place under the new trade policy regime. To evaluate whether
Russian firms have changed their behavior post-WTO accession, we construct
a treatment variable as an interaction term between the month-year periods
post August 2012 and the WTO membership status of a foreign country j, i.e.,
Post0812t × WTOmemberj. This will become our variable of interest. The
estimated coefficient will capture the extent to which Russian firms change their
trade patterns in relation to WTO member countries in the post-accession month-
year periods relative to the pre-accession periods (i.e., treatment group) compared
to any changes in relation to non-WTO member countries over the same periods
(i.e., control group).
Starting with the product extensive margin, the difference-in-differences
estimation equation that we propose takes the following form:
Prodfjst = αfjs + αt + βPost0812t ×WTOmemberjt
+Xjt
′γ + δEmbargos × Targetjt + εfjst (4.1)
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where f , j, s and t index the firm, foreign country, sector group and month-year
period, respectively. The sector group s separates the set of HS 4-digit industries
that are subject to the retaliatory embargo from the rest of the traded goods. So,
Prodfjst denotes the number of HS 8-digit products within group s that are traded
by firm f with country j at time t. The vector Xjt captures a set of time-varying
country characteristics that influence trade patterns, such as the GDP level, the
existence of free trade agreements (FTA) in effect with Russia and the exchange
rate.5 Embargos equals 1 for the group of HS 4-digit industry codes that are
embargoed starting from August 2014, while Targetjt equals 1 if foreign country
j imposed economic sanctions on Russia in period t. αt and αfjs denote month-
year, respectively firm-country-sector group fixed effects.
We estimate equation (4.1) using Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) with high dimensional fixed effects (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006))
and cluster the standard errors at the firm-country (fj) level (in the robustness
section we discuss OLS results as well). We carry out the analysis separately for
export and import transactions.
The coefficient of interest is the difference-in-difference estimator β. A key
identifying assumption in this type of estimation method is that, conditional
on the set of control variables, the trend of the product extensive margin would
have followed the same trajectory for the average firm in the sample as that of the
control group (i.e., the group of countries that are no part of the WTO). Another
important condition that is necessary in order to ensure an unbiased estimate of β
5Since our treatment variable of interest varies by country, month and year, we cannot control
for foreign country characteristics using standard country-time fixed effects. So, we are forced
to include in the estimation equation as many observable time-varying country characteristics as
possible. For variables that are available only annually (e.g., GDP level), we divide the GDP by
4 to get the average quarterly GDP. For dummy variables that are available annually (e.g., FTA
status), we use these variables as is.
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is the exogenous timing of Russia’s WTO accession such that no firm would alter
their trade behavior prior to August 2012. We assume the latter condition is likely
to hold given the lengthy and unpredictable behavior of the Russian government
in matters of foreign policy. To ensure the first condition, i.e., the parallel trends
assumption, we are particularly careful about the interplay between two of Russia’s
trade policy decisions: the WTO accession and the retaliatory embargo imposed
two years later. Since all countries imposing economic sanctions on Russia are
WTO members, bilateral trade with these countries may decrease in the post-
WTO period for reasons that are not a direct consequence of Russia’s accession to
the WTO. This decrease is most likely to happen in product categories in which
Russia has imposed a retaliatory embargo against the sanctioning countries. For
these reasons, it is important that we control in our regression estimations for the
subset of sanctioning countries (i.e., Target countries) as well as the interaction
between these countries and the set of HS 4-digit embargoed goods.
In our analysis, we experiment with variations of equation (4.1) by
aggregating the model across the two sector groups to estimate the changes
induced by the WTO accession across all HS-8 product categories traded by firm f
with country j. We further aggregate the estimation equation across all countries
that are WTO members in period t versus the group of non-WTO countries to
estimate the change in the number of products traded by a given firm f across
the entire set of WTO members versus non-WTO members. As we will show
in the results section, there are no qualitative differences between the different
aggregation levels of equation (4.1).
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Next we estimate the country extensive margin using the following difference-
in-difference specification:
Countryfmkt = αfmk + αt + βPost0812t ×WTOmembermt
+Xmt
′γ + δEmbargok × Targetmt + εfmkt (4.2)
where f , m, k and t stand for firm, country group, HS 8-digit sector and month-
year time period, respectively. The country group m denotes four sets of countries:
WTO member countries that later impose sanctions on Russia, WTO member
countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia, non-WTO member countries
that impose sanctions on Russia as well as non-WTO member countries that do
not impose sanctions on Russia. Thus, Countryfmkt denotes the number of foreign
countries within a given country group m that firm f trades with in product k
and time period t. WTOmembermt is equal to 1 if country group m consists of
WTO members, and 0 otherwise. Targetmt equals 1 if country group m consists
of countries that impose economic sanctions on Russia following the invasion of
Crimea (a subset of WTO member countries). Finally, the vector Xmt controls for
a set of time-varying macroeconomic variables that characterize country group m.
As with the product margin case, we experiment with different levels of
sample aggregation to estimate versions of equation (4.2). In particular, we
aggregate the data across country groups m and keep only the distinction between
WTO members versus non-members to ask whether trade transactions in a given
product category are more likely with WTO member countries irrespective of
whether these countries are sanctioning or non-sanctioning countries. We then
further aggregate the sample across all products k traded by a given firm to see
whether post WTO-accession the firm is more likely to enter new foreign markets
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(where it has no experience trading any product) which are WTO members as
opposed to non-WTO members.
Firm-Level Intensive Margin
Firm-level intensive margin refers to an average import and export flow within
firm-product-country groups. Additionally, we also estimate the impact of the
WTO on the weight and unit value of an average trade flow.
Tradefjkt = αfjk + αt + βPost0812t ×WTOmemberjt
+Xjt
′γ + δEmbargok × Targetjt + εfjkt (4.3)
where f , j, k and t stand for firm, foreign country, HS 8-digit product and month-
year time period, respectively. Thus, Tradefjkt represents average value of a trade
flow in HS 8-digit product k firm f exports (imports) to (from) country j during
period t. Similarly to equation (4.1), the variable of interest that captures the
effect of Russia’s accession to the WTO on the intensive margin is represented
by the interaction term Post0812t × WTOmemberjt. We also control for the
impacts of the retaliatory embargo by including the interaction term between the
indicator variable that separates a set of embargoed HS 8-digit product codes from
the non-embargoed products (Embargok) and the control for the countries that
sanctioned Russia in period t (Targetjt): Embargok × Targetjt. Finally, the vector
Xjt contains a set of time-varying country characteristics that have been shown
to impact trade patterns. The variables we include are distance between countries
weighted by population, dummy for the presence of FTA or RTA between Russia
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and the foreign country j, dummy for common border, dummy for common
language, dummy for common religion, and GDP of the foreign partner.
We complement our analysis of an average value of export and import flows
by analyzing the impact of the WTO accession on the average weight and unit
value of the export and import flow. The unit value is calculated by dividing the
value of the firm - product - country trade flow in a given period of time by the
weight of this flow in the same time period.
Firm-Level Frequency of Trade Transactions
We also investigate the frequency at which Russian firms engage in
international transactions. Following the work of Handley and Limao (2017)
on trade policy uncertainty that can be mitigated by the WTO accession, we
hypothesize that one additional channel in which Russian firms may respond to
the reduction in trade uncertainty is by trading more often. This would be the
case if trade policy uncertainty manifests itself as a fixed cost per shipment in
the eyes of trading firms. To test this hypothesis, we estimate a similar regression
model as before given by the following equation:
Freqfjkh = αfjk + αh + βPost0812h ×WTOmemberjh
+Xjh
′γ + δEmbargok × Targetjh + εfjkh (4.4)
where f , j, k and h index the firm, foreign country, HS 8-digit sectors code and
a half-year time period. The dependent variable Freqfjkh captures the number
of months within a six-month period h during which firm f trades with foreign
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country j in a given product k.6 All the other variables and fixed effects are
defined as before.
Similarly to our analysis of product and country margins we experiment with
variations of equation (4.4) by aggregating the model across all HS 8-level products
to estimate the changes induced by the WTO to the frequency of trade of firm f
with country j across all products. We further aggregate the estimation equation
across all countries to estimate the change in foreign trade frequency of a given
firm f across the entire set of WTO members versus non-WTO members in time
period t. As we will show in the results section, there are no qualitative differences
between the different aggregation levels of equation (4.4).
Data
To estimate the regression models described above, we use several data
sources, including the firm level trade data sourced from the Russian Customs
Agency, CEPII Gravity, and World Bank Global Economic Monitor databases.
The novel dataset provides detailed information on all Russian exporter and
importer firms’ monthly trade flows by partner-country and HS 8-digit product
code. The data span the time period from January 2011 to December 2015.
The CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales)
Gravity database provides information on the country-time specific macroeconomic
controls such as geographic distance between Russia and its trading partners,
common language and border, regional and free trade agreements, and other
controls typically used as regressors in the gravity equation. Time-specific
6We estimate the trade frequency regression over six-month time periods because of the short
length of our panel dataset spanning 2011-2015. In unreported results we have also experimented
with year-long time periods over which trade frequency is defined and the results are qualitatively
similar.
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macroeconomic controls such as oil price and USD to ruble exchange rate are
sourced from St. Louis FRED and Investing.com7, respectively. Finally, the GDP
data for Russia and for foreign countries are taken from the World Bank Global
Economic Monitor database, and are recorded on a yearly basis.
After combining all these data sources, we obtain a panel dataset of Russian
firms’ import and export transactions by country, by HS 8-digit product, by month
and year of transaction. The import sample contains 21 million observations,
while the exports sample has about 2.5 million observations. There is a total
of 214 exports destinations for the Russian exporting firms, 163 of which are
WTO members. Prior to the WTO accession Russian exporters export to 147
WTO member countries, while after the accession this number increases to 162.
There are 211 foreign countries that import from Russia, 159 of which are WTO
members. Prior to the WTO accession, Russian firms import from 148 WTO
member countries, while after the accession this number increases to 153.
When estimating the product margin of exporting and importing firms we
collapse the sample across all products by counting the number of unique HS 8-
digit product codes within partner country - firm pairs each month-year time
period. For the country margin analysis, we collapse the dataset by the foreign
country WTO membership and count the number of unique partner countries
each firm trades with in a particular HS 8-digit product code each month-year
time period. When we analyze the intensive margin of firm - level trade, we look
within the firm and utilize the sample in its original form with each observation
providing information on the value and weight of the firm - foreign country - HS
8-digit product code trade flow.
7https://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-rub-historical-data
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Estimation Results
Product Margin
We begin our analysis by investigating the impact of Russia’s accession to
the WTO on the product margin of exporting and importing firms. We define the
product margin as the number of unique HS-8 codes a firm exports or imports in
a period of time. It is likely that the accession to the WTO opened more markets
for the Russian exporters and importers due to the decline tariffs, decline in trade
uncertainty, and increase in the variety of products available for imports. This
would encourage both importers and exporters to trade more products. We use
equation (4.1) to estimate the effect of the WTO on the product margin. The
results of these estimations are presented in Table 24. The benchmark specification
used for the product margin is Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) due
to the count nature of the dependent variable. OLS results are presented in the
robustness checks section for comparison.
Each column of Table 24 presents a different variation of equation (4.1).
Columns 3 and 6 present the results of estimation of the most disaggregated
version of equation (4.1). The dependent variable in columns 3 and 6 is the
number of unique HS 8-digit products separated by their embargo status s a firm f
trades with each foreign country j. Columns 2 and 5 aggregates the model across
the two sector groups to estimate the changes induced by the WTO accession
across all HS-8 product categories traded by firm f with a country j. Columns
1 and 4 further aggregate the estimation equation across all countries that are
WTO members versus the group of non-WTO countries. The dependent variable
is a number of unique HS-8 level products firm f imports (exports) from (to) all
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WTO member countries and all non-WTO partner countries in a given time period
t, i.e., the level of aggregation of the dependent variable is the WTO-membership.
From Table 24 we can see that the exported number of HS 8- level products
decreases, although this effect is statistically not different from zero. Controlling
for the effects of the embargo does not alter the effect of interest, which leads us
to the conclusion that the product margin of the exporting firms is not impacted
by the accession to the WTO. This could be the result of an increased competition
from foreign firms which typically follows trade liberalization episodes. Standard
prediction of a Melitz model is that less efficient firms are forced out of the
markets, while the more efficient exporters continue to export, but limit their
efforts to a smaller set of products.
The opposite effect is observed for importers: average number of HS-8 level
products imported from country j increases by 8.6%. Controlling for the embargo
does not change the coefficient of interest. This finding could serve as evidence
of increased access to foreign markets, and a decrease in importing tariffs, which
would allow firms to begin importing additional products. Finally, consumers
prefer variety and importing firms could be attempting to capitalize on this
behavior.
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TABLE 24.
Product Margin
EXPORTS IMPORTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post0812t ×WTOmemberjt -0.056 -0.010 -0.008 0.100*** 0.085** 0.086**
[0.045] [0.023] [0.022] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034]
Embargos × Targetjt -0.084*** -0.345***
[0.025] [0.040]
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm - WTO membership FE Yes No No Yes No No
Firm-country FE No Yes No No Yes No
Firm-country-product type FE No No Yes No No Yes
Time macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-time macro controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 145,718 782,491 800,780 1,331,375 2,590,748 2,648,460
No. firm-WTO membership gr. 11,765 65,820
No. firm-country gr. 75,378 213,985
No. firm-country-product type gr. 77,326 220,644
Standard error clustering Firm Firm-country Firm-country Firm Firm-country Firm-country
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML). In columns 1 and 4 the
dependent variable is a number of unique HS-8 level products firm j imports (exports) from (to) all WTO member countries and all non-
WTO partner countries in time period t. In columns 2 and 5 the dependent variable is a refinement of columns 1 and 4: number of unique
HS-8 level products firm f imports (exports) from (to) each country j. Finally, in columns 3 and 6 the dependent variable in this table is
the number of unique embargoed and non-embargoed HS-8 level products firm f trades with each country j. Embargos equals 1 for the
group of HS 4-digit industry codes that are embargoed starting from August 2014, while Targetjt equals 1 if foreign country j imposed
economic sanctions on Russia in period t. Variable of interest is Post0812t × WTOmemberjt is an interaction term between the month-
year periods post August 2012 and the WTO membership status of a foreign country j. Country-time macro controls include distance
between countries weighted by population, dummy for presence of FTA or RTA between Russia and country j, dummies for common border,
common language, common religion, and GDP of partner countries.
Country Margin
Next we explore the impact of Russia’s accession to the WTO on the number
of partners an average firm exports to or imports from. It is reasonable to check
the country margin, because WTO membership grants many benefits, including
lower tariffs and lowering of the non-tariff barriers. Additionally, the decline in
trade uncertainty caused by Russia’s accession to the WTO might increase its
appeal as a trade partner for other country, increasing the number of partners an
average firm can trade with.
Country margin in the context of this analysis is defined as a number of
unique partner-countries a firm f exports to or imports from in a period of time.
We separate the countries by their WTO membership status. We use equation
(4.2) to estimate the effect of the WTO on the country margin. The results of
these estimations are presented in Table 25. Our estimator of choice is Pseudo-
Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML), because similarly to the product margin,
the dependent variable is a count. OLS results are presented in the robustness
checks section for comparison.
In columns 3 and 6 we present the results of estimation of equation (4.2),
where the dependent variable is a number of unique partner countries that belong
to one of the country groups in m firm f imports (exports) an HS 8-digit product
k from (to) with in a given time period t. The country group m denotes four sets
of countries: WTO member countries that later impose sanctions on Russia,
WTO member countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia, non-WTO
member countries that impose sanctions on Russia as well as non-WTO member
countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia. In columns 2 and 5 we get
rid of the sanctioning country dimension and keep only the distinction between
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WTO members versus non-members. Dependent variable in these columns is the
number of unique partner countries that are WTO members versus non-WTO
member countries firm f imports (exports) HS 8-digit product k from (to) with
in a given time period t. Finally, in columns 1 and 4 we present the results of the
highest level of sample aggregation by getting rid of the product dimension. The
dependent variable is a number of unique WTO-member and non-WTO member
partner countries firm f trades with in a given time period t.
The effects of joining the WTO on the country margin are present for both
Russian exporters and importers. An average exporting firm experiences a 5%
increase in the number of export destinations per product (columns 2 and 3), while
for the importers this effect is under 1% per product (columns 5 and 6). While
the embargo has an expected negative impact on number of trading partners for
importers, it has no statistically significant impact on the exporters. These results
are indicative of a positive impact accession to the WTO had on some margins of
the Russian firms engaged in foreign trade.
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TABLE 25.
Country Margin
EXPORTS IMPORTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post0812t ×WTOmembermt 0.045*** 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.011*** 0.006***
[0.016] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001]
Embargok × Targetmt -0.023 -0.101***
[0.015] [0.008]
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-WTO member FE Yes No No Yes No No
Firm-WTO membership-product FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time-specific macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 145,718 1,789,427 1,911,198 1,331,375 16,350,121 16,442,716
No. of firm-WTO membership groups 11,765 65,820
No. of firm-WTO-product groups 226,590 245,058 2,070,180 2,110,162
Standard error clustering Firm Firm-product Firm-product Firm Firm-product Firm-product
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML). In columns 1 and 4 the
dependent variable is a number of unique partner countries that are WTO members and unique non-WTO countries firm f trades with
in a given time period t. In columns 2 and 5 the dependent variable is a number of unique partner countries that are WTO members and
unique non-WTO countries firm f imports (exports) product k from (to) with in a given time period t. Finally, in columns 3 and 6 the
dependent variable is a number of unique partner countries from group m firm f imports (exports) product k from (to) with in a given time
period t. The country group m denotes four sets of countries: WTO member countries that later impose sanctions on Russia, WTO member
countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia, non-WTO member countries that impose sanctions on Russia as well as non-WTO
member countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia. WTOmembermt is equal to 1 if country group m consists of WTO members, and
0 otherwise. Targetmt equals 1 if country group m consists of countries that impose economic sanctions on Russia following the invasion of
Crimea (a subset of WTO member countries). Time macro controls include price of oil, Russia’s GDP, and the USD to rouble exchange rate.
Average Export and Import Flow of Firms
We complement the extensive margin analysis with analysis of the intensive
margin of trade, which we define as an average import and export flow per
product-country. Joining WTO makes foreign trade more accessible and has
potential to increase the size of an average trade flow for both exporters and
importers due to a decline in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The effects for the
weight and unit value are not straightforward.
We use equation (4.3) to analyze these effects. P × Q represents the value of
an import or export flow; Q denotes the weight (mass) in kilograms of the flow;
P is the average unit value. The results of the intensive margin analysis for both
exports and imports are presented in Table 26.
Overall, we find mixed effects of the WTO accession on the intensive margin
of Russian firms, which is consistent with the aggregate results in the literature in
that, like Dutt et al. (2013), we find a strong effect of WTO membership on the
extensive margin but not much of an effect on the intensive margin. We find no
significant effect on the value or quantity of an average export flow of Russian
exporters. However, the average unit value of an export flow increases. This
finding is in line with existing trade theory, according to which when countries
open to trade, the price of exports tends to increase due to the comparative
advantage of the exporting country, which allows firms to produce at a relatively
lower cost and sell at a higher price after the trade barriers decline.
One puzzle presented is the increase in the value of an average export flow
of embargoed goods to the sanctioning countries after the imposition of the
embargo (direct effect variable in column 1). This increase in the value seems to
be driven by the increase in price (positive direct effect in column 3), rather than
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the increase in quantity, which actually decreases, although none of these effects
are significant.
The embargo has significant negative impact across all dependent variables
(value, quantity, and unit value) for the importing firms. The only significant
impact of Russia’s accession to the WTO on imports comes from the quantity of
imports: mass of an average import flow from a WTO-member country increases
after Russia joins WTO, while the average value and unit value of the import flow
do not change significantly after the accession.
TABLE 26.
Intensive Margin of Firm - Level Foreign Trade
EXPORT IMPORT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P × Q Q P P × Q Q P
Post0812t ×WTOmemberjt 0.009 0.110 1.821** 0.050 0.113** 0.361
[0.113] [0.104] [0.706] [0.047] [0.050] [0.324]
Embargok × Targetjt 0.224*** -0.201 0.176 -0.148*** -0.372*** -0.462**
[0.079] [0.128] [0.381] [0.046] [0.083] [0.222]
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-period-country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,269,504 2,269,528 1,503,375 18,868,262 18,868,262 18,868,262
No. of firm-product-country gr. 311,171 311,181 219,967 2,495,855 2,495,855 2,495,855
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at firm-period-country in
brackets. Dependent variables: value (P × Q), mass (Q) or unit value (P ) of exports and imports
by firm-country-product. Embargok equals 1 if HS 8-digit product is embargoed starting from
August 2014, while Targetjt equals 1 if foreign country j imposed economic sanctions on Russia
in period t. Variable of interest is Post0812t ×WTOmemberjt is an interaction term between the
month-year periods post August 2012 and the WTO membership status of a foreign country j.
Estimator used is the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML).
Foreign Trade Frequency
Finally we propose a less conventional test to analyze the impacts of Russia’s
accession to the WTO on the exporting and importing firms by analyzing the
response of foreign trade frequency. We define foreign trade frequency as the
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number of periods, in which a positive export or import flow is observed for a
firm f with a country j. We use estimation equation (4.4) to analyze the impacts
of WTO on foreign trade frequency. These results are presented in Table 27.
Columns 3 and 6 present the most disaggregated version of the trade frequency
model, equation (4.4) itself. Dependent variable in this case is the number of
periods firm f imports (exports) product k from (to) country j. In columns 2 and
5 we aggregate the model across all HS 8-level products, to estimate the changes
induced by the WTO to the frequency of trade of firm f with country j across
all products. Finally, the dependent variable in columns 1 and 4 is a number of
periods, in which a firm has at least one positive import or export flow from all
WTO countries and all non-WTO member countries.
Interestingly, we find radically different results for the average exporting
frequency and average importing frequency. While the frequency of exporting to
country j decreases on average by 5%, and this effect is statistically significant,
average importing from country j increases by 6%. Exports usually are more
specialized, due to the existence of country’s comparative advantage prior to
the WTO accession. Exporting firms are, on average, larger and more effective
(Bernard and Jensen (2004)), so they might be less likely to respond to the WTO
accession, because they found their exports niche prior to the WTO. Operating
on the importing markets might be easier for firms (easier to find new partner
connections and access to new product markets) and thus we might see a positive
effect on these firms. Controlling for the embargo produces expected results for the
importing firms.
175
Robustness Checks
We next conduct several robustness checks. One worry about the exports
estimates might be that the large share of Russia’s exports are comprised of
crude oil and natural gas, and the intensive margin results in Table 26 might be
driven by these products. To check if this is the case, we exclude crude oil and gas
products (HS-4 level products 2709 “Petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals,
crude”, 2710 “ Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except crude”, and 2711
“Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons”) from the sample. The results
of this exercise are presented in Table 28. We do not find that this changes our
estimates in any significant way, so the exports results at the intensive margin are
not driven by oil and gas products.
Next, we also check the consistency of our estimations by utilizing OLS
estimator as opposed to the Poisson-PseudoMaximum Likelihood (PPML)
estimator, which is our preferred method of estimations. We re-estimate equations
(4.1), (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) using OLS. These results are presented in the
appendix Tables A.4, A.5, A.6, and A.7. The majority of extensive margin OLS
results for the coefficient of interest Post0812t × WTOmemberjt have similar
significance levels and signs as the PPML results. However, the magnitude of the
coefficients varies. The OLS results for the intensive margin estimations (Table
A3) overestimate the results of the accession to the WTO for the trade value and
price. Following the convention in the trade literature we use PPML to estimate
the intensive margin effects.
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TABLE 27.
Foreign Trade Frequency
EXPORTS IMPORTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post0812h ×WTOmemberjh -0.001 -0.035*** -0.054*** 0.022** 0.022** 0.060***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.004] [0.010] [0.010] [0.004]
Embargok × Targetjh -0.012 -0.386***
[0.017] [0.007]
Biannual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm - WTO membership FE Yes No No Yes No No
Time-specific macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-time specific controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm-country FE No Yes No No Yes No
Firm-product-country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 161,020 274,484 933,501 478,910 862,258 7,267,969
No. of firm-WTO membership groups 34,633 94,264
No. of firm-country groups 63,892 187,878
No. of firm-country-product groups 252,651 2,011,283
Standard error clustering Firm Firm-country Firm-country Firm-level Firm-country Firm-country
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML). In columns 1 and 4 the
dependent variable is a biannual frequency of trade (each 6 months), which is defined as number of periods, in which a firm has at least
one positive import or export flow from all WTO countries and all non-WTO member countries. In columns 2 and 5 the dependent variable
is the number of periods firm f imports (exports) any/all products from (to) country j. Finally, in columns 3 and 6 the dependent variable
is the number of periods firm f imports (exports) product k from (to) country j. Embargok equals 1 for the group of HS 8-digit industry
codes that are embargoed starting from August 2014, while Targetjh equals 1 if foreign country j imposed economic sanctions on Russia
in half-year period h. Variable of interest is Post0812h × WTOmemberjh is an interaction term between the half-year periods post August
2012 and the WTO membership status of a foreign country j. Country-time macro controls include distance between countries weighted by
population, dummy for presence of FTA or RTA between Russia and country j, dummy for common border, dummy for common language,
dummy for common religion, and GDP of partner countries.
TABLE 28.
Intensive Margin: Exports Sample Excluding Oil and Gas Products
(1) (2) (3)
P × Q Q P
Post0812t ×WTOmemberj -0.100 0.112 1.821***
[0.127] [0.085] [0.706]
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-product-country FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,221,187 2,220,687 2,220,634
Number of firm-product-country groups 306,393 306,389 306,374
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is PPML. Standard errors clustered at
firm-period-country in brackets. Dependent variables: value (P × Q), mass (Q) or unit value (P )
of exports and imports by firm-country-product. The sample excludes post-embargo time and all
crude oil and gas products (HS 4-digit codes 2709, 2710, and 2711).
The final robustness check we conduct addresses the worry that imports
estimates might be biased by the fact that the accession to the WTO
disproportionately impacted Russian agricultural producers. Many agricultural
enterprises in Russia rely heavily on the state subsidies, which are against the
WTO provisions. After Russia joined WTO, many agricultural enterprises
including producers of grain, dairy, and produced voiced their concerns about
the inability to face the increased competition. To check whether the agricultural
enterprises might be biasing our results, we conduct the extensive and intensive
margins analysis for two separate samples. One sample includes only enterprises
that trade (export, import or both) non-agricultural products, while the other
sample covers agricultural enterprises. The way we select agricultural enterprises
is by selecting firms which trade in at least one agricultural product over the
duration of our sample. We identify the agricultural products as products that
are later embargoed by the Russian government. This method also allows us to
check whether the way the products were chosen for the embargo was more of
a convenient instrument of protectionist policy to benefit the agricultural sector
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which is vulnerable in the face of increased competition after the WTO accession
rather than a simple retaliation instrument.
We re-estimate equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) for the two samples
separately. These results are presented in Tables 30, 31, 29, and 30. It is not
straightforward whether the agricultural products are disproportionately impacted
by the accession to the WTO, because certain dimension of firm’s behavior in
agricultural sector, like frequency of trade for exports or product margin of the
importers are more impacted by the WTO, while others, like exports unit value
are driven by the non-agricultural sector.
The frequency of trade for the exporting firms is more negatively impacted by
the accession to the WTO and the imposition of embargo than a non-agricultural
sample. However, the imports frequency for the agricultural sample increases.
At the product margin, agriculture importers benefit the most from the WTO
accession: the number of HS 8-digit products increases by 14.5% while for the non-
agriculture sector this effect is not statistically significant. Intensive margin results
in Table 26 are mostly driven by the non-agricultural sector, while the embargo
results are driven, expectedly, by the agricultural sector. We find a positive and
significant impact of WTO on the average value of an import flow, while export
flow is not affected in a statistically significant manner.
Our findings could justify the fears of increased competition that some
Russian agricultural enterprises share. We find evidence of disproportionate
positive impacts of WTO on agricultural imports: significant increase in frequency
of imports, increase in the average number of products imported, and a significant
increase in the average firm-product-country import flow. These findings could
serve as the evidence that the embargo was intended as a protectionist policy
and targeted a very specific sector whose imports benefitted significantly from the
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WTO accession (agriculture) in order to help the vulnerable domestic industries.
Because the protectionist policies are against the WTO provisions, the embargo
could have been a convenient way to kill two birds with one stone - retaliate
against the embargo and protect domestic agriculture.
TABLE 29.
Agricultural Sector: Intensive Margin
EXPORTS IMPORTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P × Q Q P P × Q Q P
Post0812t ×WTOmemberjt 0.028 -0.150 -0.029 0.119** 0.020 0.407
[0.085] [0.130] [0.177] [0.052] [0.087] [0.549]
Embargos × Targetjt 0.009 -0.330** 0.160* -0.128*** -0.110** -0.485**
[0.084] [0.152] [0.090] [0.035] [0.054] [0.189]
Firm-product-country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 485,963 485,966 485,963 3,048,029 3,048,029 3,048,029
No. of firm-product- country gr. 62,431 62,432 62,431 457,287 457,287 457,287
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at firm-period-country in
brackets. Dependent variables: value (P × Q), mass (Q) or unit value (P ) of exports and imports
by firm-country-product.Embargok equals 1 if HS 8-digit product is embargoed starting from
August 2014, while Targetjt equals 1 if foreign country j imposed economic sanctions on Russia
in period t. Variable of interest is Post0812t × WTOmemberjt is an interaction term between
the month-year periods post August 2012 and the WTO membership status of a foreign country
j.Estimator used is the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML).
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TABLE 30.
Agricultural Sector: Extensive Margin
EXPORTS IMPORTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product margin Country margin Frequency Product margin Country margin Frequency
Post0812(t,h) ×WTOmember(j,m)(h,t) -0.040 0.086*** -0.096*** 0.145** -0.001 0.091***
[0.039] [0.008] [0.008] [0.059] [0.002] [0.007]
Embargo(k,s) × Target(j,m)(t,h) -0.125*** -0.026* -0.045** -0.317*** -0.105*** -0.361***
[0.032] [0.015] [0.018] [0.044] [0.008] [0.008]
Biannual FE No No Yes No No Yes
Month - year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Firm - country - emb. product FE Yes No No Yes No No
Firm - WTO - sanctions - product FE No Yes No No Yes No
Firm - country - product FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 114,863 384,168 185,032 483,695 2,614,482 1,139,043
No. of firm - country - emb. product gr. 10,148 40,253
No. of firm - country - product gr. 47,897 350,748
No. of firm -WTO - 47,827 380,516
sanctions - product gr.
Standard error clustering Firm - country Firm - country - Firm - product - Firm-country Firm - country - Firm-product -
WTO WTO WTO WTO
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is PPML. The sample excludes all firms that trade (export, import or both) in at least
one embargoed agricultural product. Product margin in columns 1 and 4 refers to a number of unique HS-8 level products separated by
embargo status (s) firm f imports (exports) from (to) country j in a time period t. Country margin in columns 2 and 5 refers to a number
of unique countries from group m with which firm f trades in HS 8-level product k. The country group m denotes four sets of countries:
WTO member countries that later impose sanctions on Russia, WTO member countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia, non-WTO
member countries that impose sanctions on Russia as well as non-WTO member countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia. Finally,
frequency in columns 3 and 6 refers to the number of periods in half-year period h firm f imports (exports) HS 8-level product k from (to)
country j. Post0812(t,h) × WTOmember(j,m)(h,t) is an interaction term between the time period (month - year or half - year) periods post
August 2012 and the WTO membership status of a foreign country j (or country group m). Embargo(k,s) equals 1 for the group of HS
8-digit industry codes that are embargoed starting from August 2014, while Target(j,m)(h,t) equals 1 if foreign country j or country group m
imposed economic sanctions on Russia in month - year t or half-year period h.
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TABLE 31.
Non-agricultural Sector: Extensive Margin
EXPORTS IMPORTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product margin Country margin Frequency Product margin Country margin Frequency
Post0812(t,h)× 0.013 0.043*** -0.047*** 0.066 0.008*** 0.027***
WTOmember(j,m)(h,t) [0.026] [0.004] [0.005] [0.041] [0.001] [0.005]
Biannual FE No No Yes No No Yes
Month - year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Firm - country - emb. product FE Yes No No Yes No No
Firm - WTO - sanctions - product FE No Yes No No Yes No
Firm - country - product FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 687,998 1,527,030 754,706 2,165,171 13,828,234 6,134,435
No. of firm - country - emb. gr. 67,452 180,452
No. of firm - country - product gr. 206,539 1,661,588
No. of firm -WTO - 197,231 1,729,646
sanctions - product gr.
Standard error clustering Firm - country Firm - country - Firm - product - Firm-country Firm - country - Firm-product -
WTO WTO WTO WTO
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is PPML. The sample includes only firms that trade exclusively in non-agricultural
products. Product margin in columns 1 and 4 refers to a number of unique HS-8 level products separated by embargo status (s) firm f
imports (exports) from (to) country j in a time period t. Country margin in columns 2 and 5 refers to a number of unique countries from
group m with which firm f trades in HS 8-level product k. The country group m denotes four sets of countries: WTO member countries
that later impose sanctions on Russia, WTO member countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia, non-WTO member countries
that impose sanctions on Russia as well as non-WTO member countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia. Finally, frequency in
columns 3 and 6 refers to the number of periods in half-year period h firm f imports (exports) HS 8-level product k from (to) country j.
Post0812(t,h) × WTOmember(j,m)(h,t) is an interaction term between the time period (month - year or half - year) periods post August
2012 and the WTO membership status of a foreign country j (or country group m). Embargo(k,s) equals 1 for the group of HS 8-digit
industry codes that are embargoed starting from August 2014, while Target(j,m)(h,t) equals 1 if foreign country j or country group m
imposed economic sanctions on Russia in month - year t or half-year period h.
TABLE 32.
Non-agricultural Sector: Intensive Margin
EXPORTS IMPORTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P × Q Q P P × Q Q P
Post0812t ×WTOmemberj 0.009 0.118 1.811** 0.035 0.142** 0.011
[0.117] [0.107] [0.708] [0.060] [0.056] [0.218]
Firm-product-country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,783,541 1,783,562 1,783,541 15,820,233 15,820,233 15,820,233
No. of firm-product- country gr. 248,740 248,749 248,740 2,038,568 2,038,568 2,038,568
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at firm-period-country in
brackets. Dependent variables: value (P × Q), mass (Q) or unit value (P ) of exports and imports
by firm-country-product.Embargok equals 1 if HS 8-digit product is embargoed starting from
August 2014, while Targetjt equals 1 if foreign country j imposed economic sanctions on Russia
in period t. Variable of interest is Post0812t × WTOmemberjt is an interaction term between
the month-year periods post August 2012 and the WTO membership status of a foreign country
j.Estimator used is the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML).
Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the impact of Russia’s accession to the WTO on
a variety of exporting and importing firms’ outcomes. We find that, contrary
to the predictions of the seminal Rose’s paper, Russian exporters and importers
experience significant impacts of Russia’s accession to the WTO. These effects vary
significantly across the trade margins, with extensive margin of trade being more
significantly impacted that the intensive margin. We find that imports, especially
imports of agricultural products, are more impacted by the WTO. These impacts
include an increase in average frequency of import shipments, as well as increased
number of imported HS 8-digit product codes. Our findings are in line with the
aggregate results in the literature in that, like Dutt et al. (2013), we find a strong
effect of WTO membership on the extensive margin but not much of an effect on
the intensive margin, and like Liu (2009), we find that these effects are robust to
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departing from the traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method
and instead using the Pseudo-Poison Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method.
Our findings also uncover disproportionate positive impacts of WTO on
agricultural imports, which could serve as the evidence that the embargo was
intended as a protectionist policy and targeted a very specific sector whose imports
benefitted significantly from the WTO accession (agriculture) in order to help the
vulnerable domestic industry. Because the protectionist policies are against the
WTO provisions, the embargo was a convenient way to kill two birds with one
stone - retaliate against the embargo and protect domestic agricultural production.
To conclude, our empirical analysis of Russia’s accession to the WTO confirms
that this trade liberalization episode impacted several dimensions of the Russian
exporting and importing firms’ behavior.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I investigate the evolution of the current Russian foreign
trade policy from trade liberalization following the accession to the World Trade
Organization in 2012 to protectionism in the form of the retaliatory embargo
in 2014. I focus on estimating the effects of each individual policy on Russian
international trade, as well as the interconnection of these two opposing policies
as parts of a broader international policy strategy.
Russia joined the WTO in August of 2012, after 19 years of negotiations.
My analysis of firms’ dynamics in response to this trade liberalization episode in
Chapter IV uncovers disproportionately positive impacts of the WTO accession
on several dimensions of the Russian importing firms. However, along with the
certain economic gains that inevitably come with trade liberalization, there are
also drawbacks. In the case of Russia’s accession, agricultural production that
typically heavily relies on governmental subsidies, faced increased competition
from the foreign producers. When the European Union and the US imposed
economic sanctions on Russia after its invasion in Crimea in 2014, the Russian
government retaliated by hurting the sanctioning counties through an imposition of
a retaliatory embargo, which also could be viewed as a protectionist trade policy in
response to the struggles of the agricultural sector after the WTO accession.
As I show in Chapters II and III, the retaliatory embargo led to a significant
decline in Russia’s trade in embargoed products with the EU countries and the
US, while its trade with the non-sanctioning countries increased significantly.
Estimated losses for the imports of the embargoed goods are approximately 13
billion USD and the substitution towards the non-sanctioning countries is available
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only for 50% of this amount. However, aside from foreign trade losses, the embargo
also led to a significant reshuffling of trade and diplomatic connections among the
involved participants. The Russian government used this opportunity to push for
an increase in domestic production of certain embargoed products, and to focus
its diplomatic and cooperation efforts with other countries that share the “anti-
Western” mentality, such as Turkey, Egypt, Belarus, former USSR countries.
In its pursuit of retaliation, Russia sacrificed its own economic gains, including
the gains from the WTO accession. However, it also reaped certain benefits in the
form of newly established or strengthened political and economic connections with
the non-sanctioning countries, increased domestic production of grains and other
embargoed products, and weakened reliance on the approval of its policies from the
EU and the US.
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APPENDIX
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES AND TABLES
A. Supplemental Tables and Figures
TABLE A.1.
List of countries sanctioning Russia and targeted by the Russian retaliatory embargo
Country name UN COMTRADE Affiliation
code
Albania 8
Australia 36 OECD
Austria 40 OECD, EU
Belgium 56 OECD, EU
Bulgaria 100 EU
Canada 124 OECD
Croatia 191 EU
Cyprus 196 EU
Czech Republic 203 OECD, EU
Denmark 208 OECD, EU
Estonia 233 OECD, EU
Finland 246 OECD, EU
France 251 OECD, EU
Germany 276 OECD, EU
Greece 300 OECD, EU
Hungary 348 OECD, EU
Iceland 352 OECD
Ireland 372 OECD, EU
Italy 381 OECD, EU
Latvia 428 OECD, EU
Lichtenstein/Switzerland 757 OECD
Lithuania 440 OECD, EU
Luxembourg 442 OECD, EU
Malta 470 EU
Montenegro 499
Netherlands 528 OECD, EU
Norway 579 OECD
Poland 616 OECD, EU
Portugal 620 OECD, EU
Romania 642 EU
Slovakia 703 OECD, EU
Slovenia 705 OECD, EU
Spain 724 OECD, EU
Sweden 752 OECD, EU
Ukraine 804
United Kingdom 826 OECD, EU
USA 842 OECD
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TABLE A.2.
List of products targeted by the embargo
Sanctioned Description
products
0201∗ Meat and edible meat offal
0202∗ Meat of bovine animals, frozen.
0203∗ Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen.
0207 Meat and edible offal, of the poultry of heading 01.05, fresh,
chilled or frozen.
0210 Meat and edible meat offal, salted, in brine, dried or smoked;
edible flours and meals of meat or meat offal.
0301 Live fish.
0302 Fish, fresh or chilled, excluding fish fillets and other fish meat
of heading 03.04.
0303 Fish, frozen, excluding fish fillets and other fish meat
of heading 03.04.
0304 Fish fillets and other fish meat (whether or not minced), fresh,
chilled or frozen.
0305∗ Fish, dried, salted or in brine; smoked fish, whether or not cooked
before or during the smoking process; flours, meals and pellets of
fish, fit for human consumption.
0306 Crustaceans, whether in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, frozen,
dried, salted or in brine; smoked crustaceans, whether in shell or
not, whether or not cooked before or during the smoking process;
crustaceans, in shell, cooked by steaming or by boiling in water,
whether or not chilled, frozen, dried.
0307 Molluscs, whether in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, frozen,
dried, salted or in brine; smoked molluscs, whether in shell or
not, whether or not cooked before or during the smoking process;
flours, meals and pellets of molluscs, fit for human consumption.
0308 Aquatic invertebrates other than crustaceans and molluscs, live,
fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, salted or in brine; smoked aquatic
invertebrates other than crustaceans and molluscs, whether or
not cooked before or during the smoking process; flours, meals
and pellets of aquatic invertebrates other than crustaceans and
molluscs, fit for human consumption.
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0401 Milk and cream, not concentrated nor containing added sugar or
other sweetening matter.
0402∗ Milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar or other
sweetening matter.
0403 Buttermilk, curdled milk and cream, yogurt, kephir and
other fermented or acidified milk and cream, whether or not
concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening
matter or flavoured or containing added fruit, nuts or cocoa.
0404 Whey, whether or not concentrated or containing added sugar
or other sweetening matter; products consisting of natural milk
constituents, whether or not containing added sugar or other
sweetening matter, not elsewhere specified or included.
0405 Butter and other fats and oils derived from milk; dairy spreads.
0406 Cheese and curd.
0701∗ Potatoes, fresh or chilled.
0702 Tomatoes, fresh or chilled.
0703 Onions, shallots, garlic, leeks and other alliaceous vegetables, fresh
or chilled.
0704 Cabbages, cauliflowers, kohlrabi, kale and similar edible brassicas,
fresh or chilled.
0705 Lettuce (Lactuca sativa) and chicory (Cichorium spp.), fresh or
chilled.
0706 Carrots, turnips, salad beetroot, salsify, celeriac, radishes and
similar edible roots, fresh or chilled.
0707 Cucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled.
0708 Leguminous vegetables, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled.
0709 Other vegetables, fresh or chilled.
0710 Vegetables (uncooked or cooked by steaming or boiling in water),
frozen.
0711 Vegetables provisionally preserved (for example, by sulphur
dioxide gas, in brine, in sulphur water or in other preservative
solutions), but unsuitable in that state for immediate
consumption.
0712 Dried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder, but not
further prepared.
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0713 Dried leguminous vegetables, shelled, whether or not skinned or
split.
0714 Manioc, arrowroot, salep, Jerusalem artichokes, sweet potatoes
and similar roots and tubers with high starch or inulin content,
fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, whether or not sliced or in the form
of pellets; sago pith.
0801∗ Coconuts, Brazil nuts and cashew nuts, fresh or dried, whether or
not shelled or peeled.
0802 Other nuts, fresh or dried, whether or not shelled or peeled.
0803 Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried.
0804 Dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, guavas, mangoes and
mangosteens, fresh or dried.
0805 Citrus fruit, fresh or dried.
0806 Grapes, fresh or dried.
0807 Melons (including watermelons) and papaws (papayas), fresh.
0808 Apples, pears and quinces, fresh.
0809 Apricots, cherries, peaches (including nectarines), plums and sloes,
fresh.
0810 Other fruit, fresh.
0811 Fruit and nuts, uncooked or cooked by steaming or boiling in
water, frozen, whether or not containing added sugar or other
sweetening matter.
0813 Fruit, dried, other than that of headings 08.01 to 08.06; mixtures
of nuts or dried fruits of this Chapter.
1601 Sausages and similar products, of meat, meat offal or blood; food
preparations based on these products.
1901∗ Malt extract, flour, dairy preparations, low cocoa
2106 Food preparations, nes
2501 Salt (including table salt and denatured salt) and pure sodium
chloride, whether or not in aqueous solution or containing added
anti-caking or free-flowing agents; sea water.
Notes: ∗ denotes HS-4 codes that include consumption and intermediate goods as per BEC
classification. HS-4 codes not marked with an asterisk include only consumption goods.
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TABLE A.3.
Smuggling Analysis
Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Imports of E goods from S countries −0.175 0.218 0.067 0.132
(0.125) (0.160) (0.108) (0.090)
Imports of E goods from NS countries −0.358∗∗ −0.056 −0.274∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗
(0.156) (0.116) (0.091) (0.101)
Exports of E goods to Russia 0.610 0.287∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ −0.180
(0.600) (0.088) (0.124) (0.213)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 388,487 38,130 640,455 291,762 407,702 66,587 579,771 74,786
R2 0.506 0.943 0.960 0.896 0.747 0.796 0.798 0.900
Adjusted R2 0.469 0.930 0.958 0.887 0.728 0.756 0.786 0.882
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at HS-4 code level. I choose four countries, through which the smuggling of
embargoed goods might happen. The choice of these countries is was based on several factors: for each of these countries there is anecdotal
evidence of smuggling (reports or mentions in the media); these countries are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
and they share common past and connections with Russia; Belarus and Kazakhstan are both members of a customs union with Russia. To
investigate the possibility of smuggling, I analyze the response of these countries’ imports of embargoed goods from the sanctioning countries
(columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) and the response of their exports of embargoed goods to Russia (columns 2, 4, 6, 8).
192
TABLE A.4.
Product Margin: OLS Estimator
EXPORT IMPORT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post0812t ×WTOmemberj -0.232 -0.066 -0.021 1.228*** 0.649** 0.800***
[0.147] [0.083] [0.071] [0.253] [0.271] [0.225]
δEmbargos × Targetjt 0.091* -0.923***
[0.054] [0.121]
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm - WTO membership FE Yes No No Yes No No
Firm-country FE No Yes No No Yes No
Firm-country-product type FE No No Yes No No Yes
Time-specific macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-time specific macro controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 151,629 831,040 850,532 1,346,467 2,696,903 2,758,336
R-squared 0.004 0.002 0.010 0.005
No. of firm-WTO membership groups 17,676 80,912
No. of firm-country groups 123,927 320,140
No. of firm-country-product type groups 127,078 330,520
Standard error clustering Firm Firm-country Firm-country Firm Firm-country Firm-country
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is OLS. In columns 1 and 4 the dependent variable is a number of unique HS-8 level
products firm j imports (exports) from (to) all WTO member countries and all non-WTO partner countries in time period t. In columns 2
and 5 the dependent variable is a refinement of columns 1 and 4: number of unique HS-8 level products firm f imports (exports) from (to)
each country j. Finally, in columns 3 and 6 the dependent variable in this table is the number of unique embargoed and non-embargoed
HS-8 level products firm f trades with each country j. Embargos equals 1 for the group of HS 4-digit industry codes that are embargoed
starting from August 2014, while Targetjt equals 1 if foreign country j imposed economic sanctions on Russia in period t. Variable of
interest is Post0812t × WTOmemberjt is an interaction term between the month-year periods post August 2012 and the WTO membership
status of a foreign country j. Time macro controls include price of oil, Russia’s GDP, and the USD to rouble exchange rate. Country-time
macro controls include distance between countries weighted by population, dummy for presence of FTA or RTA between Russia and country
j, dummy for common border, dummy for common language, dummy for common religion, and GDP of partner countries.
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TABLE A.5.
Country Margin: OLS Estimator
EXPORT IMPORT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post0812t ×WTOmemberj 0.058** 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.084*** 0.013*** 0.007***
[0.023] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001]
δEmbargos × Targetjt -0.031* -0.121***
[0.018] [0.010]
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-WTO member FE Yes No No Yes No No
Firm-WTO membership-product FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time-specific macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 151,629 2,055,719 2,200,721 1,346,467 18,160,777 18,337,706
R-squared 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.002 0.002
No. of firm-WTO membership groups 17,676 80,912
No. of firm-WTO-product groups 492,882 534,581 3,880,836 4,005,152
Standard error clustering Firm Firm-product Firm-product Firm Firm-product Firm-product
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is OLS. In columns 1 and 4 the dependent variable is a number of unique partner countries
that are WTO members and unique non-WTO countries firm f trades with in a given time period t. In columns 2 and 5 the dependent variable
is a number of unique partner countries that are WTO members and unique non-WTO countries firm f imports (exports) product k from (to)
with in a given time period t. Finally, in columns 3 and 6 the dependent variable is a number of unique partner countries from group m firm f
imports (exports) product k from (to) with in a given time period t. The country group m denotes four sets of countries: WTO member countries
that later impose sanctions on Russia, WTO member countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia, non-WTO member countries that impose
sanctions on Russia as well as non-WTO member countries that do not impose sanctions on Russia. WTOmembermt is equal to 1 if country group
m consists of WTO members, and 0 otherwise. Targetmt equals 1 if country group m consists of countries that impose economic sanctions on
Russia following the invasion of Crimea (a subset of WTO member countries).
TABLE A.6.
Intensive Margin of Firm-level Foreign Trade: OLS Estimator
EXPORT IMPORT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P × Q Q P P × Q Q P
WTOmemberj 0.164*** 0.214*** -0.044*** -0.105*** -0.075** -0.030***
[0.021] [0.020] [0.009] [0.038] [0.038] [0.010]
Post0812t ×WTOmemberj -0.062*** -0.069*** 0.008** 0.094*** 0.098*** -0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0.009] [0.010] [0.003]
δEmbargos × Targetjt -0.013 -0.096*** 0.084*** -0.244*** -0.276*** 0.032***
[0.034] [0.033] [0.012] [0.023] [0.023] [0.006]
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-product-country FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,269,397 2,269,397 2,269,397 17,028,490 17,028,490 17,028,490
R-squared 0.899 0.951 0.963 0.815 0.878 0.938
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is OLS. Standard errors clustered at firm-
period-country in brackets. Dependent variables: value (P × Q), mass (Q) or unit value (P )
of exports and imports by firm-country-product. Embargok equals 1 if HS 8-digit product is
embargoed starting from August 2014, while Targetjt equals 1 if foreign country j imposed
economic sanctions on Russia in period t. Variable of interest is Post0812t×WTOmemberjt is an
interaction term between the month-year periods post August 2012 and the WTO membership
status of a foreign country j.
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TABLE A.7.
Frequency of Foreign Trade: OLS Estimator
EXPORT IMPORT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WTOmemberj 0.066 0.189*** -0.344*** -0.104***
[0.045] [0.025] [0.112] [0.039]
Post0812t ×WTOmemberj 0.004 -0.085*** -0.141*** 0.022** 0.091*** 0.148***
[0.023] [0.020] [0.010] [0.010] [0.030] [0.010]
δEmbargos × Targetjt -0.033 -1.069***
[0.046] [0.019]
Biannual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm - WTO membership FE Yes No No Yes No No
Time-specific macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-time specific controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm-country FE No Yes No No Yes No
Firm-product-country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 187,129 334,012 1,369,553 530,464 994,164 10,117,186
R-squared 0.003 0.044 0.040 0.010 0.053 0.049
No. of firm-WTO membership groups 60,742 145,818
No. of firm-country groups 123,927 320,140
No. of firm-country-product groups 688,703 4,860,500
Standard error clustering Firm Firm-country Firm-country Firm-level Firm-country Firm-country
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimator used is OLS. In columns 1 and 4 the dependent variable is a biannual frequency of trade
(each 6 months), which is defined as number of periods, in which a firm has at least one positive import or export flow from all WTO
countries and all non-WTO member countries. In columns 2 and 5 the dependent variable is the number of periods firm f imports (exports)
any/all products from (to) country j. Finally, in columns 3 and 6 the dependent variable is the number of periods firm f imports (exports)
product k from (to) country j. Embargok equals 1 for the group of HS 8-digit industry codes that are embargoed starting from August
2014, while Targetjh equals 1 if foreign country j imposed economic sanctions on Russia in half-year period h. Variable of interest is
Post0812h × WTOmemberjh is an interaction term between the half-year periods post August 2012 and the WTO membership status
of a foreign country j. Time macro controls include price of oil, Russia’s GDP, and the USD to rouble exchange rate. Country-time macro
controls include distance between countries weighted by population, dummy for presence of FTA or RTA between Russia and country j,
dummy for common border, dummy for common language, dummy for common religion, and GDP of partner countries. of partner countries.
FIGURE A.2.
Average trade flows by firm-product-country combination
Notes: This figure depicts the evolution over time of a raw average import flow
for embargoed products (left panel) and non-embargoed products (right panel),
disaggregated by the sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries over time. The vertical
red line depicts the imposition of the retaliatory food embargo in August of 2014.
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FIGURE A.1.
Aggregate trade flows by good and country types
Notes: This figure depicts raw total Russian imports for embargoed products (left
panel) and non-embargoed products (right panel), disaggregated by the sanctioning and
non-sanctioning countries over time. The vertical red line depicts the imposition of the
retaliatory food embargo in August of 2014.
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B. Visualization of the Three Effects of the Embargo
Targeted country Non-targeted country
Targeted good Direct effect Substitution effect
Non-targeted good Spillover effect Control group
For example, prior to the embargo firms import apples under the HS-4 code of
0808 from Poland. After the embargo is imposed, apples become an embargoed
good if they are imported from Poland, which is a country that is sanctioning
Russia. These firms’ imports from Poland become restricted and firms can no
longer import apples from Poland. This change in the import flow is the direct
effect of the embargo.
Some firms, which imported goods targeted by the embargo from the targeted
countries prior to the embargo, may choose to find new suppliers of the same
goods in a non-targeted country. For example, they may decide to begin importing
apples from Belarus. This is an example of a substitution effect. It is true that
Polish firms may choose to export their goods to Belarus instead, and their
partners in Belarus then re-direct these apples to Russia. Unfortunately, currently
I am not able to disentangle the true substitution effect from these smuggling
activities due to the illegal nature of such actions.
Some firms may choose to switch to a new set of products but keep ties
with suppliers in the targeted countries. For example, they may choose to start
importing apple juice under the non-embargoed HS-4 code of 2009 instead of
apples from Poland. This is a manifestation of a spillover effect. In this case we
will observe a positive spillover effect, because a new trade link will appear.
Another way for spillover effect to take place is if some firms, who imported
targeted goods from the targeted countries prior to the embargo, have to cut
ties with their suppliers in the targeted countries completely. This could happen
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if, for example, there are economies of scale and without targeted goods it is no
longer profitable for firms to import non-targeted goods from their suppliers in the
targeted countries. Another possibility is if Russian importers and their foreign
suppliers are risk averse and are worried that the rest of product categories might
become embargoed later on. Another explanation for the spillover effects would
come from logistical or political reasons. Irrespective of the mechanisms at play, a
negative spillover effect will be observed.
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C. Theoretical Framework Appendix
1. In order to derive the productivity cutoff for the firms that use domestic
inputs for production, recall that profits of this type of firms is given by
πD = B

φD
I∏
i=1
N
θi
σi − 1
iD
I∏
i=1
pθiiD

γ−1
− Fsunk − FD (C1)
Defining B ≡ X
P 1−γ
(
γ
γ − 1
)1−γ
, Γj ≡
I∏
i=1
N
θi
σi − 1
ij and Kj ≡
I∏
i=1
pθiij , where
j ∈ {D;T ;NT}, the productivity cutoff for the firms that use domestic
inputs for production can be found by solving the following equation:
πD(φD) = B
[
φDΓD
KD
]γ−1
− Fsunk − FD = 0
φD =
(
Fsunk + FD
B
) 1
γi − 1 · KD
ΓD
(C2)
2. Similarly, productivity cutoff for firms using inputs from non-targeted
countries is determined by solving the inequality πNT (φNT ) = πD(φNT ) for
φNT :
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φNT =
(
FNT − FD
B
) 1
γ − 1
[(
ΓNT
KNT
)γ−1
−
(
ΓD
KD
)γ−1] 1γ − 1
(C3)
3. Productivity cutoff for firms using inputs from targeted countries is
determined by solving the inequality πT (φT ) = πNT (φT ) for φT :
φT =
(
FT − FNT − Flobby T
B
) 1
γ − 1
[(
ΓT
KT
)γ−1
−
(
ΓNT
KNT
)γ−1] 11− γ
(C4)
201
4. Recall that price index is given by P =
[∑
k∈Ωk
γ
γ − 1
MCj
] 1
1− γ .
Substituting in the expression for the marginal cost, price index is then given
by
P =

∑
k∈Ωk
γ
γ − 1
I∏
i=1
pθiij(k)
φ
I∏
i=1
N
θi
σi − 1
ij

1
1− γ
(C5)
Differentiating price index with respect to the number of varieties Nij gives
∂P
∂NiT
=
1
1− γ

∑
k∈Ω
γ
γ − 1
·
I∏
i=1
pθiij(k)
φ
I∏
i=1
N
θi
σi − 1
ij

γ
1− γ
×

γ
(γ − 1)φ
∑
k∈Ω
I∏
i=1
pθiij(k)
I∏
i=1
N
θi
σi − 1
ij
θi
1− σi
NiT
θi − 1 + σi
1− σi

> 0
(C6)
5. Price index is a component of an expression B, which in turn enter the
expressions for φj. Thus, I find the expression for
∂B
∂P
to be able to find the
impact of the change in price index on the productivity cutoff:
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∂B
∂P
= (γ − 1) X
P γ
(
γ
γ − 1
)1−γ
> 0 (C7)
6. Finally,
∂φD
∂B
=
1
1− γ
B(Fsunk + FD)
1
γ − 1 πD
ΓD
< 0 (C8)
∂φNT
∂B
=
1
1− γ
B(Fsunk + FNT )
1
γ − 1 πNT
ΓNT
< 0 (C9)
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